CHRONICLE

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

Applaud us when we prevail.
Correct us when we fail.
But, above all, do not let
this indispensable,
irreplaceable institution
wither, languish or perish
as a result of Member State
indifference, inattention
or financial starvation.

— Kofi Annan,
United Nations Secretary-General

In This Issue

Mr. Kofi Annan of Ghana, on his election as the seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations, is congratulated by his predecessor, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and Ambassador Ismail Razali, President of the 51st session of the General Assembly.

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

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The *UN Chronicle* wishes its readers a very happy 1997. We extend to you an apology for the delay in the publication of this issue, which has been because of factors beyond our control.

The United Nations entered the information superhighway on 24 June 1995, with a pilot project on the World Wide Web. Since then, the range and scope of materials offered have been greatly expanded. A new area in French has been added and links to some United Nations sites in Spanish are in place.

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

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

On 17 December 1996, the United Nations General Assembly appointed by acclamation Mr. Kofi Annan of Ghana as the seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations, with a term beginning on 1 January 1997 and ending 31 December 2001. Mr. Annan took the oath of office that same day.

The Assembly also paid tribute to the work of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, acknowledging with deep gratitude the determined efforts and dedicated service he provided to the United Nations during the past five years.

'Let Us Embark on a Time of Healing'

Mr. Kofi Annan, speaking as the Secretary-General elect after taking the oath of office, said that the United Nations, along with the rest of the world, must change. He called upon all Member States to welcome the change, not resist it; to let change be an ally, not an enemy. With the participation of all nations, large and small, east and west, north and south, it would be possible to make the Organization leaner and more effective, while allowing it to set more realistic goals. The following are excerpts from his statement:

You have done me a great honour and at the same time bestowed a great responsibility in electing me the seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations. As a son of Africa and as a lifetime international civil servant, I pledge to you that I will do everything within my power to be worthy of your trust.

I wish to pay tribute to the vision and energy of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an extraordinary statesman who led the United Nations through a turbulent period of transition from the cold war to a new, still emerging era. All of us recognize, and history will record with gratitude, his important contribution.

The United Nations is now at the centre of an era of change. For 45 years, the super-Power rivalry permeated this Organization's very existence and largely shaped its agenda. With the passing of the cold war, the Member States, as they redefine their relationships with each other, must agree on what kind of United Nations they are prepared to support.

There is no lack of blueprints for a new, post-cold-war United Nations. There is no lack of ideas or debate. What we need is consensus and commitment. Our task now is to find common ground, to shape together the changes that will move this Organization forward.

All the old problems—particularly peace and security among nations and social justice for their peoples—still confront us. But the old approaches to these problems must be broadened. A new understanding of peace and security must emerge. The world is beginning to recognize the many roots of conflict, the economic base of stability, and the grim truth that intolerance, injustice and oppression—and their consequences—respect no national frontiers.

Similarly, we now know more than ever that sustainable economic development is not merely a matter of projects and statistics. It is above all a matter of people—real people with basic needs: food, clothing, shelter and medical care. Let us ensure that the

resources and facilities of the United Nations system are effectively channelled towards those who need them most, those whom globalization has left behind. And let us ensure that the voice of the United Nations in economic matters is heard by those Member States with the greatest capacity to give.

These and other challenges are not the Secretary-General's alone, not the Security Council's alone, not the Economic and Social Council's alone. The role of the General Assembly will become still more important as we seek to perfect the triangle of development, freedom and peace.

In this common effort, I shall neither overstep nor minimize my role as head of one of the six principle organs of this Organization. I intend to present my independent views to Member States for their consideration. I intend to offer my services and good offices as mediator and intermediary whenever and wherever I feel it can be helpful. I intend to lead an international civil service that will be honest, efficient, independent and proud of its honourable contribution to the improvement of life on this planet. Finally, I intend to stress not only our legal obligations, not only our fiscal limitations, not only our political and diplomatic considerations, but above all, the moral dimension of our work in this Organization.

In that spirit, let us embark on a time of healing: a healing of fractures and frictions between Member States and this Organization, which cannot function without their political and material support; and a healing of wounded morale and ideals within the Secretariat, whose dedicated staff deserves our thanks and encouragement.

To the nations and peoples of the world whose representatives are assembled here today, I say simply this: the United Nations is your instrument for peace and justice. Use it; respect it; defend it. It can be no wiser, no more competent and no more efficient than those Member States that now comprise and guide it. But those of us who serve you here pledge our every effort and energy to the causes set forth in the Charter. No nation needs to face or fight alone the threats which this Organization was established to defuse. But we cannot succeed without your political, moral, financial and material support and participation. Applaud us when we prevail; correct us when we fail; but, above all, do not let this indispensable, irreplaceable institution wither, languish or perish as a result of Member State indifference, inattention or financial starvation.

I accept the high post you have entrusted to me, humbled by the formidable challenges that lie ahead, but filled with confidence in the nobility of our common goals, in the determination of our common spirit, and in the success of our common effort. Alone, I can do nothing. Together, we can irreversibly advance the frontiers of peace, dignity and justice for all humankind.

'A New Sense of Maturity Seems Possible'

The following are excerpts from the statement by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the General Assembly that afternoon:

Five years ago, responsibility for the Office of Secretary-General was placed in my hands. I am grateful to have had the privilege of serving the Peoples of the United Nations during this time. Today I am proud of the way the United Nations has responded to the challenges of these difficult years. I have had the difficult task to guide the United Nations during the post-cold-war period. The next century has already begun. Great transformations do not wait for the calendar. The past five years opened with optimism and enthusiasm. Member States called the United Nations to take action on an unprecedented scale: for peace, development, democratization and reform.

As I entered the Office of Secretary-General, it was clear to me that the United Nations would have to undergo comprehensive change. I simplified Secretariat structures and began a process of managerial reform. This, in turn, stimulated more demand for reform. Throughout the period leading up to the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, reform was the issue of the day. In Governments, universities and foundations, proposals for restructuring and reorganization were drawn up.

But the middle years of this half-decade were deeply troubled. Disillusion set in. The volume of assistance to developing countries was not only failing to grow, it was in fact declining. Resources for long-term development were being diverted to emergency efforts. Africa was hit hardest. Despite high hopes for democratization, a counter-trend emerged. Human rights atrocities reached unprecedented levels.

And it emerged that the conditions for major reform of the United Nations did not yet exist. The decisions required far exceeded the authority of any Secretary-General. The United Nations is emerging from the mood of disillusion. A new sense of maturity seems possible.

The Rio Conference on Environment and Development, the Vienna Conference on Human Rights, the Yokohama Conference on Disaster Relief, the Cairo Conference on Population, the Naples Conference on Transnational Crime, the Barbados

Conference on Small Island Development, the Copenhagen Conference on Social Development, the Beijing Conference on Women, the Istanbul Conference on Human Settlement, UNCTAD IX on globalization and liberalization in South Africa—all have been dedicated to the betterment of the individual human person. Taken together, this series of Conferences has created an entirely new dimension to international cooperation.

The downward trend has been broken. What is emerging is a United Nations more mature in outlook and stronger in achievement—a United Nations aware not only of its potentialities, but also of its limits. Enthusiasm. Disillusion. Realism. This has been the history of the United Nations over the past five years. Now, let us look to the future.

Some old problems appear to be solved. But new problems—and old problems in new forms—have emerged. For some, the world seems more secure. But for many others, devastation, death and despair have become more common. For some, economic progress races forward. But for vast numbers of others, stark poverty crushes hope in every dimension of personal and community life. What use the world makes for the United Nations over the next few years can affect the course of world affairs for generations to come.

In saying farewell to this great Assembly, I want to stress that nothing is more precious to the United Nations than its reputation. That reputation rests on four pillars: impartiality, equity, efficiency and achievement. A fifth principle is independence. If one word above all is to characterize the role of the Secretary-General, it is independence. The holder of this office must never be seen as acting out of fear of, or in an attempt to curry favour with, one State or group of States. Should that happen, all prospects for the United Nations would be lost. The Secretary-General's loyalty must be international and nothing but international, and the international civil service must be a real civil service.

Throughout the past five years, the first thing I thought of when I awoke in the morning were my responsibilities as Secretary-General to the ideal of the Charter and independence and credibility of the Organization.

All those men and women who are devoted to the general interests of the international community are the real wealth—the real future—of this world Organization. I assure them today of my highest consideration and deepest gratitude.

In particular, I should like to congratulate the new Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, who has served this institution for many years with tenacity, competence and great energy. I am convinced that his varied experience will be useful in resolving problems that he will confront and in defending the interests of the Secretariat and of the entire staff of this world Organization.

Statements by the Presidents of the Security Council and the General Assembly

Francesco Paolo Fulci (Italy), as President of the Security Council, described Kofi Annan as an eminent son of Africa who fully understood the origins and often devastating effects of the crises to which the world was prey. On many occasions, Mr. Annan had shown the ability to find an impartial, fair and effective middle road by which the United Nations could help to ease the tensions at the heart of so many of today's conflicts. His curriculum vitae was a testimony to more than 30 years of almost uninterrupted dedication to the many-faceted tasks performed by the United Nations. Time and again, the Organization had entrusted assignments of grave responsibility and diplomatic delicacy to Mr. Annan; time and again, he had not disappointed those who had faith in him. He would be an impeccable and impartial Secretary-General.

"We all owe an immense debt of gratitude to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, whose vision of the United Nations and message of mutual understanding between diverse peoples and cultures will remain a source of continuous inspiration to this Organization", he continued. Mr. Boutros-Ghali would leave a legacy that would guide the Council's debates for years to come, including his two outstanding studies, the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development, which concerned the two key tasks of the Organization.

Razali Ismail (Malaysia), President of the General Assembly, recalled that Boutros Boutros-Ghali had become Secretary-General of the United Nations at a time of unprecedented change and considerable flux in the world. Notwithstanding the challenges, he had served the United Nations with dedication and selfless service, and with resolute sense of purpose.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali would be remembered for his seminal intellectual contributions to the understanding of preventive diplomacy, humanitarian intervention and democratic nation-building, and for laying the essential building blocks for the reform and revitalization of the United Nations system. "His legacy will serve us well in the challenging years ahead", he added.

Both Mr. Annan and the incumbent were illustrious sons of Africa, he went on to say. In appointing Mr. Annan to this post, the Assembly had taken into account his long record of accomplishment and his understanding of the needs of the Organization at this critical juncture. "You are well known to all of us and we place our trust in your ability to articulate and defend a vision of the United Nations that meets the expectations of Member States and the peoples of the world."

"This General Assembly believes in a Secretary-General with an independent perspective in defence of the Charter", he said. With discretion, authority and responsibility, the Secretary-General must speak up and act for the wider international interest, one that transcended the concerns of any particular country or region.

Kofi Annan:
The International Civil Servant

Mr. Kofi Annan, the seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations who was Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations at the time of his appointment, brings to the position a wealth of experience and expertise gained through more than three decades of service with the world Organization. A national of Ghana who is fluent in English, French and several African languages, he has had a remarkably varied United Nations career, focusing not only on questions of management—administration, budget, finance and personnel—but also refugee issues and peace-keeping. He has also carried out a number of sensitive diplomatic assignments, including negotiating the repatriation of over 900 international staff and the release of Western hostages in Iraq following that country's invasion of Kuwait in 1990; initiating discussions on the "oil-for-food" formula to ease the humanitarian crisis in Iraq; and overseeing the transition from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia to the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) following the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement.

Complementing this strong grounding in management and in peace-keeping—two areas of paramount importance to the future of the Organization at a critical juncture in its existence—is the new Secretary-General's strong commitment to economic development and social justice. As he stated in an address to the General Assembly following his appointment, "A new understanding of peace and security must emerge". The world is beginning to recognize, he said, that conflict has many roots, that peace rests on economic and social stability, and that "intolerance, injustice and oppression—and their consequences—respect no national frontiers".

UN/DPI Photo/Milton Grant

Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his wife, Nane Annan

As the first Secretary-General to emerge from the ranks of the international civil service, and having served in Addis Ababa, Cairo, Geneva, Ismailia (Egypt) and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, Mr. Annan also has intimate knowledge of the Organization's activities in the field, at the grass-roots level, as well as of the views of staff at all levels, at duty stations throughout the world.

United Nations career

Most recently, from 1 March 1993 until his appointment as Secretary-General—except for the period from 1 November 1995 to March 1996, when he served as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the former Yugoslavia—Mr. Annan served as Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, and for a year before that, as Assistant Secretary-General of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations. In these positions, he helped to formulate new approaches to the complex uncertainties of a post-cold-war world marked by unprecedented levels of international cooperation, as well as widespread strife fuelled by fierce assertions of national and ethnic identities. Throughout this volatile period, Mr. Annan worked to strengthen the capacity of the Organisation to undertake both traditional peace-keeping missions and multifunctional operations, and to shoulder new tasks in the area of international peace and security such as "preventive deployment".

To cope with the dramatic growth in the number of operations—26 of the 41 operations in United Nations history have been mounted since 1989, the majority of them since 1993—Mr. Annan oversaw the creation of a "Situation Centre" that receives information from, and is available to United Nations peace-keeping operations around the clock. He also concentrated on enhancing the Organization's readiness for peace-keeping, seeking commitments from Member States for "stand-by arrangements" for the provision of troops, equipment and other resources. As of 30 November 1996, 62 Member States had confirmed their willingness to provide stand-by resources totalling some 80,000 personnel.

Mr. Annan also worked with Member States to improve "response time" by taking steps towards the creation of a Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters, with earmarked Secretariat and other personnel, which is expected to be functional in early 1997. And to ensure that the lessons of peace-keeping experiences, successful and otherwise, are assimilated and applied, Mr. Annan created a "Lessons Learned" unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The unit's activities will soon be broadened to encompass lessons learned by other departments—including the Departments of Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, and Public Information—in the area of peace and security.

As Secretary-General, Mr. Annan has emphasized his commitment to engaging with Member States in a dialogue about the best possible use of peace-keeping, preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace-building. These instruments were particularly reflected in the special assignments he carried out on behalf of the Organization.

The Secretary-General's managerial portfolio is similarly extensive, and Mr. Annan has been deeply involved in the full range of questions now at the forefront of efforts to reform and streamline the Organisation, a priority for which he expects to appoint a special adviser within his office. His United Nations postings in the management area include: Assistant Secretary-General for Programme Planning, Budget and Finance and Controller (1990-1992); Assistant Secretary-General in the Office of Human Resources Management and Security Coordinator for the United Nations system (1987-1990); Director of Budget in the Office of Financial Services (1984-1987); Deputy Director of Administration and Head of Personnel at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva (1980-1983). His first assignment with the United Nations was in 1962 as an Administrative Officer and Budget Officer at the World Health Organization in Geneva.

Apart from his official duties, Mr. Annan has long been involved in the areas of education and the welfare and protection of international staff. He has contributed to the work of the Appointment and Promotion Board and the Senior Review Group (both of which he chaired); to the Administrative, Management and Financial Board; to the Secretary-General's Task Force for Peace-keeping; and to the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund. He also served as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the United Nations International School in New York (1987-1995) and as a Governor of the International School in Geneva (1981-1983).

As Secretary-General, Mr. Annan intends to place particular emphasis on achieving consensus among Member States on the role the United Nations should play in its many fields of endeavour. As he said in the press conference following his appointment, "We need to encourage Member States to develop the sustained will to support the Organisation". Equally important, he added, is the need to "demystify the United Nations and not make it so bureaucratic and distant from the average person. We should bring the Organisation closer to the people."

From 1 November 1995 to March 1996, he served as Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the former Yugoslavia and, in this context, as Special Envoy to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this capacity, following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, he coordinated the United Nations role in achieving a smooth transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina from UNPROFOR to the NATO-led IFOR. He also supervised the establishment of the three successor peace-keeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

In 1990, following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Mr. Annan was sent by the Secretary-General to facilitate the repatriation of more than 900 international staff and to conduct negotiations for the release of Western hostages. While there, Mr. Annan helped focus attention on the plight of more than 500,000 Asians stranded in Iraq and Kuwait as a result of the hostilities. Subsequently, Mr. Annan was the first to encourage the Government of Iraq to discuss the sale of oil to fund purchases of humanitarian aid, and he led the first United Nations team negotiating with Iraq towards this end. That initiative has since borne fruit with the 1996 agreement between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations on implementation of the "oil-for-food" formula under Security Council resolution 986 (1995).

Background and education

Mr. Annan studied at the University of Science and Technology at Kumasi, Ghana, and completed his undergraduate work in economics at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota (1961). From 1961 to 1962, he undertook graduate studies in economics at the Institut universitaire des hautes etudes internationales in Geneva. As a 1971-1972 Sloan Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he received a Master of Science degree in Management. In a two-year break from United Nations service from 1974 to 1976, Mr. Annan served as the Managing Director of the Ghana Tourist Development Company, serving concurrently on its Board and on the Ghana Tourist Control Board. Currently, the Secretary-General serves on the Board of Trustees of Macalester College, which in 1994 awarded him its Trustee Distinguished Service Award in honour of his service to the international community. He also serves on the Board of Trustees of the Institute for the Future, in Menlo Park, California.

Mr. Annan was born on 8 April 1938, in Kumasi, Ghana. He is married to Nane Annan, a lawyer and artist. They have three children.

'Bring the Organization Closer to the People'

On 18 December 1996, in his first press conference after being elected Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan had the following points to make:

On the Organization itself: I firmly believe that the United Nations is a democratic institution—or should be a democratic institution. What we have at the United Nations is a group of 185 Member States, each with its own rights and voice. Nobody can push you around unless you allow it.

We, the Member States of this Organization, should begin to discuss what the United Nations should be doing. What should our business be? What should be our objectives? How do we reposition the United Nations as we move into the twenty-first century?

There are lots of ideas, within and without. But I do not think there is a consensus yet, because a debate has not taken place. I would hope to be able to engage the Member States in that debate, and once we have been able to set our objectives, we can then refocus and reorient the efforts of the Organization towards those objectives.

Sometimes, many of the Member States are not as involved and as engaged in the activities of this Organization as they ought to be. They constantly seem to be surprised that things are happening around them. I plead with them to become engaged, to get involved and make their voices heard, and play a role.

The role of the Secretary-General: It is multifaceted. Some have referred to it as an administrator and a manager. That is an essential part of the work. But he also has a political and diplomatic role, and above all, a moral voice which should be heard periodically when necessary.

On peace-keeping operations: There is a perception that peace-keeping has decreased over the past few years. The reality is that peace-keeping has increased. It has become diversified. There are 50,000 troops under NATO operating with IFOR in Bosnia, and we also have the CIS troops in former Soviet republics. We have the ECOMOG troops in Liberia and, of course, the 25,000 United Nations peace-keeping troops. The figure is roughly around 100,000, and I am not counting the United States troops in the Gulf. At its peak, we had 75,000 to 80,000, so peace-keeping has increased.

We also ought to note that the two organizations currently involved in peace-keeping operations in Europe—NATO and CIS—cannot, in principle, operate outside their region. And, therefore, if there is any crisis that the international community decides to get involved in, the only organization it has is the United Nations. Of course, the regional organizations have a role to play and we welcome it, but at the universal level the only instrument we have is United Nations peace-keeping machinery. And when we look around and consider the crises around us, I think peace-keeping is going to be with us for a while. I am not drumming up business, but I am just talking the facts.

We have learned from our mistakes and our failures in the area of peace-keeping. In fact, it was one of the reasons that pushed us to establish a "lessons-learned" unit. We have learnt—and I think the Security Council has also—that a clear mandate is necessary. We have learned

"The most important, if you are going to give new strength to the United Nations, is the reaffirmation by the Member States of their belief in the Organization. It is equally important that we really demystify the United Nations and not make it so bureaucratic and distant from the average person. We should bring the Organization closer to the people. If we have the support of the people and if they understand what we are trying to do, the politicians will be there."

that the resources must be commensurate with the tasks. We have learned that we should go into the theatre with a force and a force structure that is capable of carrying out its mandate and defending itself. We have learned, contrary to past hesitation, that intelligence is necessary and that we need to have solid political analysis to be able to, if not determine, then envision how the crisis is likely to develop and how we would act if it went in one direction or the other. It is also important that we explain to the public and to the media our mandate and why we are on the ground, what we are there to do and what we are not there to do.

We have also learned a lot from IFOR. IFOR has defined its mandate narrowly and clearly and has constantly repeated it and told the public what it will do and will not do. On the contrary, UNPROFOR was seen as being everything to everybody.

Finally, I think we should let the public, both within the country in which we are operating and outside it, understand why we are there and try to sustain their support. Without that support, things get difficult.

In recent years, the Security Council has made it clear that, in those situations where it believes that there are compelling humanitarian reasons or that a leader is unreasonably brutalizing his or her population, the Council has intervened. And I think that is a step in the right direction.

I don't think we can have a standing United Nations army. The membership is not ready for that. There are financial questions and great legal issues as to which laws would apply and where it would be stationed. But short of having a standing United Nations army, we have taken initiatives that will perhaps help us achieve what we were hoping to get out of a standing army.

The real problem has been rapidity of deployment. We are now encouraging Governments to set up rapidly deployable brigades and battalions that could be moved into the theatre very quickly, should the Governments decide to participate in peace-keeping operations. A Government like Denmark's has set up a 5,000-man and woman brigade that could be deployed fairly quickly. It has indicated that the headquarters elements can be deployed within 48 hours and the bulk of the force within a month.

If we can encourage 12 or 20 Member States to do this, 12 or 20 Member States that will have the will to respond if the Council makes an appeal, we should be able to reduce considerably the time it takes us to deploy troops in the field.

On Africa: On the question of the crisis on the continent, the only solution we should seek is political. The solution does not lie in the military route. And I think that I would much prefer the leaders of the region resolving these issues through political discussion, and I will give all my weight and effort to that.

When we look at what is happening in the continent we have to realize that, without stability, economically not much can be done. Investors and Governments with money to give are not going to put it in conflict situations when they are not sure what the situation will be like a year or two years from now.

Obviously, the United Nations will have to channel the resources it has within its system effectively to those Governments that need assistance most, and we will need to coordinate our efforts a bit more effectively than we have done so far. But the Africans also have their part to play.

On the expansion of the Security Council: It's a matter for Member States to decide. But I do agree that the Security Council, as it exists today, by and large, reflects the political and economic realities of 1945 and that it has to be brought into line with the realities of today.

While it is generally agreed that Japan and Germany should join the Council, they cannot expect to get in alone. There are other countries around the world, in other regions, with legitimate aspirations, and if we are going to try to make this Organization a bit more democratic, then we will need to broaden the Council to reflect the realities of today.

On United States dues to the Organization: I expect to work with the Administration and—through it—the Congress to get the United States to pay the money due to the Organization. I have made it clear in previous statements that it is not really in the interest of the United States not to pay its contribution to the United Nations. It offends friends and foes alike. The United States needs the United Nations and the United Nations needs the United States. We cannot operate effectively and efficiently without a sound financial basis.

I am confident that the Administration will do all that it can. We on our side also have to do what is expected of us. By this I mean ongoing in reforms. The search for excellence is an ongoing process and that will continue. ❑

The Election of the Secretary-General

On 19 November 1996, the Security Council considered the question of the recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In a vote taken by secret ballot, the draft resolution, which called for the appointment of Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali for a second term of office, received 14 votes in favour to 1 against. Since the negative vote was cast by a permanent member of the Council—the United States—the draft resolution was not adopted.

Subsequently, Dr. Boutros-Ghali announced he would suspend his candidature to enable the Council to consider other names for the office. On 6 December, the Security Council received the names of four candidates: Hamid Algabid of Niger, Kofi Annan of Ghana, Amara Essy of Côte d'Ivoire, and Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah of Mauritania. On 13 December, the Council unanimously voted to recommend Mr. Annan to the General Assembly, which elected him to the office on 17 December.

Mr. Annan is the seventh Secretary-General of the Organization. This article surveys the earlier elections held for this office.

Fifty-one years ago, the Security Council, at its fourth meeting on 30 January 1946, decided to recommend to the General Assembly that Trygve Lie be appointed the first Secretary-General of the United Nations; on 1 February the Assembly accepted this recommendation. Mr. Lie, then Foreign Minister of Norway, was also a labour leader. His name was proposed by the Soviet Union, which suggested that a national of a State which had undergone Nazi occupation during the Second World War should be chosen, and he was nominated.

1950:

As the end of Mr. Lie's five-year term approached, the 11 members of the Security Council were unable to agree on a recommendation; they rejected by 7 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions, a USSR proposal to suggest to the General Assembly that it postpone consideration of the appointment of the Secretary-General. These facts were conveyed in three letters from the Council President to the Assembly President.

The Assembly considered the matter on 31 October and 1 November. In addition to the three communications from the Council, the Assembly had before it a joint draft resolution calling upon it to continue Mr. Lie in office for a period of three years, and a letter from the Chairman of the USSR delegation drawing the attention of the Assembly President to the "illegality" of including the question of the appointment of the Secretary-General in

'Responsible Only to the Organization'

The Charter establishes the Secretariat, comprising "a Secretary-General and such staff as the United Nations may require", as a principal organ of the United Nations.

The Secretary-General, who is also chief administrative officer of the United Nations, is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He acts in the capacity of Secretary-General in all meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council, and performs such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. He makes an annual report to the Assembly on the work of the Organization, and may bring to the attention of the Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Charter states that in the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff may not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They are to refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

The General Assembly on 24 January 1946 decided *(Resolution 11(1))* that the terms of appointment of the Secretary-General should be such as to enable a man of eminence and high attainment to accept and maintain the position, and that the first Secretary-General should be appointed for five years, the appointment being open at the end of that period for a further five-year term. The Assembly and the Council, it was noted, were free to modify the terms of office of future Secretaries-General. The Assembly also stated that because the Secretary-General was a confidant of many Governments, it was desirable that no Member should offer him, immediately upon retirement, any governmental position, and that he, on his part, should refrain from accepting any such position.

Correspondents at UN Headquarters flash the word of Mr. Trygve Lie's election by the Assembly (1950).

the agenda of a plenary meeting of the Assembly, in the absence of any recommendation by the Council. A Soviet proposal for adjournment of the question until a later meeting was rejected by the Assembly which then proceeded to consider the joint draft resolution.

The representative of the United States (which was President of the Security Council in October) recalled in the Assembly that when the Council had met to consider the question of the appointment of a Secretary-General, the representative of Yugoslavia had proposed the reappointment of Mr. Lie. A few days later, the representative of the USSR had nominated Zygmunt Modzelewski, the Foreign Minister of Poland. The Council had voted 9 to 1 (USSR), with 1 abstention, in favour of Mr. Lie.

It had been made clear, the United States felt, that the veto had been employed to "punish" the Secretary-General for carrying out the decisions of the Security Council to resist aggression in Korea. At subsequent meetings, the names of able and highly esteemed individuals had been placed before the Council—General Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines; Charles Malik of Lebanon; Sir Benegal Narsing Rau of India; and Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico—but the matter had by then become one of principle, which made it impossible to consider new nominations on their merits.

Finally, the United States delegate maintained that the joint draft resolution before the General Assembly was a continuation of the effort to maintain the integrity and independence of the office of Secretary-General and to ensure that whoever held that office might function without fear of reprisal by one of the permanent members of the Council.

A draft resolution submitted by the USSR asked the Council to continue its consideration of the question. Speaking in its favour, the Soviet representative recalled, inter alia, the proposal of the appointment of Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs as Secretary-General. When the majority of the Security Council did not vote for that nomination, the Soviet delegation had not been indignant and had not declared that it would vote against any other candidate or use the veto. That, the USSR stated, was what the United States delegation had done in connection with the other candidatures.

A number of other Council members had proposed candidates for the office of Secretary-General. If, as stated by some representatives, the USSR had wanted to "punish" Trygve Lie for his support of the policy of the majority in Korea, it would be absurd for the Soviet delegation to support, as it had, the nomination of other candidates who had also pursued, perhaps even more energetically, the very same Korean policy to which it objected. For the General Assembly to take action on the question of the appointment of a Secretary-General without a recommendation from the Council, the Soviet delegate declared, would undermine the very foundations of the Charter, and the foundation on which the entire life and activity of the United

Procedure for Appointing the Secretary-General

According to Chapter XV, Article 97, of the United Nations Charter, "The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council".

Rule 48 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council specifies that "any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting".

The relevant decision of the Council takes the form of a resolution recommending to the Assembly the name of a person to be appointed Secretary-General.

The decision of the Council on this matter is made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members. (Chapter V, Article 27 of the Charter).

The resolution is then transmitted to the Assembly by a letter from the Council President. (Since 1981, the resolution has been sponsored by all 15 members of the Council).

"When the Security Council has submitted its recommendation on the appointment of the Secretary-General, the General Assembly shall consider the recommendation and vote upon it by secret ballot in private meeting." (Rule 141, Chapter XV, Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly).

According to Article 18 of the United Nations Charter, the decisions of the General Assembly on all but "important questions"—the list of which does not include the appointment of the Secretary-General—shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting, otherwise known as simple majority. (The phrase "present and voting" means members casting an affirmative or negative vote; members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting). In its actions since 1981, the Assembly adopted the relevant resolutions by acclamation.

Nations rested. If Trygve Lie were appointed Secretary-General for any period whatsoever, the USSR would have no dealings with him and would refuse to regard him as the Secretary-General.

The Assembly President suggested that it would be wise to have a secret ballot on the joint draft resolution; in fact, he said, Mr. Lie himself had expressed this wish to give the utmost liberty of action to delegations. The President observed this would mean suspending one of the rules of procedure, and the suggestion would, therefore, require unanimous approval. This did not prove possible as the representative of Chile objected and the normal procedure of an open vote was followed. The joint draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 46 to 5, with 8 abstentions, continuing Mr. Lie in office for a period of three years.

1952:

On 10 November, Trygve Lie wrote to the General Assembly President that, after long consideration, he had decided to submit his resignation as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

At a meeting of the Assembly that day, the Secretary-General recalled that he had wanted to retire in 1950 at the end of his five-year term. He had agreed to continue only because the aggression in Korea had created circumstances that put him under an obligation to carry on. However, he said, the existing situation was somewhat different. The United Nations had thrown back aggression in Korea. An armistice was possible. A new Secretary-General who was the unanimous choice of the five Great Powers, the Security Council and the General Assembly might be more helpful in this regard than he could be. On the other hand, if the world situation should go from bad to worse, he would not wish the position of the Secretary-General to hinder any hope of reaching a new understanding.

There were other reasons why it was more appropriate for him to retire at that time than in 1950. The permanent Headquarters buildings had been completed. The Secretariat was better established and organized as one of the principal organs of the United Nations. He had placed before the Assembly proposals for reorganization that he believed might contribute to improved administration in the future; a new Secretary-General should have time to make his own judgement about those proposals before the Assembly's next session.

These, he said, were the reasons for his resignation, and no other. He was stepping aside at that time because he hoped that that might help the United Nations to preserve peace and to serve better the cause of freedom and progress for all mankind.

1953:

At private meetings in March, the Council considered three persons for recommendation to the office. The United States proposed Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, the USSR proposed Stanislaw Skrzeszewski of Poland and Denmark proposed Lester B. Pearson of Canada. None was accepted in secret ballot. On 19 March, the USSR proposed the name of Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit of India; this proposal was vetoed by China (whose seat was then occupied by the delegation from Taipei).

On 31 March, France proposed the name of Dag Hammarskjöld, then Swedish Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. This proposal was adopted by 10 votes to none, with 1 abstention. The General Assembly approved this recommendation.

1957:

At a private meeting on 26 September, the Council unanimously decided to recommend to the General Assembly that Mr. Hammarskjöld be appointed as Secretary-General of the United Nations for a fresh five-year term of office. This recommendation was unanimously endorsed by the Assembly the same day.

1961:

But Mr. Hammarskjöld was not to complete his second term. On 18 September, he died in an air crash at Ndola, Zambia, while on a mission to resolve the internal conflicts that erupted in the wake of Zaire's independence.

On 3 November, in a private meeting, the Council decided to recommend to the Assembly that Ambassador U Thant, then Permanent Representative of Burma to the United Nations, be appointed as Acting Secretary-General for the unexpired portion of Mr. Hammarskjöld's term, until 10 April 1963. The Assembly voted by secret ballot on this proposal, and adopted it unanimously. The next year, U Thant's term of office was extended until 3 November 1966, thus giving him a full first term of five years in office.

1966:

In a statement on 1 September, U Thant said that he had decided not to offer himself for a second term as Secretary-General, and to leave the Security Council unfettered in its recommendation to the General Assembly with regard to his successor. It was his belief, as he had said more than once in the past, that a Secretary-General of the United Nations should not normally serve for more than one term.

In his statement, U Thant also referred to some of the problems which the Organization had to face since he was first appointed, but stressed that he did not wish to relate them to the variety of considerations—personal, official and political—which had influenced his own decision.

A private meeting of the Council on 2 December agreed that the higher interests of the Organization would be best served if U Thant continued in the post of Secretary-General.

Whatever their views on the observations he had made, they fully respected his position and his action in bringing basic issues confronting the Organization and disturbing developments in many parts of the world to their notice.

In a statement, the Secretary-General expressed gratitude to the Council for its serious consideration of the question and for its sympathetic understanding of the reasons which had impelled him to announce his intention not to offer himself for a second term. He recognized the validity of the reasons it had advanced in requesting him to serve for another full term, and particularly appreciated its respect for his position and his action in bringing to the notice of the Organization basic issues confronting it and disturbing developments in many parts of the world, and hoped that the close attention being given to these issues and developments would serve to strengthen the Organization by the cooperative effort of the entire membership and promote the cause of world peace and progress. It was in this hope that he acceded to the appeal addressed to him by the Council.

The same day, the Assembly endorsed the reappointment of U Thant.

1971:

At the conclusion of U Thant's term, after three closed meetings in December, the Security Council unanimously recommended to the General Assembly that Kurt Waldheim be appointed Secretary-General. Mr. Waldheim, a former Foreign Minister of Austria, was serving as his country's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The other candidate at this time was Ambassador Max Jakobson, of Finland, who was vetoed by the USSR; China vetoed Mr. Waldheim in two initial ballots whereafter two Latin American candidates—Carlos Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina and Felipe Herrera of Chile—were vetoed by the USSR and the United States respectively. At this stage, China abstained in a fresh vote on Mr. Waldheim, clearing the decks for his nomination.

On 22 December, the Assembly adopted by acclamation a resolution appointing Mr. Waldheim for a five-year term of office as Secretary-General, from 1 January 1972 to 31 December 1976.

1976:

After a closed meeting on 7 December, the Council unanimously adopted a resolution by which it recommended to the Assembly that Mr.Waldheim be appointed Secretary-General for a second five-year term of office from 1 January 1977 to 31 December 1981. On this occasion too, China initially vetoed his name; the nomination of former President Luis Echeverria of Mexico was vetoed by the United States. In the subsequent ballot, China withdrew its veto and Mr. Waldheim was recommended again to the General Assembly, which re-elected him to office.

Straw Polls

Balloting in the Security Council does not directly pit one candidate against another. Rather, Council members traditionally vote for all the candidates they find acceptable, with the goal of finding one who can garner the maximum support and escape a major-power veto. In the Assembly, the vote has always been on the single name recommended by the Council, and always by secret ballot.

The desire to find broad consensus led the Security Council in 1991 to undertake straw polls in which Council members voted anonymously before proceeding to the formal balloting. In the last round of straw votes, the five permanent members voted on paper of a different color from that used by the non-permanent members, so that their "no" vote—which would be fatal to a candidacy—could be distinguished from the "no" of a non-permanent (i.e, non-veto-holding) member.

UNA-USA Factsheet
"Electing a UN Secretary-General"

(Straw polls were similarly held during the election process in 1996.)

1981:

By a resolution adopted by acclamation on 15 December, the Assembly, on the recommendation of the Council, appointed Javier Pérez de Cuéllar as Secretary-General of the United Nations for a term of office from 1 January 1982 to 31 December 1986. Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar had served as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus (1975-1977), Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs (1979-1981), and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan (1981). He had previously been Peruvian Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

The Council recommended the appointment of Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar from a list of nine new candidates who had come forward after the two previously announced candidates—the incumbent, Kurt Waldheim, and Foreign Minister Salim A. Salim of the United Republic of Tanzania—had asked that their names be removed from further ballots. Mr. Waldheim, on this occasion, had been vetoed by China in 15 ballots; Mr. Salim was vetoed by the United States. This process, which lasted six weeks, ended when both candidates withdrew.

In a letter dated 3 December to the Council President, Olaru Otunnu of Uganda, Mr. Waldheim recalled that on 10 September he had made a public statement declaring his availability to serve for another term. He had done so, "at the express wish of a large number of Member States after considerable reflection and out of a sense of duty".

Since that time, Mr. Waldheim observed, the Council had

devoted several meetings "to discharge itself of the responsibilities entrusted to it in this matter by the Charter". He expressed deep appreciation for the "consistently broad support" he had received in all the ballots so far, but noted that the Council had not been able to reach agreement.

Mr. Salim said at his press conference on 8 December that he himself, and the member States of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which had unanimously nominated him, had made considerable efforts to obtain the support of a permanent member (the United States) whose position had thus far made it not possible for him to be recommended by the Council.

However, he felt that it was in the interests of the United Nations that a decision be reached as soon as possible. It was common knowledge that there were several potential candidates from the third world prepared to enter the race, but most of them had made it clear that they would not do so as long as his name was on the ballot. He was therefore asking that his name be set aside from the subsequent ballots that the Council might hold, because that would give real possibilities for other candidates from the third world.

In addition to Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, the other candidates considered by the Council following withdrawal of the names of Mr. Waldheim and Mr. Salim from the balloting were: Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Ambassador of Argentina to the United Kingdom (who had also been proposed in 1971); Foreign Minister Jorge Illueca of Panama; Carlos Julio Arosemena-Monroy, former Constitutional President of Ecuador; Santiago Quijano-Caballero of Colombia, former Director of the Office of Inter-Agency Affairs at the United Nations Office in Geneva; Sir Shridath Ramphal of Guyana, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth; Sadruddin Aga Khan, Special Consultant to the Secretary-General; Rafael Salas of the Philippines, Under-Secretary-General and Director of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities; and Radha Krishna Ramphul, Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations.

1986:

At a closed meeting on 10 October, the Security Council unanimously recommended to the Assembly that Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar be appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations for a second term of office; the Assembly concurred by acclamation.

1991:

Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations by the General Assembly on 3 December for a five-year term beginning on 1 January 1992. Among Mr. Boutros-Ghali's supporters was the Organization of African Unity, which included him on a list with five other nominees from the continent—Bernard Chidzero of Zimbabwe, Kenneth Dadzie of Ghana, James Jonah of Sierra Leone, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Nguema François Owono of Gabon. Africans had stressed that their region had not yet had the privilege of providing a Secretary-General for the United Nations. Three prominent non-African persons—Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada, Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek of The Netherlands and Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the United Nations official in charge of Persian Gulf war relief-efforts—did not receive enough support. In the final rounds of balloting in the Security Council, the choice was narrowed to Dr. Boutros-Ghali and the Zimbabwe Finance Minister, Mr. Chidzero, with the 69-year-old doctor of law, who had served as Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt emerging as the eventual unanimous choice and the draft resolution for his appointment before the General Assembly being sponsored by all 15 members of the Council.

The election process had begun months earlier as it became clear that, after a decade in office, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar would most likely not be seeking a third term. The Council met informally for consultations on a number of candidates from a group of about a dozen contenders from several regions before convening on 21 November to decide on their final recommendation. ❑

"I learned a lesson at the age of 17 that I never forgot", Mr. Kofi Annan told Newsweek *in an interview, just before the United Nations Security Council voted to recommend him as its next Secretary-General. "One day, the headmaster walked into the classroom, and he put up a broad white sheet of paper, about 1 meter by 1 meter, with a small black dot in the corner. And he asked, 'Boys, what do you see?' And all of us shouted in unison, 'A black dot!' And he stood back and said, 'So not a single one of you saw the broad white sheet of paper? Don't go through life with that attitude'."*

—"Newsweek", 23 December 1996

The Chronicle Interview

Ambassador Ismail Razali

President of the Fifty-first Session of the General Assembly

On major issues to be addressed by the fifty-first session: One of the most important issues will be the completion of work of the General Assembly's working groups. As yet, there has been little progress on some of the issues; some of the problems are politically charged. Much needs to be done to uplift the level of work, particularly on the issues of development, which is critically important to developing countries. There is no point in having too blunt confrontational language, which goes beyond the parameters of agreements and resolutions adopted in previous meetings and summits. This leads nowhere.

The work of groups dealing with strengthening the United Nations and reform of the Security Council will also be difficult to complete. But I feel that we have certain opportunities at this moment in time. We have had them for some time, but we've been delayed, and continue to hold meeting after meeting in the traditional UN way. It's a pity, but it happens.

So, we'll try to move these processes forward, and if we cannot find a real consensus, then we should use the two-thirds majority decision, which to me is a very respectable idea. We shouldn't allow a few countries to stop the process in its tracks. That's how I would approach the major issues.

If you consider what the UN can and is supposed to do under the Charter, underlining all the principles is the need for the United Nations to mean much more to many people. The reason the UN has not been able to do this is because of power politics. The UN has looked across crises without really being able to optimize the benefits to a maximum number of people. In this sense, development means helping the huge numbers of people who desperately need help. No matter how you package it, this is what the UN is supposed to do.

For instance, we need to talk about the problems of poverty. No General Assembly, whether it's the fiftieth or fifty-first, can be valid unless it looks at issues where people are deprived of basic rights. In May 1997, there will be a review of the decisions of the Rio Summit. We should not, at this Review, go through the motions of making pious statements and bringing all the Prime Ministers, Kings and Presidents here. The Review should focus its work on enhancing the quality of the output of this meeting. We need to see tangible results and make sense of what we've been talking about. The UN must have a delivery capacity and cut out a clear profile for itself and its future agenda. Otherwise, its work is irrelevant.

Ambassador Razali, shown here on his first day of office as President of the General Assembly, is the Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations, a post he has held since June 1988. From 1989 to 1990, he headed the Malaysian delegation to the UN Security Council and served twice as the President of the Council and, in 1990, as Chairman of the Security Council Committee concerning the arms embargo on South Africa. In 1991, he served as Vice-President of the Economic and Social Council. The Chronicle *interviewed Ambassador Razali just before the 51st session of the General Assembly began. These are excerpts from that interview.*

On the adoption of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty: The primary obstacle is that there is no clear, unequivocal commitment by nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Given the end of the cold war, there is no justification for hanging on to nuclear weapons. The fact that the "Five" have nuclear weapons and other States do not is to me a temptation for others to pursue nuclear ambitions. After all, nuclear-weapon technology is not difficult to obtain. The idea of the Five acting as guardians of international security through nuclear deterrence is unjustified.

The commitment to nuclear disarmament must be made now, and the societies of the nuclear States must urge their Governments to make this commitment. Neither is there any need for "Star Wars" technology. We should not go for subterfuge, by banning all nuclear-test explosions, but allowing the refinement of nuclear-weapon technology through laboratory tests and computer simulations. Surely, all these important issues must be brought out to the open.

But not all countries are allowed to participate in the Conference on Disarmament. It's as if a group of countries has arranged the right to determine the outcome of these issues for themselves, and the rest of the world must be kept out. While the recent expansion of the Conference's membership to 61 was a step in the right direction, many countries are still outside, including Malaysia. Perhaps, there was a reason for this before, but now there should be a universal effort towards nuclear disarmament, and all aspects of nuclear politics must be examined, including the question of uranium mining.

On the United States proposal urging a worldwide ban on land-mines: Eventually we'll have to have a convention. And we

"The UN must have a delivery capacity. Otherwise its work is irrelevant."

have to be very strict about land-mines production and distribution. The effort of the United States has to be supported, but the ban must encompass all kinds of land-mines. One cannot maintain an intellectual sleight of hand by arguing that certain mines should be banned, while other newer "designer mines" or "smart mines", which self-destruct, are exempted from the ban. There is a principle involved here—either you are for mines or you are against them. I think the major Powers should themselves take the first steps to agree to a major curtailment of producing land-mines until their eventual elimination. The issue of land-mines should also be included in the UN Register on Conventional Arms, if it's not already there.

On the overall role of the United Nations in world affairs as we approach the next millennium: This is a very complex question, which requires a comprehensive answer. Firstly, I think that many countries know what they do not want. They do not want the UN to be just a debating club. That period of endless discussions is over. The UN must mean something substantive. The UN is a very important global vehicle, particularly for the developing countries, since it's the only place they have where they can explain their problems to the international community as equal partners. The UN, in its role of protecting international peace and security, must understand the totality of the meaning of "security". It is not simply political security, but also economic security, food security, health security, environmental security. UN decisions must deal with all those aspects, we must promote and protect the security of the human person in all its dimensions.

These universal values are enshrined in the Charter, but in the last 50 years the United Nations has been more or less taken over by power politics, and its effectiveness hampered by major power rivalry. We still have situations where people can be killed brutally, and the UN is not in a position to stand up against the violation of universal values and protect human lives, as in the case of Bosnia. Because of politics, the UN was not able to weigh in with moral authority to prevent hundreds or thousands of people from being killed. These are things that we must recognize, that we, as governmental delegations, have serious responsibilities. And when people die by the thousands like that, it is on our hands, because the UN is charged to protect them, but we were negligent and failed to do so.

Then, there is another aspect. The UN has to deal with this new phenomenon of globalization and privatization. If the Organization doesn't deal with these things properly, it will be further marginalized. Globalization today is only seen in the context of the global market place, not embracing the concepts of multi-pluralism and multiculturalism. Neither does it help those who are marginalized by market forces. This is something the UN cannot ignore, as it is supposed to be a last sanctuary for poor people.

Another question is leadership of the UN. The Secretary-General, together with the governmental delegations and through the intergovernmental process, should constitute the leadership of the UN. Only with the support of the intergovernmental process can the Secretary-General influence world leaders. He must be able to do that, particularly in defence of universal values. For example, if people are dying and a major country doesn't want to help, or if Member States cannot help because of conflicting politics, as in Bosnia, the Secretary-General must stand up for these values nevertheless. And, of course, we in the General Assembly, representing the international community, must support him in this. So, I am looking forward to a UN of the future that understands this interactive arrangement of what the Secretary-General is doing and what the governmental delegations are supposed to do.

On whether criticism of the UN, especially in cases like Bosnia or Rwanda, is justified or derived from lack of support from Member States and their unwillingness to give the Organization the necessary means to fulfil the assigned tasks: We can all go to our own Wailing Wall and each of us try to work out our culpability and guilt. But, basically, these people have already been dead, their houses have been destroyed, and we have to carry on. I don't know whether to attribute the blame to countries or organizations—everybody is guilty. Everybody is guilty to a certain degree for the injustices of this world, so

The President ... the Person

About Ismail Razali—the man: his family and interests, likes and dislikes, what he would like to do if his profession did not keep him so busy: I am 57 and have three kids, I have a lot of interests, and I insist on having spare time to pursue them. I am not captured by my work. There must be the fun side to life, one cannot be obsessed by work. I live life with a passion, and being in natural surroundings is very important to me. I love to go fishing, sometimes swept by thoughts of a particular fish in a river. And above all, I value privacy. I think that sometimes authorities and States intrude too much into lives. The human person should have freedom to do all things he or she wants to, within reason of course. How else would I describe myself? I guess I am a "reticent middle-of-the-road nihilist".

"The United Nations must understand the totality of the meaning of 'security'."

I don't know whether it helps to say that it's the national government or the UN that is responsible for helping. We, in the international community, are the people who allow others to be killed, that is how I look at it.

On terrorism: All forms of terrorism must be eliminated. There is no justification for such actions whatsoever, whether you are fighting for freedom or whatever. Terrorism is inflicted on helpless and innocent people, terrorists do not identify an enemy, but inflict chaos. No country should give sanctuary to terrorists either. Our own societies are culpable as well. Sometimes we try to put a glow to these people, as if they have a legitimate grudge. We see movies that give terrorists this kind of colouration. So-called freedom of information is also responsible for exacerbating terrorist tendencies by inciting people to hatred and violence, and dissemination of information about making explosive devices freely to the international community at large.

On poverty and underdevelopment, and whether the world community will ever be able to bridge the gap between rich and poor: I am not optimistic. There is so much disparity between the rich and the poor. The major Governments—the G-7, for example—must stake out clear global programmes to alleviate global poverty. For example, I find it obscene that people in London can buy beans that are out of season and cheap, which are grown in Ethiopia, while the Ethiopians themselves starve. We must understand this important relationship between producers and consumers. Perhaps, only if the poor people in Africa cross the Mediterranean and press their faces against the windows of restaurants in Europe will people wake up to know that something needs to be done.

On population problems: We all know the terrible problems associated with uncontrollable population growth. Unsustainable population growth is a function and result of poverty. Once again, the issue is development. Despite all our new technology, we are unable to produce enough food for everyone, there is no distributive justice. Programmes to control population growth must put women at the centre of them, and they must be culturally appropriate. We should use the "bottom up" approach. Population programmes that hand out pills or condoms will not succeed. We must also realize that in desperately poor communities, children are assets. I am sorry to say that, since they are human beings. But in Africa and India, families are dependent on children for their survival.

On drug trafficking: I cannot offer formulas to solve this problem. Society must understand what drugs are. Either you accept the menace of drugs or, calmed by liberal ideas, think you can tolerate them. Some countries delineate between "soft drugs" and "hard drugs", so while banning the former, they allow the latter. Once you do this, you will never be able to eliminate the scourge of drugs. There will always be the money to pay for drugs. We must not forget the supply aspects either—there is no justification for Governments or certain politicians profiting from the drug business. We tend to look at the drug problem solely from the angle of the drug addict, considering him to be a menace to society. But he is a victim of a whole process of trafficking which make him a waste to society. These other actors include financial institutions that launder money, the shipping routes and customs agencies that are

Of Two Prime Ministers

UN Photo 67276

On who has made a particular impression on his life and ideas: Well, it's a good question, because the new generation has few role models, except for Bill Gates and people like that. When I was young and had recently become a diplomat, one of the leaders who influenced me greatly was Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India at that time. There was a sense of humanity about that person; he was a national leader, but the points he had to make always had regional or international dimension. And for us in Malaysia, when we were just emerging out of many years of colonialism, he evoked a sense of purpose ... he moved me quite a bit.

There is another person, too, who has influenced me, and I hate to say this, because one normally shouldn't say good things about one's boss. But I am talking about the Prime Minister of Malaysia. I may be subjective, but even objectively, I have never met a person who is so driven by what he wants to do for his country in terms of development and elevating the standards and quality of life of people. This man is extremely committed to the goal of development, and he has achieved it so successfully. Perhaps, it's because he is a doctor and he understands the meaning of things in their wholeness, the meaning of life. He is completely focused. This guy has taken the slings and arrows of criticism, exposed himself to challenge from the Malaysian public, but has always defended his position very well.

And what is being a leader? It's not just an ego trip, the fact that you will be cited in history books, or in charge of a national territory for 10 or 15 years. Unfortunately, many countries have even taken steps backwards since independence because of irresponsible leadership. Is watching your people die the way to cope with leadership? One needs to take leadership very seriously, since it is a serious responsibility.

"Being a leader is not just an ego trip."

accomplices to trafficking, and the dealers themselves. If we are serious about reducing the scale and volume of drug trafficking, we need a global effort that attacks the root causes of the problem.

On the role of the regional organizations and groups in the UN: They have done some positive things. But not all of the regional organizations have the same leverage or influence in the UN. We have the G-7, which is not even formally represented at the UN, but its influence is enormous. Another regional organization—the European Union—also has a dominant interest in the UN. The United States is not an organization, but it has a leverage that transcends everybody. Then there is the Non-Aligned Movement, with the largest number of member States, which includes countries of three continents, but its influence to apply leverage is declining. So, the fate and fortune of different organizations wax and wane depending on the politics of the time. I think in the 1960s more weight was given to regional groupings; the Non-Aligned Movement and Commonwealth could draw countries to a common position more easily. Now it's less easy to do this, the G-77 being a good example. Its members are going different ways: the rich ones are looking at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with great interest, while the poor countries are just being left helpless. With these divided commitments, divided interests, regionalism cannot be the cohesive force it used to be. But from the point of view of putting a consensus together, it would have been much easier to work if we could deal with regional organizations.

On the role of a diplomat in today's world: The role of a diplomat has changed as much as the world has changed. Now there are many who are not career diplomats. For example, the Iranian Ambassador was trained as a petroleum engineer, but he is a first-class diplomat, not only understanding Iranian interests, but the global implications of things. The traditional definition of a diplomat has also changed. One needs to be multi-dimensional and have multiple skills. For instance, one needs to know about DNA, business and finance, fibre optics, biotechnology, energy and power, all the issues that are not strictly those of politics. National imperatives are now no longer seen in the context of who wins or loses territories, but who wins or loses in markets and access to technology. The diplomat therefore has to grapple with all those interrelated issues.

The fifty-first General Assembly opens on 17 September—the day on which Malaysia begins its 40th year of membership in the UN. What Malaysia looked forward to when it joined the Organization, and how far its objectives have been fulfilled: When we joined the UN in 1957, we were idealistic and believed in the Charter. We believed in the "one country-one vote" principle, that every country was equal. But now, we believe that all issues at the UN need to be re-examined almost clinically. This is why Malaysia is very active at the UN, and we feel there is much needed to be done to redefine programmes. So, we are advocates of development issues and we are against the narrow decision-making processes, when only five countries, the P-5, can decide. These are the things we have been complaining about. We are looking forward to changes in the UN in that regard.

UN/Photo 192912C/Milton Grant

With Ruth Perry, Chairman of the Council of State of the Liberian National Transitional Governmnent.

On whether the UN has an "image" or "awareness" crisis: It's pretty obvious that the UN has an "image crisis". The favourite game of certain parties is "UN failure-bashing". Actually, it's true, the UN has failed here and there, but the media is partisan and distorts the real truth. The media of one country wants to see the UN in the context of the imperatives of that particular country, and the effect of this is to prevent genuine open debate on issues. I think the international community, the society that we serve, the global society, if there is one, deserve the right to hear Governments and organs, like the UN, having a clear, open debate on some of the critical questions of our times. For example, what is development? What is politics? What is disarmament? The UN of the last 50 years was caught in the web of power politics. The decisions of the Security Council mattered so much more than those from other UN organs. One could easily make a case and blame inordinate power politics for stifling the creative energies of the UN. This has also contributed to the image of the UN.

On any particular personal experiences in the field of diplomacy—happy or sad, funny or serious—that he would care to share: As a diplomat, one is supposed to be totally objective and unemotional, one cannot commit the sin of subjectivity. But when I was Ambassador to Poland, and it was my first ambassadorial post, the "Solidarity" movement was right at its height, and I was pleasantly surprised that Poles were not satellites of the Soviet Union. I found them creative, prolific, nationalistic and culturally rich. The Poles did not like the Soviet Union, they had jokes and plays to express their sentiments and kept their nationalism alive that way.

Anyway, there was a prospect that the Soviet Union might invade Poland. And a Polish playwright called Richard, a friend of mine, came to me one evening at a party. He was very sad, convinced that the Soviet troops would soon come to Poland. So he said to me, "Give me your shirt, so that I can wear it and face the Russian tanks". And that was what I did. I took off my shirt, right at the party, and exchanged it with his. And when I was doing that, I really meant it. Richard was smaller than me, and his shirt was tight ... well, when I recovered my emotions, I realized it was time to leave Poland. It was a very funny incident. Can you imagine? The Malaysian Ambassador taking off his shirt at a party and exchanging it with somebody else? But it did happen. ❑

"One could blame inordinate power politics for stifling the creative energies of the UN."

This is the face of terror.

Person: Unknown. Gender: Unknown.
Age: Unknown. Weapon: Unknown.
Funding: Unknown. Time of action: Unknown.
Place of action: Unknown.
Target: It just might be you

Levers that unleash nuclear warfare. Laboratories that perfect chemical weapons in stealth. Living organisms that fuel the armaments for biological strife. Land-mines that continue to trip and maim and kill, years after they were planted.

These are sources of terror.

Guns that brush against a hostage's eyelashes. The plastic lining on an explosive stowed away upon an aircraft. The forgotten brown paper package upon the floor.

These are sources of terror.

Speaking at the United Nations last October, Pope John Paul II placed upon the Organization the responsibility of "the historic, even momentous, task of promoting this qualitative leap in international life, not only by serving as a centre of effective mediation for the resolution of conflicts, but also by fostering values, attitudes and concrete initiatives of solidarity, which prove capable of raising the level of relations between nations from the 'organizational' to a more 'organic' level, from simple 'existence with' others to 'existence for' others, in a fruitful exchange of gifts, primarily for the good of the weaker nations, but even so, a clear harbinger of greater good for everyone".

In the year since then, the Chemical Weapons Convention is set to come into force. A Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty has been endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. A global ban on land-mines is being deliberated upon at the United Nations. And the Organization has offered itself as the instrument to fashion a comprehensive legal framework for the fight against terrorism in all its aspects.

"Acts of terror", said Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on United Nations Day in 1996, "are as old as history itself. But terrorism in our time has grown from a national to an international to a global threat."

So too have the sources of terror. In the following few pages, we document some of the efforts the United Nations has made in confronting them. And we invite you to write in and tell us what else, and more, it could do.

Convention Set to Go

We now have the mandate for getting rid of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Sixty-five States have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); it will enter into force on 29 April 1997. **Anil Wadhwa,** ***Head of the Media and Public Affairs Branch, Provisional Technical Secretariat for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), outlines the progress towards implementation of the Convention.***

Recent events, including those related to chemical terrorism in Japan, and continued reports on the production and use of chemical weapons in various parts of the world remind us that their proliferation continues to be a threat. The Convention was not designed specifically against terrorism, but once in force, it will provide a forum for consultation and cooperation and will also provide a forum for common action to combat such threats. Above all, it will create a comprehensive legal norm against such threats, which does not yet exist. The alternative is a world with a lingering risk to security from chemical weapons, encouragement of proliferation of such weapons, and a dampening impact on similar multilateral agreements being negotiated in the field of disarmament. Approximately three and a half years ago, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva adopted the text of one of the most ambitious multilateral agreements in the history of arms limitation and disarmament—the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly known as the CWC.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is the first multilateral disarmament agreement that would eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction

A product of the end of the cold war and brought about after years of arduous negotiations, the Convention was hailed as one of the new generation of multilateral disarmament agreements which encompassed comprehensive verification provisions, and as a precursor for similar agreements on other disarmament-related issues.

Apart from prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, engagement in military preparations to use chemical weapons or assistance, encouragement and inducement to anyone to engage in activities prohibited under the Convention are also proscribed. All chemical weapons and related production facilities have to be completely eliminated or converted to peaceful purposes within 10 years of the entry into force of the Convention, under international supervision. The use of riot control agents as a method of warfare is prohibited, prohibition on the use of herbicides as a method of warfare is reaffirmed, and protection against and assistance in case of use or threat of use of chemical weapons against a State party are provided. Exports to non-States parties of chemicals listed in the Convention are prohibited in some instances and subject to end-user certificates in others, and States parties are benefited by its provisions on economic and technological development.

Chemical warfare agents are relatively easy to produce. And the civilian chemical industry all over the world is engaged in production, processing and consumption of a number of dual-use chemicals for peaceful purposes. This makes necessary a complex verification regime which envisages a routine monitoring regime involving declarations and systematic inspections of declared chemical weapons storage, production and destruction facilities, as well as relevant civilian chemical industry facilities. A regime of challenge inspections allows a State party to have an international inspection of any facility or location in the territory of any other State party conducted at short notice without the right to refusal.

Over the past few years, the Preparatory Commission has worked out a number of detailed procedures for declarations and inspections, and has adopted draft policies on confidentiality, health and safety, as well as media and public affairs for the future Organization, all of which will also help during the conduct of inspections.

Procurement of the necessary equipment for training of future inspectors of the Organization, and evaluation of the usefulness of this equipment during actual inspections have been completed. A decision will be taken on accreditation of a small number of laboratories throughout the world which meet the OPCW analytical standards.

Member States and the industry all over the world expect, quite logically, that highly qualified personnel will be hired for the Technical Secretariat, working without intrusion or compromise of confidential commercial information. A training scheme consisting of three main stages for inspector trainees has been agreed upon, and arrangements with specific training sites in Member States which have made offers for this purpose have been nearly completed.

Persons with a suitable background in industrial chemistry and chemical engineering have been approached through various means to apply for eight categories of inspectorate-trainee posts.

At the very outset of its work, the Preparatory Commission had adopted several assumptions. One of these was the assumption that the two largest declared possessors of chemical weapons—the United States and the Russian Federation—would be among the first 65 ratifiers. However, this has not proved possible.

The extent of preparations required for meeting the Convention's requirements on destruction by these two States before ratification is enormous. In the Russian Federation, the draft destruction plan is expected to cost approximately 16.6 trillion roubles ($US3.68 billion). There have been some exploratory discussions on combining the efforts of all countries willing to help in eliminating chemical weapons in the Russian Federation. It is clear, however, that a major portion of the expenditure for destruction of approximately 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons will have to be borne by the country itself. According to the United States Department of Defence, the total amount of chemical weapons currently present in that country amount to a little over 31,000 tonnes and the destruction costs for these stocks will be approximately $12 billion. Debate still continues on the technology to be used for destruction of these chemical weapons stockpiles—more so in the Russian Federation than in the United States.

An added possible source of concern among Member States is the fact that the 1990 Bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons between the United States and the former USSR has not yet been implemented. This puts into question another basic assumption of the Commission, that this agreement would be in force and in the process of implementation at entry into force of the Convention. This would allow the OPCW to limit verification by the Organization to measures complementary to those to be undertaken under this bilateral agreement. Essentially, this means that the OPCW will then not have to engage itself in verification of destruction, but would only send observers with the national teams of these two States which will inspect each other. If the agreement is not under implementation at entry into force, it may affect the number of OPCW inspectorate staff required, and this issue would then require a timely analysis for determining if any additional financial resources are required for implementation.

Towards implementation

At the national level, preparing for the implementation of the Convention involves, inter alia, an extensive education programme for the chemical industry, establishing a data base system for processing and filing declarations, training national escorts for the verification activities under the Convention, enacting the necessary legislation and, last but not least, establishing or designating a viable National Authority which will liaise with the future OPCW. The Secretariat, on its part, has been engaged in dissemination of relevant information on the Convention and Preparatory Commission through various means—written contributions, organization of regional seminars, courses for National Authority personnel, communication and inspection logistics workshops, setting up an outreach group for industry and participating, when resources permit, in national events related to the implementation of the Convention. However, the ultimate responsibility for getting ready with national preparations lies with Member States themselves. Since the Convention places extensive declaration and verification obligations in the chemical industries of States parties, those with a relatively decentralized system have found it difficult to put all the necessary procedures in place before ratification.

A number of Signatory States have utilized the relative delay in entry into force to work further on their internal procedures for national implementation. Many of them, however, may be reluctant to agree to submit their chemical and defence facilities to inspections without the United States and the Russian Federation—the only two declared possessors of chemical weapons being on board. Issues such as determining the top legislative and management structure of the OPCW will now be taken up in real earnest. A number of lingering technical issues in the Preparatory Commission, which await finalization, will affect declarations in the chemical industry, and have to be resolved in order to ensure that planning in States parties themselves are not made more difficult. A Convention of this nature will only be successful if it enjoys near universal adherence. Given the penalties imposed on non-States parties under the Convention, it is widely believed that the entry into force of the Convention, and the eventual ratification by the two largest declared chemical weapons possessor States, will be a spur to action. ⌟

Nuclear Disarmament: A Long and Winding Road

The moment the first atomic bombs exploded on 6 and 9 August 1945 over Japan, their immense destructive power confronted the world with a challenge of unprecedented magnitude.

On the one hand, these weapons threatened life and the earth. On the other, they promised power. They promised dominance. They promised control. And in the times of cold war, this consideration got the upper hand.

Four years after the United States, the Soviet Union acquired a nuclear-weapon capability in 1949. Three years later, the United Kingdom joined the "nuclear club". France entered in 1960, and China in 1964. The United States and the Soviet Union (succeeded, after its dissolution in 1991, by the Russian Federation) have possessed by far the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons and the most advanced systems for their deadly delivery.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty commits all States Parties not to carry out, cause, encourage, or participate in, any nuclear explosion

Arduous steps

Development of nuclear weapons requires testing. A great deal of it. And the question of a ban on such tests has figured prominently on the world community's disarmament agenda since the mid-1950s. Interest intensified with the awareness of the harmful fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests.

The issue of the ban on nuclear-weapon tests was subsequently pursued intermittently as an element of comprehensive plans for arms control and disarmament, as a measure interlinked with progress in other disarmament areas and as an arms limitation issue on its own. It has been dealt with in the framework of multilateral, trilateral and bilateral negotiations.

And, at the United Nations, the possibility of completely prohibiting all nuclear tests has been discussed in more detail than any other disarmament measure.

Although disagreement about verification procedures did not allow the inclusion of a ban on underground testing, a milestone was reached on 5 August 1963 with the signing in Moscow—by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States—of the *Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,* known as the Partial Test-Ban Treaty. It came into force on 10 October of the same year.

The 1963 Treaty was the first international agreement pertaining to nuclear testing, and an important instrument in reducing international tensions and decreasing radioactive pollution. It also helped to create a climate propitious to negotiations on other nuclear-arms limitation agreements, notably the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Two bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and the United States—the 1974 *Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests* (known as the threshold test-ban Treaty) and the 1976 *Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes*—placed additional limits on nuclear tests.

Between 1977 and 1980, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States held negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test-ban treaty and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Questions of verification, including seismic monitoring, on-site inspection and participation of other parties presented difficulties. There was also disagreement as to the duration and scope of the ban, nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and laboratory testing. A draft for multilateral consideration eluded agreement.

Moratoria

Unilateral moratoria have played an important role in the history of test-ban negotiations. France and China discontinued atmospheric tests in 1974 and 1980, respectively. The former Soviet Union conducted its last nuclear test on 24 October 1990, the United Kingdom on 26 November 1991, and the United States on 23 September 1993. On 27 January 1996, France announced the end of all its nuclear testing. China, declaring that its position was to exercise great restraint with respect to nuclear testing and that it favoured a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, announced a moratorium effective 30 July 1996. India conducted an underground nuclear explosion in 1974, stating it was strictly for peaceful purposes.

Work in Geneva

In 1982, an Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was set up by the Committee on Disarmament—later known as the Conference on Disarmament or CD—with a mandate to "discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating

to verification and compliance, with a view to making further progress towards a nuclear test ban".

Two years later, it received a proposal that a subsidiary body initiate immediately multilateral negotiations on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests. But no consensus could be reached and no ad hoc subsidiary body was established.

Finally, in 1993, with the marked improvement in international relations, the CD directed its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to "negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security".

The Fiftieth GA: 1995

Conclusion of a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was a "task of the highest priority", the General Assembly declared on 12 December 1995.

In adopting resolution 50/65 as a whole without a vote (only paragraph 2, which contained the above quote, was voted on, with 160 votes to none, with China abstaining), the Assembly also called upon all States participating in the Conference on Disarmament, particularly the nuclear weapon States, to conclude such a treaty, so as to enable its signature by the outset of the Assembly's fifty-first session.

On the same day, the General Assembly strongly urged the "immediate cessation of all nuclear testing". As it adopted resolution 50/70 A by 85 votes to 18, with 43 abstentions, the Assembly also strongly deplored "all current nuclear testing". China, which voted against, affirmed that it had never participated in the nuclear-arms race, maintained an appropriate capacity for legitimate self-protection and would neither be the first to use nuclear weapons nor use or threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States. France, also voting against, stated that its programme of nuclear testing was strictly limited and was aimed at maintaining the credibility of its deterrent force, which contributed to its own security and to that of Europe.

Another nuclear-weapon State voting against the draft, the United Kingdom, stressed that no undertaking to cease testing immediately was included in the decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, it could not subscribe to a view expressed in the fourth preambular paragraph that nuclear testing was "not consistent with undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States" at that Conference.

The Russian Federation and the United States, both abstaining, feared that the text might be counter-productive because it did not enjoy consensus.

Malaysia, the Philippines and Swaziland, in expressing their wholehearted support for the resolution, stated that they would have preferred even stronger language.

By another text—resolution 50/64, adopted by 110 votes to 4 (Israel, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States), with 45 abstentions—all States parties to the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty were urged to contribute to the conclusion of a comprehensive ban "as soon as possible and no later than 1996 and to its expeditious entry into force".

The United States, in explaining its position, said the draft was not helpful to the negotiating process under way in the Conference on Disarmament, the appropriate forum for such negotiations, and did not even note in the operative part that work was moving into the final phase in Geneva.

CTBT: 1996

On 10 September, the General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), under resolution 50/245, by a vote of 158 to 3 (Bhutan, India and Libya), with 5 abstentions (Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria, United Republic of Tanzania). In opening the Treaty for signature on 24 September, **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** declared: "A major milestone has been reached on the road to making the world a safer and more secure place for generations to come."

The text of the Treaty is contained in an annex to a 26 August letter to the Secretary-General *(A/50/1027)* by **Richard Butler, Australia's Permanent Representative.** The text, the letter said, was "identical to the draft treaty text in Conference on Disarmament document CD/1427", where it had not achieved consensus. Introducing the draft on 9 September, Ambassador Butler had stated that bringing the text to the Assembly was "consistent with the fundamental relationship" between the Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, which was an "integral part of the United Nations system".

Madeleine K. Albright of the United States said the CTBT adoption was a "milestone in the transition from the cold war to a safer time", promising "greater security for all, a healthier environment, and a giant step towards ending a nuclear arms race that had endangered human survival for most of the past century". Under the Treaty, the "vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons should end", so that the present generation of nuclear weapons would be the last, she stressed, observing that such a "climate of confidence" would sustain trends towards smaller nuclear arsenals, substantially reducing the risk that the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons would increase.

Grigori Berdennikov of the Russian Federation told the Assembly that the test-ban treaty would be a "necessary stage on the road to complete nuclear disarmament". The ban on any and all nuclear explosions would "forestall the development of improved nuclear weapons or of a new generation of weapons", would have the effect of strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, and would make it difficult for nuclear weapons to proliferate.

The text, which had "emerged after lengthy and difficult talks" in Geneva, was "final and not subject to alteration. ... The old saying 'Better is the enemy of good' could not be more apt", he added.

John Campbell of Ireland—speaking on behalf of the European Union, as well as Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Liechtenstein,

Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia—said the draft treaty represented the world community's determination to bring to completion "one of the most sought-after non-proliferation and disarmament measures in the history of the United Nations".

The text was the "compromise characteristic of any multilateral instrument of importance", since it contained "all essential provisions to ensure that it achieves the objectives that its title calls for". The treaty was not the end of the process, and there was a "need for further systematic efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation", Mr. Campbell stressed.

Arundhati Ghose, India's representative in the Conference, in explaining her country's opposition to the draft, said that in the absence of a commitment by nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their weapons within a finite time period, the treaty would "allow the continuation of a discriminatory weapons regime". The ban on nuclear explosions provided for in the draft was acceptable to nuclear-weapon States because they had "already completed their explosive testing programmes", she added.

During negotiations, those States had "categorically rejected proposals to end the qualitative development and upgrading of nuclear weapons". Therefore, in view of the fact that the 1963 Partial Test-ban Treaty, which banned atmospheric testing, had resulted in a "dramatic increase in the number of underground tests", she felt the present text would "encourage a nuclear-weapon technology race".

Prakash Shah, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, told the press on 30 August at Headquarters that his country had always visualized the test-ban treaty as a "genuine and irreversible step along the road to nuclear disarmament". Such a treaty should: be "securely anchored in a global disarmament contract and linked through treaty language to the elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework"; end all nuclear-weapon development, be it "explosive-based or non-explosive based"; and not be a licence, such as was provided by the indefinitely extended NPT, to proliferate nuclear weapons.

Ali Sunni Muntasser of Libya on 10 September said the draft did not include a time-frame for the comprehensive elimination of nuclear weapons, and his country did not accept half solutions. What was at stake was the survival of humanity, he stated.

Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago of the United Republic of Tanzania on 10 September, in announcing his country's abstention in the vote, due to the "departure of the draft treaty from its original mandate" and the manner by which it had been brought to the Assembly, said the text made "no positive contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", since it had left those weapons "in the hands of a few".

Samir Moubarak of Lebanon said his country would abstain because the draft treaty, "by not forbidding laboratory testing nor the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons", would "allow destabilizing activities to continue". The comprehensive test ban should "defend the interests of all States" and reinforce the NPT, he stated.

Sha Zukang of China said the Treaty by and large reflected the "realistic state of negotiations" and, therefore, was "balanced in general". However, it was not entirely satisfactory, since it failed to fully reflect the "justifiable requests and reasonable positions of many developing countries", he stated.

For example, the text contained no reference to an "international legal instrument on no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and no-use or threat-of-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones". Nor did it "touch upon the conclusion of a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons", he noted.

Munir Akram of Pakistan believed that the Treaty would fall short of the expectations of the international community as an effective measure for nuclear disarmament. That shortcoming should have been redressed by an "inclusion of solemn and binding commitments in the text towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific time-frame", he stated.

The Treaty's effectiveness depended on its acceptance by all those States which had the "technological capability and legal latitude to conduct nuclear tests", Mr. Akram pointed out. Pakistan would take its "own sovereign decisions regarding time and conditions" for its signature and ratification of the Treaty which, nevertheless, could "not constitute a legal commitment" to its basic obligation until the CTBT had entered into force.

According to **Nugroho Wisnumurti, Indonesia's Permanent Representative,** "one major flaw" in the text was that it allowed the "improvement of arsenals and related technologies through laboratory-scale nuclear testing". It also evaded the question of nuclear disarmament as if the treaty were an "end in itself". A treaty that permitted "technical loopholes for testing" could not be comprehensive, he asserted.

Celso Amorim of Brazil, speaking on behalf of the members of the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR)—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, as well as Bolivia and Chile—observed that while the draft before the Assembly might not address all concerns, it encompassed the "unprecedented commitment to stop nuclear explosions forever" and enjoyed the support from the overwhelming majority of countries. ❑

The Test-Ban Treaty: What It Says

Basic obligations

Under *Article I*, each State Party would undertake: "not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion", and to prohibit and prevent any such explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and "refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion".

Under *Article II*, the States Parties—in order to achieve the object and purpose of the Treaty, ensure its implementation, including provision for international verification, and provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among them—would establish the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Organization, to be located in Vienna, Austria.

The organs of the Organization would be: the Conference of the States Parties (to be initially convened within 30 days of the Treaty's entry into force); the Executive Council, consisting of 51 States Parties (10 from Africa, 7 from Eastern Europe, 9 from Latin America and the Caribbean, 7 from the Middle East and South Asia, 10 from North America and Western Europe, and 8 from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East); and a Technical Secretariat, with an International Data Centre as its integral part, which would assist States Parties in the implementation of the Treaty and carry out verification and other functions.

Entry into force

According to Article XIV, the Treaty would enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all 44 States possessing nuclear power reactors, but "in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature". Those States are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam and Zaire.

If the Treaty has not entered into force three years after its opening for signature, the United Nations Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Treaty, would, at the request of a majority of States that had ratified it, convene a Conference to examine the situation and decide by consensus "what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process" in order to facilitate the Treaty's early entry into force.

Unless otherwise decided by the Conference, "this process shall be repeated at subsequent anniversaries of the opening for signature of this Treaty, until its entry into force".

Amendments, review

At any time after the Treaty's entry into force, any State Party may propose amendments which, according to *Article VII*, "shall be considered and adopted only by an Amendment Conference".

Article VIII provides that a conference to review the operation and effectiveness of the Treaty would be held 10 years after its entry into force, "unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties". Such review would take into account "any new scientific and technological developments" relevant to the Treaty. Further review conferences may be held with the same objective "at intervals of 10 years thereafter" if the Conference so "decides as a matter of procedure in the preceding year".

Also, upon request by any State Party, the Review Conference "shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes". If it permits such explosions by consensus, then the Review Conference "shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions".

Implementation and verification

Article III obliges each State Party to take "any necessary measures to implement its obligations" under the Treaty, including the establishment of a National Authority as a focal point for liaison with the Organization and other States Parties.

Under *Article IV*, a verification regime shall be set up. Such a regime, which includes an International Monitoring System, consultation and clarification, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures, "shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty" at its entry into force.

Verification activities should be based on objective information, limited to the subject matter of the Treaty, and carried out on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of States Parties and in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of their objectives. At the same time, each State Party "shall refrain from any abuse of the right of verification", the Treaty says.

Article V deals with "measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions". Among other things, it stipulates that "in cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Treaty may result from non-compliance with the basic obligations", the Conference may recommend to States Parties collective measures in conformity with international law.

Disputes

In case of a dispute between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States Parties and the Organization, relating to the Treaty's application or interpretation, the parties concerned should, according to *Article VI*, "consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Treaty and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice".

Protocol

According to *Article X*, the Protocol and its Annexes form an integral part of the Treaty. Part I of the Protocol describes the International Monitoring System (seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring), and outlines the functions of the International Data Centre.

Part II sets up the procedures for on-site inspections, which "shall be carried out in the area where the event that triggered the on-site inspection request occurred". It specifies the process of designation of inspectors and inspection assistants, their privileges and immunities, points of entry, arrangements for use of non-scheduled aircraft, approved inspection equipment, on-site inspection requests, inspection mandate and notification of inspection. Pre-inspection activities and the conduct of inspections are also described in detail.

Part III deals with confidence-building measures which, among other things, provide that each State Party should notify, preferably in advance, the Technical Secretariat of "any chemical explosion using 300 tonnes or greater of TNT-equivalent blasting material detonated as a single explosion anywhere on its territory, or at any place under its jurisdiction or control".

Rembrandt, *Faust in His Study, Watching a Magic Disk*—The Pierpont Morgan Library, New York.

The World Court Speaks



The International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 8 July handed down its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, as requested in General Assembly resolution 49/75 K of 15 December 1994. In that text, the Assembly had posed the following question: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?"

The Court found unanimously that there was in "neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and, by 11 votes to 3, that there was neither "any comprehensive and universal prohibition" in that regard.

The ICJ was also unanimous in concluding that: a threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that was contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and failed to meet all the requirements of Article 51 was "unlawful"; a threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be "compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict", particularly those of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings expressly dealing with nuclear weapons; and there existed an "obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations

Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter

However, the World Court was divided, by a vote of 7 to 7, on whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would "generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law", and whether, "in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal", the Court could conclude "definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake".

Also on 8 July, the ICJ decided, by 11 votes to 3, that it was "not able to give the advisory opinion" requested by the World Health Organization (WHO) in May 1993 on the following question: "In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution?"

The Court established that although WHO was "authorized to deal with the effects on health of the use of nuclear weapons, or of any other hazardous activity, and to take preventive measures aimed at protecting the health of populations in the event of such weapons being used or such activities engaged in, the question put to the Court in the present case relates not to the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on health, but to the legality of the use of such weapons in view of their health and environmental effects". Whatever those effects might be, WHO competence to deal with them was "not dependent on the legality of the acts that caused them", and there was "no doubt that questions concerning the use of force, the regulation of armaments and disarmament are within the competence of the United Nations and lie outside that of the specialized agencies". ❑

Nuclear Safety Convention Comes into Force on UN Day

The International Convention on Nuclear Safety—the first legal instrument to directly address the issue of nuclear powerplant safety worldwide—entered into force on 24 October 1996, United Nations Day. So far, 63 States have signed the Convention and the necessary 25 of them have now ratified it.

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval have been deposited by: Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Lithuania, Mali, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

The Agency's Director-General, Hans Blix, has said he looks forward to the conclusion of further instruments in the future, notably in the field of waste management safety.

Completed after three years of work under the IAEA's auspices, the Convention applies to land-based civil nuclear powerplants and obliges the parties to establish and maintain proper legislative and regulatory framework, based on fundamental safety principles for nuclear installations, and submit safety reports to be examined at peer review meetings. Subscribing States were committed to ensure the safety of land-based civil nuclear powerplants, including storage, handling and treatment facilities for radioactive materials located on the same site and directly related to the plant's operation.

Safeguards reviewed

Reviewing the implementation of the IAEA's safeguards during 1995 at its Vienna meeting (10-14 June), the Agency's Board of Governors found "no indication of the diversion of nuclear material nor of the misuse of any facility, equipment or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards", and concluded that such items remained in peaceful use or were otherwise unaccounted for. More than 550 nuclear facilities and other locations containing nuclear material were inspected over the year.

However, the IAEA was still unable to verify the initial declaration made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which was "not in full compliance with its safeguards agreement". The IAEA safeguards agreements are in force with 125 States and in Taiwan, province of China.

In a separate action, the Board of Governors also agreed to establish a special committee to negotiate a legal document to give the Agency "more information about the nuclear activities" of a State and "increased access to relevant installations" in the State. Those broader rights would "strengthen the present verification system" and markedly enhance the IAEA's ability to "detect possible clandestine undertakings". ❑

South Seas Study

Terrestrial and marine samples, including plankton, fish, seawater, lagoon sediment, coral, soil, coconuts and vegetation, were collected in July and August by international teams of scientists at the Pacific atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa, in the context of the radiological study requested from the IAEA by France.

The Agency announced that those samples would be shared for analysis with a grid of laboratories worldwide, including the Pacific region, and the results forwarded

UN Photo 109936/Nagata

to it. Data from French studies already undertaken would be available for comparative purposes in determining the radiological situation in the atolls.

Separately, geological specialists would be examining the situation regarding possible future scenarios, including in the very long term. They would use modelling techniques, taking as their starting point such factors as the geological characteristics of the atolls, experience gained at other nuclear test sites, and information provided by the French authorities regarding their own series of tests. The results would then be consolidated with the other part of the study and made publicly available, hopefully in early 1998.

There are 110,000,000

Trigger Points

- It is estimated that more than 110 million active mines are scattered in 68 countries—with an equal number stockpiled around the world waiting to be planted.
- Every month over 2,000 people are killed or maimed by mine explosions. Most of the casualties are civilians who are killed or injured after hostilities have ended.
- For every mine cleared, 20 are laid. In 1994, approximately 100,000 were removed, while an additional 2 million were planted.
- Anti-personnel mines are priced at $3 to $30 each. The cost to the international community of neutralizing them ranges from $300 to $1,000.
- The cost to remove all 110 million active mines is estimated at approximately $33 billion. Many experts believe that under current conditions it would take more than 1,100 years to clear the entire world of mines, provided that no additional mines are planted.
- Land-mine usage has dramatically increased over the past 20 years, with an emphasis on its potential as a weapon to terrorize civilians. Mines are used to deny access to or usage of farmlands, irrigation channels, roads, waterways and public utilities.
- Land-mine victims need blood transfusions twice as often as people injured by bullets or fragments. The number of units of blood required to operate on patients with mine injuries is two to six times greater than that needed by other war casualties.
- Surgical care and the fitting of an orthopedic appliance cost about $3,000 per amputee in developing countries. This means a total expenditure of $750 million for the 250,000 amputees registered worldwide by the United Nations.
- Delivery and distribution of relief assistance for emergency situations are affected when mines prevent or slow down provision of relief supplies. This increases the incidents of hunger and starvation among isolated populations.
- According to the International Committee of the Red Cross medical database, of mine-injured patients only 24.6 per cent arrive within six hours, 69.4 per cent within 24 hours and 84 per cent within 72 hours. The remaining 16 per cent travel for more than three days.
- Manual mine clearance is extremely dangerous—currently accidents occur at a rate of 1 for every 1,000-2,000 mines destroyed.
- Buried land-mines can remain active for over 50 years. The threat they pose thus lingers long after hostilities have ceased. Mines maim and kill tens of thousands of people each year, most of them women and children.
- In addition to inflicting physical and psychological damage on civilians, land-mines disrupt social services, threaten food security by preventing thousands of hectares of productive land from being farmed, and hinder the return and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.
- A British commercial bank has urged its competitors to unite to help end worldwide funding for the production and sale of land-mines. Terry Thomas, Managing Director of the Cooperative Bank, said a worldwide ban on land-mines could be accelerated if every bank agreed not to finance the trade in anti-personnel mines.

Clandestine Cloaks on Daggers Drawn

Secrecy shrouds the arms trade, and trading in mines is no exception. There is a remarkable lack of information and awareness in this respect. More than 50 countries are thought to produce between 500,000 and 1 million mines per year; of these countries, 35 are known exporters. There are currently several hundred types of mine in production by approximately 100 companies worldwide. The exact numbers cannot be determined because rudimentary devices can be produced easily without being registered, licensed or declared, and even sophisticated mines can be copied in other countries or produced in secrecy. When the export of mines from one country to another is banned, producers often deal through intermediaries or set up production in third countries to circumvent regulations and avoid public opposition.

Technology has been transferred from the industrialized Western countries to other parts of the world, with mines now being increasingly assembled by local or regional subsidiaries. "Evidently", says one journalist specializing in the arms trade, "the use of subsidiaries has involved a highly-developed infrastructure covering credit, financing, shipping and so on. Trade in commodities such as tobacco, grain or coffee has often been used as a cover."

Because of the low price of anti-personnel mines, it is economically advantageous for mine producers to manufacture as many of the devices as possible. "Unidentified" producers include State production units in some countries, dozens of companies engaged in their own secret production and guerrilla movements making their own mines. Mines produced by "unidentified" companies are often copies of versions registered elsewhere.

Although mines are clearly considered weapons and are subject to export licensing procedures, they are nevertheless traded in very large numbers either officially or unofficially. One indication of the extent of this trade is the wide range of models found in various conflicts. Recent reports by Africa Watch and the United States Congressional Research Service counted no less than 37 different types of land-mines in Angola from at least eight countries.

Anti-personnel mines are not only cheap, they are also easy for weapons plants to manufacture. According to quotes from weapons producers, average prices for anti-personnel mines vary from $3 to $15 per unit. In practice, the price of a mine can vary widely; it may be extremely low, as surplus stock can be sold far below cost price and sales are sometimes subsidized by the Government of the selling country as part of a military assistance programme.

Anti-tank mines command far higher prices than anti-personnel devices. Some of the more modern and sophisticated anti-tank mines from the United States and Europe sell for thousands of dollars each. The most expensive known Asian mine is the STM-1 plastic anti-tank mine from Chartered Industries of Singapore, which sells for $78.

Deadline: 2001

A Declaration stating that the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction—Biological Weapons Convention—was "essential to international peace and security" and that its full implementation should, among other things, "facilitate economic and technological development and cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities" was adopted at the conclusion of the Fourth Review Conference of States parties to that accord (25 November-6 December, Geneva).

In expressing its determination to enhance the Convention's effectiveness and further strengthen its authority, including through confidence-building measures, the Conference welcomed the decision of the ad hoc group attempting to design a verification protocol for the treaty to intensify its work, with a view to completing it as soon as possible and before the Fifth Review Conference, which would be held at the request of the majority of States parties "or in any case not later than 2001". It also encouraged the ad hoc group, which had begun work in 1994, to review its working methods and "move to a 'negotiating format'".

In addition, States parties reaffirmed their determination to "act with a view to achieving effective progress toward general and complete disarmament", and that "under any circumstances the use, development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited under Article 1 of the Convention".

The 15-article Convention—commended by the General Assembly on 16 December 1971 in resolution 2826 (XXVI) and opened for signature on 10 April 1972—has been signed and ratified by 138 States, with a further 18 having signed, but having not yet ratified. The depositary Governments are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

UN Photo 159113/H. Arvidsson

Bio-Facility Destroyed

At a Headquarters press briefing on 4 September, **Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission** set up under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in connection with the disposal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, said the Commission had grounded all its air operations—both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters—for the time being. However, the Commission tried to keep its monitoring of Iraq's industrial, chemical and biological facilities on a normal footing.

He said the Commission inspectors were in a "potentially risky situation" with the Iraqis, stating they would no longer recognize the "no-fly zones" which had been instituted after the 1991 Persian Gulf war. The inspectors had to wait until the situation had become a bit more settled.

Mr. Ekeus said there were 104 Commission specialists in Baghdad. Of the number, one team of 16 persons had just completed their tasks and were eager to leave. There was another team of monitoring specialists in Bahrain waiting to go into Iraq.

On 20 June, **the Special Commission** announced the successful completion of the destruction of Iraq's former biological warfare production facility known as Al Hakam. Under Council resolution 687 (1991), the Commission has to supervise the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, related components, and research, development and production facilities.

An international team took over one month to oversee the careful and rigorous destruction of Al Hakam and associated equipment. The site was composed of a score of large buildings, spread out in the desert over an area of roughly 3 x 6 kilometres, 60 kilometres southwest of Baghdad.

Each building at the site was demolished using high explosive charges. Several hundred pieces of equipment procured for or used by Iraq in its biological warfare programme were extensively damaged or embedded in concrete to prevent future repair and use. Some furniture, air conditioners, chillers and other dual-use equipment were spared destruction and handed over to Iraqi authorities. Key dual-use items will be tagged and their end-use monitored by Commission experts based in Baghdad.

The destruction was accomplished by Iraqi workers, under the supervision of a Special Commission team composed of 20 personnel from seven countries. ⌟

Combating Terrorism: The UN Role

"I do see a role for the United Nations in appealing to Member States to co-operate in combating terrorism", Secretary-General elect Kofi Annan stated on 16 December. "No one country can separately deal with terrorism as terrorists move across borders. It requires the exchange of information to contain terrorists. I also believe that the United Nations can undertake tangible steps to prevent the spread of terrorism. Helping release hostages is one thing and saying we will take charge of combating terrorism is another. The only thing we can do is to bring Governments together to exchange information and work together so terrorists will not feel immune and realize that the circle around them is getting tighter. They will know that they are not protected if they are across the border. It is equally important that we deal with the root causes of the problem which led them to terrorism, as it is seen by some as the weapon of the weak. Terrorism could erupt from the feeling that a person is oppressed and has no voice except through terrorism."

As part of UN ongoing efforts, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had held a series of meetings with his senior aides to discuss ways in which the Organization's expertise and resources could be deployed to assist in the global battle against terrorism.

Three elements have been identified to the task, namely, to undertake a comprehensive review of all Conventions relating to terrorism, to convince Member States to sign all important Conventions on combating terrorism, and the identification of new machinery necessary to implement Conventions to stop terrorism. The United Nations participates in the Working Group on terrorism, formed at the Summit of Peacemakers in Sharm El-Shiek, Egypt, in March, at which the Secretary-General reaffirmed the Organization's readiness "to serve as a mechanism for mobilization on a global scale" of action to defeat terrorism.

At the fifty-first session of the General Assembly, he reported *(A/51/336)* on "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism", including international treaties. There were 13 global or regional treaties pertinent to international terrorism. Nine were in force, covering: offences committed on board aircraft; unlawful seizure of aircraft; acts against safety of civil aviation; internationally protected persons; taking of hostages; protection of nuclear materials; violence against airports and; acts against safety of maritime navigation and acts against safety of platforms on the continental shelf. Two were yet to come into force. **Only nine countries have ratified the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, while 22 are required to do so. The Convention on the Making of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection has been ratified by only 23 of the 35 countries which are required to do so before it comes into force. Even the others are still far from being universal or fully regional. Quite a number of countries are not parties to these treaties; several new States have yet to take appropriate action.**

The first major multilateral attempt to adopt an international instrument addressing the problem of international terrorism was the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, under the auspices of the League of Nations. That Convention, however, never entered into force.

Terrorist acts whose prevention or suppression is the subject matter of international instruments adopted under the auspices of the United Nations system include: acts against certain means of transport or specific facilities; acts against specific categories of persons; hostage-taking and; use of certain substances or devices for terrorist purposes.

The majority of those instruments focuses on the question of individual criminal responsibility of the terrorists and requires States parties to make the crimes defined in the relevant instruments punishable under their own municipal laws. The State in the territory of which an alleged offender is found has the duty either to extradite that person to one of the States having a connection to the crime or to submit the case to its competent authorities for prosecution.

Skies, seas and surface

The International Civil Aviation (ICAO) and Maritime Organizations (IMO) have adopted instruments to address terrorism directed at aircraft and ships, as well as airports and fixed platforms located on the continental shelf.

Individuals, such as Heads of State or Government, diplomatic agents, as well as the premises they operate, and their residences and means of transport have been targets of terrorism. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted on 14 December 1973 by the General Assembly, defines as a crime a murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person, as well as a violent attack upon the

official premises, the private accommodation or the means of transport of such person.

On 17 December 1979, the General Assembly adopted, in resolution 34/146, the *International Convention against the Taking of Hostages*, which affirms the need for international cooperation for the prevention, prosecution and punishment of all acts of hostage taking intended towards compelling a third party, namely a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a national or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage.

The International Atomic Energy Agency on 26 October 1979 adopted the *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* concerning the protection and safety of international nuclear transport and the coordination of recovery and response operations in the event of any unauthorized removal, use or alteration of nuclear material or in the event of credible threat thereof.

Following the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988, ICAO undertook the elaboration of an international instrument relating to the marking of plastic or sheet explosives, and on 1 March 1991 adopted the *Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.*

Article 13(e) of the *Universal Postal Convention* of 5 July 1974 provides that "States parties shall take the necessary measures for preventing and, if necessary, for punishing the insertion in postal items of ... explosives or easily flammable substances, where their insertion has not been expressly authorized by the Convention and the Agreements".

At the fifty-first General Assembly session, the United Kingdom proposed the adoption of a new declaration on terrorism, and India prepared a draft international convention on the suppression of terrorism. ❑

Advice, Assistance, Action

The United Nations assists Member States by providing advisory services on legislation, policies and strategies for preventing, controlling and combating crime, including terrorism. It also provides interregional advisers free of charge to requesting Governments, to assist them in solving urgent and specific problems.

Consistent with its policy to accord aviation security the highest priority in its work programme, ICAO has assisted States to organize workshops and training courses on combating crimes connected with international terrorism. Experts were recruited to work in Chile, Panama, Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Thailand and Viet Nam to review the security conditions at international airports.

IMO organized seminars in Puerto Rico, the Aegean Sea and Tokyo on measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization prepared studies on threats to democracy and on sources of violence, xenophobia and racism. Specific measures related to prevention and elimination of terrorism were foreseen in the context of the UNESCO programme for 1996-1997 and activities for the Fourth Medium-term Strategy (1996-2001), in particular those linked with the creation of an Observatory for Human Rights.

The United Nations Secretary-General has already received national laws and regulations regarding the prevention and suppression of international terrorism from Armenia, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, Japan, Maldives, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom. These laws offer useful illustrations for other Governments which intend to introduce counter-terrorism legislation.

Legal Framework

The United Nations constitutes the unique forum on a worldwide basis to promote counter-terrorist activities and international cooperation in combating terrorism. This can clearly be seen from the instruments adopted by its organs (including the 1994 Declaration) and instruments transmitted by Governments to the Organization (including the Lyon Declaration, the Sharm-el Sheik Statement and the Cartagena Statement). It is now necessary to ensure that there is a comprehensive and truly universal legal framework concerning all aspects of the matter.

Most of the international legal instruments pertaining to international terrorism were introduced after significant international incidents had already taken place. International terrorism is in many instances associated with drug trafficking, the arms trade, smuggling or money laundering, and acts by groups with extremist persuasions. A number of subjects are not covered by existing international treaties. These include terrorist bombings, terrorist fundraising, traffic in arms, money laundering, exchange of information concerning persons or organizations suspected of terrorist-linked activities, the disruption of global communications networks, the use of weapons of mass destruction, falsification of travel documents, and technical cooperation in training for counter-terrorism. Preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and the use of modern information technology for terrorist purposes, such as disrupting a communications network by altering data or disseminating on a wide scale extremist ideologies inciting persons to commit terrorist acts, also requires to be addressed.

Safe Enough To Rest Upon?

Reports on United Nations activities towards a more secure world

The fifty-first session of the General Assembly is set to consider two draft international instruments to combat transnational crime and official corruption, based on recommendations made by the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.

An 11-article draft on "United Nations declaration on crime and public security" would have States pledge a range of crime control measures including commitments to prevent those who engage in organized crime, terrorist crimes, arms and drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, smuggling and money laundering from finding safe haven on their territories, and enforcing national laws against bribery and corruption.

An accompanying "strategic management plan" lists a series of projects, including establishment of a money-laundering database, an anti-corruption programme, a programme to enhance regional cooperation against international trafficking in stolen vehicles, and further development of the United Nations on-line criminal justice clearing-house (UNOJUST).

Varied views

In the debate, States with economies in transition—including Romania, Poland, Kazakstan, Ukraine and Belarus—saw the increase in organized crime in their countries as a side effect of having opened up markets and borders. Views diverged, however, on the development of an international instrument, with Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany and Japan focusing on the difficulties of arriving at common definitions of key concepts, overlapping instruments, and the strained resources of the United Nations programme.

In a related draft resolution, the Commission also recommended establishment of a central repository for relevant national legislative actions, regulations and international cooperation agreements, and enumerating constraints on the elaboration of a convention or conventions against such activities.

Public domain

A draft "international code of conduct for public officials" stresses that "the ultimate loyalty of public officials shall be to the public interests of their country".

It incorporates specific sections on conflicts of interest, disclosure of assets, acceptance of gifts or favours, confidential information and political activity, and asks the United Nations Secretary-General to elaborate an implementation plan and provide increased advisory services and technical assistance to States requesting them.

Juvenile justice

Another draft resolution invites Governments to adopt measures to prosecute all persons involved in illicit trafficking in minors and hear their views on the elaboration of a legally binding international instrument on the issue.

It would urge Governments to provide adequate resources for juvenile justice, and ensure that acts of violence against women are recognized as crimes, and ensure women have fair and equal treatment in their criminal justice systems.

Other measures

Under other wide-ranging recommendations by the Commission, views of States on the feasibility of establishing appropriate machinery for applying criminal law for the protection of the environment would be sought.

'Advance Fee Fraud'

Nigeria has alerted the world to a crime wave of international fraud emanating from that country. Addressing the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice on 23 May, its representative described a practice known as "advance fee fraud", whereby individuals in his country were faxing firms and individuals abroad, seeking help in getting large sums of money out of the country. The money was purportedly accumulated by over-invoicing of petroleum contracts by the Nigerian National Petroleum Company. The firms or individuals were asked to provide banking information, which allowed them to be defrauded.

Computerization of criminal justice operations worldwide and a mechanism to mobilize resources for United Nations assistance to States in crime prevention and criminal justice have also been suggested.

Organized crime constitutes a veritable underground economic system, the net gain of which exceeds the gross national product of many countries.

A proposed central repository of information on measures taken by States and organizations to combat transnational crime was endorsed by several speakers in the Commission.

New forms of organized crime are emerging—often as the result of the dramatic political, economic and technological changes of the 1990s. Criminal groups have been increasingly taking advantage of looser border controls and the movement towards free trade to launch or expand such activities as international car theft, black-market trade in nuclear materials, smuggling of migrants, arms trafficking, drug trafficking, trade in human donor organs, environmental crime, computer tampering and money laundering.

Organized crime, according to the latest United Nations report, has become predominantly "border-free" in character, while leaving law enforcement locked within traditional national legal frameworks. This makes international cooperation essential

There is increasing use by criminals of the relatively unregulated electronic network linking banks and non-bank institutions worldwide. Microchip-based electronic money that can be transferred via "smart cards" and the Internet is fast becoming a major means of payment. Such "cybercurrency" can be used to bypass reporting regulations and make the proceeds of drug trafficking and other lucrative illicit enterprises difficult to trace and seize.

There are many loopholes in the present patchwork quilt of bilateral extradition treaties and national laws which allow criminals to escape prosecution in one country by finding refuge in another. General international law does not impose a duty on States to extradite or prosecute persons who have committed crimes in other countries. In practice, every extradition case amounts to an individual agreement under international law, regardless of existing treaties among the States involved.

A Model Treaty on Extradition was adopted by the General Assembly in 1990 in an effort to harmonize the provisions of bilateral and multilateral treaties on the matter. In recent years, with the spread and interlinkage of organized criminal groups, the transborder expansion of money laundering and the establishment of international jurisdictions, such as the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, the urgency of carrying forward the momentum towards improving cooperation in extradition is mounting. The issue has been particularly significant in cases of international drug trafficking, prompting the provision, under the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, that drug and money laundering offences are to be considered extraditable offences.

The challenge to which Governments have to respond remains formidable. Existing modalities for international cooperation have not been able to keep up with the mobility of terrorists and members of organized criminal groups. But the report sees improved prospects since the end of the cold war for an effective global response to both types of crime, given the greater commonality of values throughout the world, and awareness of the need for global action to solve global problems. ⌟

Coercion Compels Concern at Crime Congress

The Special Rapporteur on torture of the Human Rights Commission, Nigel Rodley, has voiced concern that several countries had admitted to, and sanctioned, the use of torture by their law enforcement officials, and that a recent United Nations report on police conduct did not identify those States.

At the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice meeting in Vienna, he drew attention to the report's statement that two countries allowed such officials to use "interviewing and interrogation techniques which might cause physical or mental pain or suffering" when ordered to do so by superiors. Also, two countries had reported permitting such techniques when there was a threat to national security or a public emergency. One country had reported permitting them when dealing with particular forms of crime. He noted that the report identified countries by name in all other sections, but referred to them anonymously in the section on torture.

ECOSOC Urges NGO Participation in 'All Areas' of UN Work

Texts adopted by the Economic and Social Council on new arrangements for consultations with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and on strengthening collaboration between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions represented a great step forward, **Council President Jean-Marie Kacou Gervais of Côte d'Ivoire** said on 26 July as he suspended the 1996 substantive session.

During the five-week session which began on 24 June, the Council adopted recommendations to the General Assembly, including that it: consider the participation of NGOs in all areas of United Nations work; adopt an 11-article United Nations Declaration on crime and public security and an international code of conduct for public officials; and convene a special session in 1998 to consider the fight against illicit drugs.

Under the Council's consideration of social, humanitarian and human rights questions, issues relating to the right to development were the subject of two texts adopted on the recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights: one requesting the establishment of a programme unit in the Centre for Human Rights to deal with the debt burden of developing countries; and another endorsing the establishment of an open-ended working group to elaborate policy guidelines on structural adjustment programmes and economic, social and cultural rights.

The Secretary-General was invited to play an active advocacy role in regard to the serious threat posed by the spread of HIV/AIDS, by one of several texts adopted containing specific requests addressed to him. He was also requested to submit a report on new and innovative ideas for generating funds for globally agreed commitments, in a text which stressed the role of private investment in financing development, and to report on possibilities of strengthening the coordination of United Nations activities in the field of energy.

Among issues the Council decided to consider at a resumed substantive session was the question of corruption and bribery in transnational commercial activities.

The Council recommended exploring concrete modalities for strengthening the exchange of information on development issues between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as the possibility of having joint reports prepared by the Secretariat, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Trade Organization.

At an informal dialogue with representatives of United Nations agencies and bodies based in Egypt and Malawi, the Council discussed with them subregional and country-level cooperation, logistical aspects of their work, and results achieved so far. The Coordinator in Egypt said that coordination among United Nations agencies in that country was sometimes difficult as they had offices in 14 different locations, and the provisions of their host country agreements with the Government varied. The United Nations Resident Coordinator in Malawi told the Council that, since the capacity of national NGOs was limited, a balance in the role of the Government and those organizations had to be worked through in that country.

At its coordination segment held from 1 to 3 July, the Council stressed that the participation of civil society, including people living in poverty, local empowerment and a feeling of "ownership" by Government and local communities were essential for poverty eradication strategies. The United Nations system had a complementary role to play, assisting Governments and orienting support activities according to their priorities. There was an urgent need to fulfil the agreed target of 0.7 per cent of the gross national product of the developed countries for official development assistance, and to integrate the gender perspective into all efforts to fight against poverty.

The Council also examined the implementation of the agreed conclusions reached at last year's coordination segment relating to the results of major United Nations conferences in the economic and social fields. Speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, Costa Rica said the commitment to provide new resources for implementing conference recommendations had not yet been fulfilled, so the burden of providing resources had fallen on national governments.

General segment: economic, social and related issues

In his address to the Council on 22 July, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights José Ayala Lasso said that there was no country in which human rights performance was fully satisfactory. The Council adopted a series of texts on the recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights, eight of which were voted upon.

By one, the Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a programme unit in the Centre for Human Rights for the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights, particularly those related to the debt burden of developing countries and the implementation of the right to development. By another, the Council established an open-ended working group to elaborate policy guidelines on structural adjustment programmes and economic, social and cultural rights. Acting without a vote, the Council endorsed the establishment of an intergovernmental group of experts to elaborate a strategy for the implementation and promotion of the right to development.

The Council, acting on the report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, recommended that the Assembly convene a special session in 1998 to consider the fight against illicit drugs. Among the other resolutions adopted on the Commission's recommendation was one calling for continued development of a draft declaration on guiding principles of demand reduction.

The Council adopted a text recommended by the Commission on the Status of Women, approving a multi-year work programme which would enable the Commission to consider, by the year 2000, all critical areas of concern identified in the Beijing Platform for Action adopted at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women.

It also recommended that the General Assembly endorse the Washington Declaration and Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, adopted by an intergovernmental conference held in Washington, D.C. last year. It stressed the need for an accelerated international response to the challenges of the Programme of Action adopted by the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo, relating to reproductive rights and reproductive health. ❑

The Human Being Comes into Focus

With 1996 designated the International Year for the Eradication of Poverty and 1997-2006 the first United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty, the United Nations Commission for Social Development, meeting in New York in special session (21-31 May), has called for the human being to be placed "at the core" of both national and international efforts to end that scourge, regardless of political, economic, social and cultural considerations.

"The role of the State and the commitment of Governments are fundamental in eradicating poverty and in improving living conditions", the Commission said. Job-training and job-creating activities, as well as reinforcing the means for people to participate in the formulation of social and economic policies, were encouraged.

The international community and financial institutions should support national efforts at poverty eradication, and United Nations activities, programmes and strategies should be strengthened to promote self-reliance and community-based activities through financial and technical support.

The Commission held a series of panel discussions, opening up its debate to experts and other actors in civil society active in that field. The dialogue focused on how best to implement the Social Development Summit's goals of attacking poverty, unemployment and social exclusion. Panelists called for a shift from traditional development, saying that poverty could be tackled by creating new means of earning livelihood, increasing labour productivity and by redistribution through fiscal measures. The importance of diversifying the economy, of education and of training was stressed.

There was also a general consensus on the need to better understand the causes of poverty and the characteristics of the poor, including low life expectancy, lack of basic services, and low level of par-ticipation in economic and political life.

The Economic and Social Council on 22 July, by a vote of 51 to 1 (United States), expanded the Commission's membership from 32 to 46, and authorized it to meet every year, rather than every other. "Productive employment and sustainable livelihoods" would be a priority theme at the Commission's upcoming thirty-fifth session.



Adam and Eve-1504 by Albrecht Durer. The Pierpont Morgan Library, New York

The World Congress against the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children on 29 August adopted without a vote the Stockholm Declaration and Agenda for Action requiring States to criminalize the commercial sexual exploitation of children, and to review and revise laws, policies and practices to eliminate such sexual exploitation. States are also required to protect the child and promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of child victims.



Photo by Namas Bhojani/Bombay Magazine

The Vast Underground
Money laundered after sales of cocaine, cannabis and heroin exceed GNP of 150 nations

The Economic and Social Council devoted the high-level segment (25-27 June, New York) of its annual substantive session to issues of drug control. **Giorgio Giacomelli, Executive Director of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP)**, observed, "no single country has the solution, and solidarity is not a question of generosity. It is, in fact, a matter of survival for societies and, sometimes, for nations." The Financial Action Task Force of the "Group of Seven" industrialized countries has estimated that some $122 billion had been accumulated annually from cocaine, heroin and cannabis sales during the late 1980s. About 70 per cent of that figure, or $85 billion, became available for laundering and investment—an amount larger than the gross national product (GNP) of three quarters of the 207 economies of the world.

Opening up of markets and borders worldwide, while carrying numerous attendant benefits, had also allowed drug trafficking to flourish and criminals to invest drug profits in both legitimate and illegitimate sectors. Traffickers were organizing themselves globally and were well-placed to spread corruption, thus undermining democratic institutions from within.

The Secretary-General's 4 June report *(E/1996/57)* called for: greater transparency in financial records; anti-racketeering laws; the exchange of intelligence on criminal trends, particularly cross-border financing and more cross-border cooperation and coordination between those responsible for international drug control. The United Nations had both the potential and the comparative advantage to contribute to cooperation between various national authorities, the report stated. Coordination should also be fostered between the public and private sectors. The United Nations could coordinate international efforts to combat organized crime and money-laundering with other organizations working in the field, such as the Financial Action Task Force, as well as the provision of assistance and training to Member States.

According to the report, "the highest rates of heroin addiction are no longer found in developed countries, but rather in a number of developing countries in Asia, such as Pakistan, and high growth rates for heroin abuse are also found in parts of Africa". Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan said "there is an inexorable rise in demand because of mushrooming addiction in countries where drugs are produced". Ghana's Deputy Minister for the Ministry of the Interior and Chairman of its Narcotics Control Board, K.A. Bonful, stressed the need for a concerted, sub-regional response, backed by international support.

Several participants in the Council's high-level segment noted that the resources available to UNDCP—$168.8 million—were paltry in comparison with those of the illicit drug traffickers and money-launderers it was working against. Council President Jean-Marie Kacou Gervais and several other speakers suggested that a portion of the profits seized from drug traffickers should be allocated to UNDCP.

For the first time in its history, UNDCP will receive funds derived from assets confiscated from drug traffickers to support its worldwide campaign against illicit drugs.

A Luxembourg fund consisting of assets forfeited in that country by drug dealers has agreed to provide $200,000 to a $1.1-million training programme for drug control officials from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru. The programme, which is designed to meet the drug-control-related training needs of police, judges, prosecutors and customs officials of the four countries, is coordinated by UNDCP. Participants will be trained in such areas as control of money laundering and counter-narcotics field operations. ❑

Central Asia Offers Model of Cooperation

Faced with the mounting problem of simultaneous increase in the production, trafficking and abuse of illicit drugs, five Central Asian Republics, with the assistance of the Vienna-based **United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP)**, decided to complement their national efforts and join forces to combat drug problems through a subregional approach.

The Foreign Ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the UNDCP on joining efforts to combat illicit production, trafficking and abuse of drugs in their respective subregion. The Memorandum represents both a culmination of ongoing efforts by the UNDCP and the Central Asian countries to enhance regional cooperation and a political basis for future concrete projects on a range of drug-related issues.

Climatic conditions in Central Asia are very favourable for the growth of opium poppy and cannabis, both with high alkaloid content, as well as for the harvesting of ephedra, which is used in the production of artificial stimulants. The total area under illicit opium poppy cultivation is estimated at around 2,000 hectares, capable of producing over 30 tons of opium. Prior to the official ban in 1974 on opium poppy cultivation, Kyrgyzstan alone was supplying 16 per cent of all opium licitly produced worldwide.

In addition to the locally produced illicit drugs, large amounts of opium, heroin and hashish are trafficked into Central Asia from Afghanistan, mainly across the border in the barely controlled mountainous Gorno-Badakhshan province of Tajikistan and across Afghanistan's border with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

Drug traffickers and criminal organizations have exploited the vulnerability of the Central Asian countries caught in the process of democratic and economic reform. Their opportunistic and ruthless methods have left law enforcement agencies unequipped and ill-prepared to face the threat posed to national security. The opportunities provided by the privatization of the economy have been seized by criminal organizations to launder their illicit proceeds.

The UNDCP, which has maintained a regional office in Tashkent since 1993, has been putting together the countries' law enforcement and other officials with technical experts and advisers, with the aim of strengthening national drug-control regimes and paving the way for further subregional cooperation in the drug field. *(See also page 53.)* ❑

CIS Population Movements Addressed

A Programme of Action—incorporating principles and concrete measures for dealing with massive population movements in the area of the former Soviet Union, which had involved the displacement of more than 9 million people since 1989—was adopted on 31 May at a two-day Geneva conference, held in response to General Assembly resolution 49/173 of 23 December 1994 and attended by delegates from 87 countries. The gathering was jointly sponsored by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

It stated that further massive and unmanaged population movements in the region, if left unattended, might "undermine political and economic transformation" in the CIS countries and would have "far-reaching implications for international security and stability", and suggested a number of measures including: preventive diplomacy to ward off conflicts; effective laws and institutions to protect human rights and minority rights; confidence-building and peace-building measures, environmental clean-up; and the creation of economic potential available to every individual in their own native land.

Central among the principles outlined in the Programme were rights to freedom of movement, nationality and citizenship in a successor State, and the right to choose where to live within one's own country. A wide range of minority rights and the rights of deported peoples to return to their ancestral homes was also reaffirmed.

In closing remarks, **Conference Co-Chairperson Rose Otounbayeva of Kyrgyzstan** said the meeting had been so useful that some felt it could serve as a "model for similar initiatives in other regions of the world".

The United Nations on 31 May launched a consolidated inter-agency appeal for $101 million in humanitarian assistance to the three Caucasian States—Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia—to address the most urgent needs of refugees, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups.

A $7.6-million joint appeal for a six-month pilot programme as a follow-up to the Programme of Action was launched by UNHCR and IOM on 5 July in Geneva.

Legal assistance was to be provided for some groups in need, including some of the 260,000 Crimean Tatars who had returned to their ancestral homeland half a century after they had been deported to central Asia by Stalin. A recent assessment mission to Crimea had identified some 60,000 Crimean Tatars who were either stateless or in a nebulous position with regard to citizenship.

Harnessing Nature
Nationally and Globally

Member States will accord high priority to the formulation and implementation of national policies for the management of water resources in large cities and towns and the protection of groundwater from over-utilization and pollution, under a draft resolution forwarded by the Committee on Natural Resources to the Economic and Social Council.

A second draft resolution urges establishment of a global geochemical database for objective resource management, a global knowledge base on mineral resource potential, and the dissemination of information on technological progress related to sustainable extraction and use of minerals resources.

A strategy paper on future water resources management *(E/C.7/1996/6 and Corr.1)*, prepared for the session, warned that "rising expectations and unavoidable population growth—both major societal driving forces—are leading the world towards a severe water crisis". By 2025, it said, more than one third of the world population would be living in countries that were water-stressed or had faced chronic water scarcity.

"The imminent crisis", the paper stressed, "propels the water issue onto the international political agenda alongside global climate change." With water affecting human activities in many parallel ways, "the threat lies in collapsing water-supply systems in cities and escalating pollution in existing systems", it suggested, calling for no less than a "water management revolution".

UNICEF Photo 1425/John Isaac

Member States were urged by the Committee to put in place regulatory arrangements to formalize small-scale mining, and allow appropriate interaction with, and assistance from, international financing institutions and multinational mining companies.

A second inter-sessional strategy paper *(E/C.7/1996/11)* estimated that the volume of rock—raw material used for construction, industrial minerals, fuel, steel and other metals—consumed over the average lifespan to be more than 500 cubic metres. Were consumption on that scale to be extended to a population of 10 billion to 12 billion, the total volume would more than quadruple, approaching 100 cubic kilometres of rock each year or over 200 billion tons. "It is hardly possible to argue that such consumption rates are sustainable, either in terms of their environmental impact or in terms of the availability of resources", it concluded. ❑

Source: E/C.7/1996/6

Fourfold Water Crisis: Threats and Risks

Problem	Cause	Threat	At stake
Water quantity crisis	Finite resource Escalating demands	Increasing disputes and conflicts	Development Peace Food security
Water quality crisis	Expanding water pollution	Increasing morbidity/ mortality	Human health Aquatic ecosystems
Urban scale/water supply crisis	Urban growth out of control	Social unrest Persisting poverty	Social order Overall development
Land fertility degradation crisis	Degradation of soil permeability/water holding capacity Erosion	Decreasing crop yields/agricultural production	Food security

An Environmental Court?

Costa Rica has called for the establishment, under United Nations auspices, of an international Court to adjudicate international environmental disputes, punish international environmental crimes and help States to interpret international environmental agreements. Its delegate, Maureen Clarke, on 23 May urged the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to support the creation of an "International Court of Justice for the Environment". It was not too late to avert a global catastrophe, she said, provided real steps were taken to ensure sustainable use of the environment.

Costa Rica had also set up an environmental tribunal and taken various legal measures to prevent and punish "eco-crimes", she said. It sought to reserve 27 per cent of the national territory for "bioreserves", as part of the common heritage of humanity, and adopted international and regional instruments on climate change, biodiversity and desertification.

She said there was a need for an international court—a standing body of the United Nations—with the competence to adjudicate environmental disputes, punish environmental crimes and interpret international norms in this area. Existing bodies were not capable of fulfilling those mandates. Costa Rica wished to host an international expert meeting in November, with a view to providing a technical basis for that proposal.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions To Be Cut by 2020

As of 16 September 1996, the Second International Day for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer, 75 per cent of the world's population in the developing world and in countries with economies in transition had yet to begin reducing their ozone depleting substances (ODS) consumption, the United Nations Environment Programme has said. The remaining 25 per cent had nearly completed the phase-out of ODS as called for in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, now ratified by 157 countries.

Ministers and Heads of delegations from some 150 countries on 18 July called for significant reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) before the year 2020 and for legally-binding targets to accomplish that goal.

In the "Geneva Declaration", which emerged from an intense two-day ministerial segment (16-17 July) at the second session (Geneva, 8-19 July) of the international Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-2), the high-level government officials also called for accelerated negotiations on the text of a protocol or another legal instrument, which would encompass "quantified legally-binding objectives for emissions limitations and significant overall reductions within specified timeframes, such as 2005, 2010, 2020".

The growing GHG atmospheric concentrations "will lead to dangerous interference with the climate system", including "significant, often adverse, impacts" on food supply and water resources, and on human health, they stressed, adding that in some cases, the impacts would be "potentially irreversible".

"The continuing talks on new commitments for developed countries will not be easy", said Chen Chimutengwende, President of the Conference and Zimbabwe's Minister for Environment and Tourism, "but this ministerial declaration demonstrates that there is overwhelming support from most Governments for taking serious action against climate change."

Sixteen delegations—many from oil-producing States—expressed reservations. However, in a significant shift, the United States joined in supporting a legally-binding agreement to fulfil the Berlin Mandate to cut GHG emissions. It had earlier advocated a policy of voluntary reductions. ❑

World May be 3 Degrees Warmer by 2099

The ministerial-level Declaration also recognized and endorsed the Second Assessment Report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

Among other findings in the more than 2,000-page document were estimates that the Earth's surface temperature would rise by 1 to 3.5 degrees Celsius by the end of the next century and would continue to rise even thereafter. The average sea level, it also estimated, could rise by the year 2100 by 15 to 95 centimetres (6 to 36 inches) above the current level.

The Law of the Sea

The International Seabed Authority has elected Lennox Ballah of Trinidad and Tobago as President of its Council and extended, beyond 16 November 1996, the provisional membership for States that have yet to ratify the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. These include Bangladesh, Canada, Nepal, Poland and the United States.

Twenty-one judges have been elected to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which will be based in Hamburg, Germany, and is the central forum for the settlement of disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Elected to serve on the International Tribunal are: Paul Bamela Engo (Cameroon); Mohamed Mouldi Marsit (Tunisia); Thomas A. Mensah (Ghana); Tafsir Malick Ndiaye (Senegal); Joseph Sinde Warioba (United Republic of Tanzania); Joseph Akl (Lebanon); Choon Ho Park (Republic of Korea); P. Chandrasekhara Rao (India); Soji Yamanoto (Japan); Lihai Zhao (China); Anatoly Lazarevich Kolodkin (Russian Federation); Budislav Vukas (Croatia); Alexander Yankov (Bulgaria); Hugo Caminos (Argentina); Edward Arthur Laing (Belize); Vicente Marotta Rangel (Brazil); L. Dolliver M. Nelson (Grenada); David H. Anderson (United Kingdom); Gudmundur Eiriksson (Iceland); Tullio Treves (Italy); and Rudiger Wulfrum (Germany).

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Flood Relief Assistance Sought

A consolidated inter-agency appeal, seeking more than $43 million for flood-related emergency humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), was launched on 6 June by **Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs**, who called upon the international community to "contribute generously and urgently". The initiative covers the period from 1 July 1996 to 31 March 1997, and seeks a total of $43,632,935.

According to the DPRK Government, some 359,936 hectares of arable lands had been seriously damaged or irreversibly eroded and lost under sand or gravel as a result of torrential rains which caused unprecedented floods. Severe run-off erosion wreaked massive destruction, sweeping away entire villages, knocking out large bridges and dams, and in several cases permanently changing the course of major rivers. Reservoirs, irrigation canals and equipment, pumping stations, roads, telephone and electricity lines, schools, health clinics and rural hospitals were damaged.

Rice and maize crops had also been destroyed, particularly in North and South Pyongan and Hwanghae provinces, causing a dramatic drop in the production of cereals for the year, the Government reported. Approximately 1.5 million tons of grains were lost, including stocks in warehouses and households, as well as livestock and poultry.

The appeal focuses on three priority sectors: food aid ($26,804,363); recovery of arable lands ($10,322,260); and health ($5,940,310). Some $566,000 were requested to ensure adequate monitoring and reporting procedures.

The principal target beneficiaries of the short-term, small-scale activities of the appeal were the people and local communities in the most-affected province of Chagang, North and South Hwanghae, North and South Pyongan, and Kangwon.

Exactly one year after unprecedented torrential rains devastated much of the agricultural sector and infrastructure of the DPRK, heavy rainfall in July-August is once again causing widespread flooding in that country.

Heavy damage has been sustained in 117 cities and counties in eight provinces in the south-western and northern parts of the country. At least 116 people have been reported killed and approximately 3 million affected. The agricultural sector, which suffered crippling damage from last year's flooding, has been dealt another severe blow, since flooding was heaviest in the south-western area, which is considered to be its main granary. The Government estimates this latest damage to be about $1.7 billion.

The Department of Humanitarian Affairs is approaching all nations to alert them to the damage caused and urging them to support the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for flood-related emergency humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, launched in June. This would allow United Nations agencies to take adequate measures to address the most urgent and outstanding problems resulting from the devastation wreaked by the floods. So far, the response to the June appeal has been concentrated mainly in the food sector.

While a famine was not necessarily under way, there were "pre-famine indicators" in the DPRK, **Douglas Casson Coutts, Director of the North American Office of the World Food Programme (WFP),** told the press at Headquarters on 23 May.

Based on his experience in Africa, there were several "tried-and-true indicators", such as sudden migration of people, underfed babies and young children, and the consuming of seeds, Mr. Coutts stated. What had been seen in the DPRK was that people were "consuming substantial quantities of wild foods and herbs, as opposed to traditional grains".

Families in the north of the country were living "principally off gathered greens and rice", Mr. Coutts went on. Those affected by the current situation were collective farmers living completely outside the national food distribution system, which covers some 62 per cent of the DPRK's 22 million population.

A few years ago, when the country had "subsidized arrangements" with the Soviet Union and China, the distribution system aimed to provide a daily ration of 900 grams of food per industrial worker, Mr. Coutts estimated. "Now, the system is providing only 250 grams per day", he stated.

"This figure is likely to drop to 200 grams by the end of the month, less than half the food needed for someone working in an office and far less than the food needed to sustain agricultural workers", Mr. Coutts stressed.

According to WFP, the 1995 flooding displaced half a million people and left 100,000 families homeless. Out of some 500,000 displaced, 55,000 were children under the age of five. ❑

City Lights

After two weeks (3-14 June 1996) of gruelling debate, meetings and negotiations at HABITAT II—the "City Summit"—world leaders headed home from Istanbul, Turkey, carrying with them commitments for adequate shelter for all, better standards of living for their people, sustainable human development and the mobilization of crucial financial resources.

Those commitments were contained in the Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements and the Habitat Agenda, approved in the early morning hours of 15 June, after the clock was stopped at midnight. The Agenda—the Conference's action plan—is to be considered for adoption by the General Assembly this year.

The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements—better known as Habitat II—brought to an end nearly five years of major world conferences held under United Nations auspices, which put problems in areas as diverse as environment, human rights, population, social development, women and human settlements at the forefront of international concern. Without the conference series, those problems might otherwise have not had the political clout needed to grab front-page headlines and command the attention of world Governments. Instead, they might well have been swept under the rug, ignored in favour of immediate crises in various hot spots around the globe.

Launched in 1992 with the Earth Summit—the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development—in Rio de Janeiro, the conference series was the first phase in an ongoing effort to address the complex challenges created by a century of sometimes mind-boggling change. It was hoped it would help supplant the cold-war era of sterile confrontation with a new one characterized by global cooperation and development.

Habitat II was the culmination of the series and, with some 24,000 Government, non-governmental and grass roots delegates attending, unprecedented in terms of participation by various sectors of civil society. It was also the most transparent of the United Nations conferences, with immediate posting of documents and speeches on the Internet.

While held on a large scale, Habitat II nevertheless was affordable. The United Nations budgeted $1.7 million for the Conference—the bulk of its cost was borne by the host country and other partners.

"We, the Heads of State or Government and the official delegations of countries assembled at the United Nations Conference on Human Settle-ments (Habitat II) in Istanbul, Turkey, from 3 to 14 June 1996, take this opportunity to endorse the universal goals of ensuring adequate shelter for all and making human settlements safer, healthier and more livable, equitable, sustainable and productive ...

"This Conference in Istanbul marks a new era of cooperation, an era of a culture of solidarity. As we move into the twenty-first century, we offer a positive vision of sustainable human settlements, a sense of hope for our common future and an exhortation to join a truly worthwhile and engaging challenge, that of building together a world where everyone can live in a safe home with a promise of a decent life of dignity, good health, safety, happiness and hope."

—from the Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements

Turkish Tourist Office

Commanding the entrance to the narrow Bosphorus, astride Europe and Asia Minor, Istanbul is a great gateway between two continents, a patriarchal port city, and the commercial and industrial centre of modern Turkey. It is also a city seeking a delicate balance between development and the dangers of overdevelopment.

With a population nearing 7 million, factories and industries intrude upon old city walls on the European side and stretch out along the Asiatic shore. Growth has carved wide roadways through ancient walls, and overwhelmed rustic countryside where, until a mere half century ago, shepherds had been grazing flocks through the ages. Yesterday's Constantinople is today's Istanbul. As Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali put it, the United Nations could not have hoped for a more gracious or more gentle venue for these deliberations than this great city.

According to the *Global Report on Human Settlements*, at least 600 million people worldwide live in housing that threatens their health and life. Almost half of them are children. Some 500 million urban dwellers are in inadequate housing or are simply homeless. Less than two thirds of city inhabitants have access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation.

Partnerships

With a focus on people and their relationship to their urban habitat, the City Summit also dealt with issues examined earlier in the Conference series: improving living conditions for women, children and the disadvantaged; cleansing and protecting the environment; defending the rights of individuals; generating employment; promoting commerce and industry; encouraging ethnic groups to live in peace; and enabling all people to participate in community life free from poverty or fear. Habitat II's Declaration and Agenda ushered in a new phase of implementing the conferences' action plans by means of innovative "partnerships" involving States, as well as other players in an increasingly interdependent world: local cities, towns and smaller settlements; intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); the private sector; religious groups; and the scientific community. Indeed, Mr. Boutros-Ghali described it as "the first United Nations conference to have given, as part of its official machinery, a platform to representatives of civil society". Alliance-building was seen as crucial to developing and implementing the different action plans, which encompass practically every aspect of human endeavour.

The global urban population is expected to more than double by 2025—from 2.4 billion last year to 5 billion 30 years from now. By century's end, every other person in the world will be a "city-zen". When the new millennium is barely a quarter century of age, our stressed planet will be home to almost 100 "mega-cities", each with populations exceeding 5 million. More than two thirds of all humans will live in cities—80 per cent of them in developing countries.

Parallel to the committee that conducted negotiations among national Governments, a "partnership committee", including NGOs and local authorities, met and forwarded recommendations for inclusion in the Habitat Agenda, based on reports from over 500 mayors and key municipal leaders, constituted as the World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities. It also heard from NGOs grouped in forums.

The Istanbul Declaration

"Our cities must be places where human beings lead fulfilling lives in dignity, good health, safety, happiness and hope", affirmed the 15-paragraph Declaration, proposed and negotiated entirely in Istanbul.

"Rural and urban development are interdependent", it emphasized. In addition to improving the urban habitat, partners should also "work to extend adequate infrastructure, public services and employment opportunities to rural areas in order to enhance their attractiveness, develop an integrated network of settlements and minimize rural-to-urban migration". Medium- and small-sized towns needed special focus.

Delegations also reaffirmed their commitment to address: unsustainable

The Habitat Agenda

The final document of the Conference—the Habitat Agenda—is intended as a global call to action at all levels and a guide towards sustainable development of the world's cities, towns and villages in the first two decades of the next century. It contains a preamble, a statement of goals and principles, a set of commitments to be undertaken by Governments, and final strategies for implementing the global plan of action:

The goals and principles include:

- ***Poverty eradication in the context of sustainable development***
- ***The need to strengthen the family as the basic unit of society***
- ***Citizens' rights and responsibilities***
- ***Partnerships among all countries and among all sectors within countries***
- ***Solidarity with disadvantaged and vulnerable groups***
- ***Increased financial resources***
- ***Health care, including reproductive health care and services to improve the quality of life.***

Six commitments were made to:

- ***Adequate shelter for all***
- ***Sustainable human settlements***
- ***Participation and gender equality***
- ***Financing human settlements***
- ***International cooperation***
- ***Assessing progress***

Strategies for implementing the action plan elaborate on:

- ***Action to be taken to achieve adequate shelter for all and sustainable human settlements development in an urbanizing world***
- ***Ways to promote efficient land markets and sustainable land use***
- ***Ways to mobilize financing and facilitating access to land and security of tenure***
- ***Actions that Governments can take to integrate shelter policies with macro-economic, social and environmental policies***
- ***Actions to improve shelter delivery systems***

The strategies emphasize that individuals, families and communities must be enabled to improve their housing. Governments should promote better housing by prohibiting discrimination and ensuring legal security of tenure and equal access to land. And markets should be enabled to function efficiently.

consumption and production patterns, particularly in industrialized countries; unsustainable population changes; homelessness; unemployment; inadequate resources; lack of basic infrastructure and services; growing insecurity and violence; and increased vulnerability to disasters. It called for "positive actions" on financing of development, external debt, international trade and transfer of technology.

Housing: A human right?

Much of the four-part Habitat Agenda was negotiated and agreed to prior to the Conference (*see* UN Chronicle, *Vol. XXIII, Number 1*), but a number of difficult issues remained to be negotiated, including one of Habitat II's defining issues: housing as a human right.

Delegates wrestled with this issue until the final hours of the Conference. In the language as adopted, Governments reaffirmed their "commitment to the full and progressive realization of the right to adequate housing as provided for in international instruments. To that end, we shall seek the active participation of our public, private and non-governmental partners at all levels to ensure legal security of tenure, protection from discrimination and equal access to affordable, adequate housing for all persons and their families".

They promised also to work to expand the supply of affordable housing "by enabling markets to perform efficiently and in a socially and environmentally responsible manner, enhancing access to land and credit, and assisting those who are unable to participate in housing markets".

In another innovation, the Agenda calls for decentralization of governmental decision-making and greater influence for local authorities; partnerships for urban development between Governments, businesses, trade unions and NGOs; attention to environmental problems associated with the spread of urban areas; and promotion of so-called "enabling environments" to stimulate market-driven expansion of the supply of adequate and affordable housing.

Financing the plan

By committing themselves to the recommendations of the Agenda, world leaders pledged in the Declaration to support each other in its implementation, and declared that financial resources should be mobilized at the national and international levels, including new and traditional finances from all sources.

A commitment to promote international cooperation to achieve Habitat II goals called on States to strive to fulfil the target of 0.7 per cent of developed countries' gross national product (GNP) for official development assistance, and to increase the share of funding for Habitat II objectives. They also agreed to strive to meet the target of 0.15 per cent of the GNP of the developed countries as assistance to the least developed countries. They would also increase funding for adequate shelter and human settlements development.

Putting the costs of implementing the global plan of action into perspective, Conference Secretary-General Wally N'Dow stressed that the world could address its housing needs affordably if every nation cut its military budget by just 5 per cent. "The resources exist to put a roof over the head and bring safe water and sanitation, for less than $100 per person, to every man, woman and child on this planet."

The General Assembly will consider implementation of the outcome of the City Summit at its fifty-first session, and will take up the issue of human settlements again in June 1997, when it holds a special session to review the implementation of Agenda 21—the Earth Summit's action plan—in which human settlements are a central element.

In Istanbul, international agencies pledged further commitments to human settlements, with the World Bank announcing that its pipeline of urban operations would amount to $15 billion for the next five years—a tripling of the Bank's efforts in this sector. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) announced it would contribute $15 million to the Urban Management Programme, a joint initiative with the Bank and the United Nations Centre on Human Settlements (UNCHS). That Programme, supported by the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, provides technical assistance to developing-country cities and towns to find ways to alleviate poverty and strengthen cooperation with local enterprises, NGOs and other groups.

UNDP and donor countries—the Netherlands, New Zealand and Switzerland—also launched a new $10-million facility to promote private investment in urban areas. The funds will be used in 50 projects in developing-country cities over a five-year period, and those are expected to generate $1 billion in investments in energy, water, and waste management. The new facility is part of the Public-Private Partnership for the Urban Environment—an initiative by UNDP and the donor community to promote cooperation between the public and private sector. ❑

Declaration

In the Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements, Governments agreed to address:

- Unsustainable consumption and production patterns, particularly in industrialized countries
- Unsustainable population changes
- Homelessness
- Unemployment
- Lack of basic infrastructure and services
- Growing insecurity and violence
- Increased vulnerability to disasters
- Gender equality in policies, programmes, and projects

The United Nations as Pioneer and Standard Bearer

Few issues are more closely identified with the United Nations than the promotion and protection of human rights. Without the efforts of the Organization, major achievements—such as the end of colonialism and discrimination, as well as the advent of democratization in numerous Member States, the thousands of lives saved, torture victims freed, missing and "disappeared" persons found, and the establishment of international human rights tribunals and treaties—may not have been achieved.

The 10 experts forming the **Committee against Torture**, during its sixteenth session (Geneva, 29 April-10 May), cited as a frequent shortcoming in the implementation of the 1984 Convention against Torture a lack of national laws that specifically define torture and make it a crime. The Convention has been ratified or acceded to by 96 States. Malta was the only State party which had such laws among the six countries whose reports were being considered, the others being Armenia, Senegal, Finland, China and Croatia. The Committee also made public the results of its inquiry on Egypt and recommended that the Government of Egypt set up an impartial mechanism to look into allegations made against its security forces.

As it concluded its three-week fourteenth session in Geneva (30 April-17 May), the **Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights** called for, among other things: increased emphasis by the Government of Guatemala on social welfare programmes; the establishment of an office of ombudsman in Paraguay; special steps to protect vulnerable groups against the impact of budget cuts affecting the social sector in Spain; and efforts to ameliorate unequal distribution of wealth in El Salvador. It also noted that Guinea had yet to submit a report under the Covenant, although it had been a party since 1978. A total of 135 States have now ratified or acceded to this Covenant.

The Human Rights Committee, during its 57th meeting in Geneva (8-26 July), called for the restoration of democracy in Nigeria and an end to reported human rights violations by security forces in Brazil and Peru.

The Committee also completed work on a general comment on article 25 of the Covenant concerning the right to take part in public affairs, to vote or be elected, and to have access to public service. In a private session, numerous complaints by individuals on human rights violations were also considered. The Convention has either been ratified or acceded to by 134 States.

The **Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination**, which held its forty-ninth session in Geneva (5-23 August), reiterated its readiness to contribute to the implementation of the peace accord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the perspective of the principles and objectives of the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. It also expressed serious preoccupation that as a result of deficiencies in voter registration, of intimidation and other restrictions, the holding of elections might reinforce patterns of ethnic segregation and division.

The Committee reviewed the implementation of the Convention in 10 States whose regular reports were overdue, and looked at countries listed under its early warning and urgent procedures mechanism, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cyprus, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Israel, Liberia, Papua New Guinea and Rwanda. Israel was removed from the list and requested to submit information through the regular reporting process. The Committee adopted a recommendation aimed at assisting the 148 States parties to implement provisions of the treaty related to the rights of refugees and persons displaced on the basis of ethnic criteria. ❑

UN REPORTED:

News on the United Nations System at Work

As part of a cooperation programme between the Government of **Côte d'Ivoire** and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), support has been provided to some 300 primary schools, and committees for the promotion of basic education have been set up. Many nursery schools have been established in project areas as a result of local initiatives. A functional literacy project for women is in progress. A course on basic skills ("facts for life") has been introduced in the curriculum of Koranic schools on a trial basis. A community-based monitoring system has been set up in over 500 villages affected by dracunculiasis, and the number of reported cases has fallen from 12,600 in 1992 to 3,800 in 1995.

As part of the UNICEF country programme for **Malawi**, district-based water and sanitation projects, which focused mainly on community action and behaviour change, were very successful. Low-cost technologies, especially the use of hand-operated drilling rigs, and a strong mobilization strategy resulted in a remarkable network for community-based management of water points. The project has been a model for replication in other districts and other countries. The UNICEF-led water sector study helped to reorient a large World Bank loan towards giving more attention to sanitation and women's involvement. The programme also developed model cooperation arrangements whereby non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a facilitation role in health education and sanitation at the district level.

The Government of **Gambia** and UNICEF have developed teaching and learning materials, and in-service training has been provided to teachers and trainers. Some 126 schools have school farms and gardens, benefiting 43,300 children. A primary school agricultural science syllabus was produced, along with a teachers' guide; an evaluation recommended a focus on the educational objectives of school farming and gardening. Extensive collaboration with an NGO facilitated the setting-up of 100 literacy training centres by 1996. A total of 150 centres and 30 facilitators provide literacy skills to some 6,000 adult females.

A community-based programme for psycho-social rehabilitation of children affected by conflict was successfully developed by UNICEF in the municipalities of Nebaj, Chajul and Cotza in **Guatemala**. This experience is now ready for expansion to other areas affected by armed conflict.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will continue to strengthen agricultural research and development institutions in **China**, especially those servicing poor areas, and support institutions addressing desertification, irrigation and farming techniques for dry land and fruit tree development. It will also support a research and development programme for income-generating cash crops such as rapeseed, peanuts and sugarcane, and for rice breeding suited to poor regions. New and innovative techniques in areas such as virus-free fruit tree cultivation, agricultural machinery, agricultural education, irrigation and dry land farming systems were to be brought together for demonstration in selected model countries. These projects have already been successful in north-western China.

A new trust fund agreement will help improve the livelihoods and incomes of the indigenous Yakut population in the Republic of Sakha, in the **Russian Federation**. The 365,000 Yakutians obtain most of their income from hunting, reindeer breeding and handicrafts. The trust fund, recently launched by UNDP and the Republic of Sakha, will make Russian funds available to improve education for Yakut children, upgrade processing procedures and marketing

An Unusual Meeting

On 25 June, a delegation of 35 men and women from poor communities in the United States, Europe, the Philippines, Thailand, Peru, Haiti, Burkina Faso and Rwanda came to Geneva for meetings with the Secretary-General, and there were working meetings with representatives of Geneva-based United Nations agencies. The Secretary-General heard from an old woman living under a traffic bridge in the Philippines and from a young man struggling to survive in New York City, who said many promises were made, but few were kept. Another woman said that poverty was bad enough, but what was worse was realizing that nobody recognized their struggle and their courage. The dialogue was the result of a collaboration between the Information Service, the Office for the High Commissioner on Human Rights and ATD Fourth World—an international NGO engaged around the world on behalf of people living in extreme poverty.

of reindeer meat and other products, and introduce techniques for water purification. It will also provide funds for doctors to be sent to the area through the United Nations Volunteers programme.

The World Food Programme provides rations of edible oil to women who attend primary health care centres in regions of **Pakistan** where health problems are widespread. Supporting almost 20 per cent of the country's functional health care outlets, the Programme encourages mothers to seek care and advice when they most need it, namely during early pregnancy and post-delivery. Each beneficiary receives up to four tins of oil during a pregnancy.

The largest repatriation and reintegration programme in African history has concluded. Four years ago, on 4 October 1992, a peace agreement was signed in Rome. Twenty years of civil war in **Mozambique** ended. Within three years, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had brought home—by train, bus, ship and plane—some 378,000 Mozambican refugees. Another 1.3 million returned home spontaneously, mainly from Malawi. UNHCR has now turned over more than 1,500 projects, worth $80 million, to the Government of Mozambique for incorporation into its long-term development plans.

Although the lack of security and infrastructure has prevented the collection of reliable nationwide statistics in **Somalia**, it is clear from current estimates that infant, child and maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the world. Prior to the recent civil war, access to and the quality of basic social services there were generally poor and the civil war destroyed what services there had been. During the past four years, however, international agencies, including UNICEF, have established health, nutrition, water supply and educational services. In Mogadishu, for example, the level of immunization against measles was raised to over 75 per cent by the end of 1995; and the case fatality rate from cholera, which is annually epidemic, has been halved from 1994 to 1995. Given the chronic and sporadic nature of the civil conflict in Somalia, UNICEF is designing activities that can be implemented in a short duration, "modular" manner, which, if interrupted, can be completed later. Another factor in modular programming relates to uncertain donor commitments. UNICEF has designed core programme activities in health, nutrition, and education, and a core administrative structure and staffing. As new project funds become available, the additional modules of staffing and project activities can be made operational.

UNICEF is to support operational research to strengthen public sector management of **Malaysia's** 9,000 youth organizations, thus helping to improve the quality of participation for the 1.8 million young people in these organizations. UNICEF will provide technical assistance in education for development and programme communication to strengthen capacity, including entrepreneurial and leadership abilities of youth. The lessons learned from these youth development activities will be used for policy development.

Buddhism plays a dominant and guiding role in the daily life of the majority of the population of **Bhutan**. Monks residing in the country's 2,000 monasteries have an important spiritual influence on all matters pertaining to life, death and physical well-being. Therefore, Buddhist monks and traditional healers will be trained to increase public awareness of health and hygiene through teaching and example. In doing so, religious practitioners will be involved in a holistic approach to the health needs of the population by complementing valuable traditional beliefs with elements of modern health care.

Women Vital for Food

Unless women are placed at the centre of efforts to increase food production, vital opportunities to meet the world's present and future food needs will be missed, says a new report by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Women provide much of the food grown for home consumption in the developing world, but most countries do little to encourage women farmers, says the report. Women's work constitutes 60 per cent of the world's labour, but they receive only one tenth of the world's income and own less than 1 per cent of the world's land. Nearly one sixth of the world's population of 5.8 billion is malnourished.

The evaluation by a consulting firm on the United Nations Development Fund for Women has indicated that, given limited resources, major impact at the individual level occurs when resources are committed to changing laws and policies, followed by educating women on their rights. A **Brazilian** project of women legal promoters, which only costs $2,500, had a huge impact on individual women's lives and was able to attract great donor attention and resources. Other initiatives that affect individuals, but appear to have broader impact, are those that target persons in leadership positions, such as the Presidents of Domestic Workers Federations, who later form national and international networks and influence those they lead. Another example is training Parliamentarians, who will then introduce gender-sensitive laws that affect millions, as was done in **Paraguay** or in **Morocco** where a specific chapter for women's concerns was added to the country's National Strategic Note. ❑

General Assembly Meets for First Time in New York

On 23 October 1946, a day crowded with receptions and colourful ceremony, the General Assembly of the United Nations convened in New York for the second part of its first session. At 10 a.m., the delegates began assembling at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria in Manhattan and were driven to New York's City Hall, where a brief open-air ceremony was held welcoming the General Assembly to New York. From there, the 96-car procession, carrying over 400 delegates and preceded by detachments of the United States Armed Forces, passed through the streets of lower Manhattan on its way back to the city. The streets were lined with thousands of spectators.

At the Waldorf-Astoria, the delegates were greeted by New York State and City officials and by the United States Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes. "Those whom war hath joined together", Mr. Byrnes paraphrased, "let not peace put asunder." Enthusiastic approval from the 1,600 people present greeted the toast he proposed "to the peace and the understanding of the peoples of the world, our one world".

The scene at Flushing

For an hour preceding the opening of the Assembly at Flushing Meadow, the delegates had been filing into the brightly decorated Hall, and the buzz of conversation, the click of cameras and the accompanying incessant flashes as outstanding personalities and delegations entered, all contributed to a steadily mounting anticipation. The corridors outside the Hall and all the surrounding areas were filled with milling crowds of official representatives, various kinds of security guards (including a large detachment of United States Secret Service on duty to safeguard Mr. Truman), pressmen and distinguished guests.

Converging on the New York City building were the foreign ministers of many countries and leading personalities of many others—the representatives of no less than 75 per cent of the world's population. The building had become the scene of one of the greatest assemblages of international personalities in history.

The afternoon was sunny—the warm, hazy sun of a late autumn day. Around and inside the building, there was an atmosphere of haste and genial bewilderment at the stiff security arrangements; because of the limited corridor space, it seemed almost impossible to go more than a few feet without encountering a new security barrier, with United Nations guards (now in uniform), United States marines, the New York City police and plainclothesmen of various kinds desperately trying to separate those who could pass through from those who could not. In spite of this, there was something of a festive air; press and cameramen, spotting celebrities, were feverishly darting about and delegates were good-naturedly submitting to abrupt commands to look this way and that.

Session begins

At 4:30, the President of the General Assembly, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, took his seat at the desk behind and above the rostrum. Immediately preceding him came the President of the United States. The whole assemblage rose to applaud the quiet entrance of the United States Chief Executive, and remained standing until he took his seat, below M. Spaak, on a level with the rostrum.

Turning to Mr. Harry Truman, M. Spaak said: "Your presence here, Mr. President, is a sure testimony of the importance which the people of the United States attach to our work; it is not only a great honour, for which we thank you, it is in itself a reason for confidence and hope."

Commenting on the "sceptics, pessimists and unbelievers" in the success of the United Nations, M. Spaak said: "In San Francisco, they announced that the Charter would never be established; in London, that the organization would never come into existence; in the past few weeks, that we would never meet again; and now,

...from United Nations publications 50 years ago.

no doubt, that we are going to tear each other to pieces."

Mr. Spaak urged the press, to which he ascribed "in the final analysis the success or failure of our efforts", not to dramatize the debates unnecessarily; not to "present as a weak statesman that statesman who seeks the path of conciliation and accepts compromise. That is why we are here, and may the press not forget it, to seek and find the point of equilibrium of our respective interests."

President Truman's speech

At the outset, Mr. Truman pointed out that this opening meeting of the General Assembly in New York had a special historical significance to the United States.

This meeting symbolized, he said, "the abandonment by the United States of a policy of isolation. ... The American people ... are resolved that the United States, to the full limit of its strength, shall contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world."

UNCIO Photo 1818

Economizing the Time of the General Assembly

A resolution submitted by the General Committee on measures to economize the time of the General Assembly was adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December 1946.

Mr. Paul Martin (Canada), whose delegation had made the original proposal to the General Committee, explained the necessity of adopting such action. The proposal, he said, might in one or two years' time be considered one of the most constructive decision of the First Session. He disclaimed any motive of limiting the freedom of speech. A body like the General Assembly could not allow unrestricted liberty of discussion without running the risk of stultifying and bringing into contempt the whole international deliberative process. Experience had demonstrated that an international conference which begins with unrestricted freedom of discussion ends by operating under the most rigid rules for limiting the length and number of speeches, Mr. Martin said.

The Official Language

To an international organization, good translators are indeed precious. Men in this profession never forget that theirs has often been the responsibility for providing definitive translations of treaties or of such a document as the Charter of the United Nations, which one of the translators defines as "condensed thought".

Each language has its peculiar problems. Russia, for example, is a language which has never heretofore had what the chief of the Russian section calls the "elaborate international terminology". French was for centuries the chief diplomatic language of the world. Twenty-five years' experience at Geneva has helped solve most of the terminological troubles between English and French. Pan-American activity in recent years has solved most of the problems of Spanish-English translation, but for the other languages, the process of establishing standard equivalents began only relatively recently.

All sections of the United Nations Language Division groan whenever a statistical summary appears, because an abbreviated column heading in one language is almost impossible to duplicate in another. The Chinese particularly have trouble with the names of organs and organizations, such as the "Economic and Employment Commission". The word "employment" cannot be translated by a single Chinese character. It requires more than four, and therefore the translators have had to slide around the word (not very successfully, they admit) by using "profession" as a substitute, in order to fit their characters into a limited space.

Certain terms used in English (many of them relics of the days of the Preparatory Commission, which was predominantly British) also are a problem for the whole division. A favorite United Nations phrase, well known in British parliamentary usage but rarely heard in the United States, is "terms of reference". At San Francisco, the men who had learned their English in the United States had to resort to their British colleagues for a definition of the phrase before attempting translation. Thus the Spanish section interprets terms of reference as "functions". Nobody has complained yet. The Chinese, who also had trouble, translate their characters back into English as "provisions of the duties and responsibilities", while the French hit on "mandate" as a close equivalent.

The word "nuclear" is another common problem. In recent months, the nuclear commissions of the Economic and Social Council have been much in the United Nations spotlight. The Spanish section, casting about for an acceptable English equivalent, hit upon "preliminary" as a solution. "Seized", used in its juridical sense, turns into "recognized" for purposes of Spanish translation.

Similarly the word "body" (as used in the context of "international body") causes the Russian section trouble, and as a result there must be used the Russian equivalent for "collegium" and other words.

Despite 25 years of intensive trial and error, some of the same types of difficulties still crop up between French and English. French translators are still troubled by what they call the "elliptical" character of English phraseology. "It's so loose", they complain. French, they say, is a far more precise language than English and requires more careful attention to the logic of syntax. For instance, an impersonal and passive formula like "it is suggested that ..." is abhorrent to the French mind. The French would always say: "I suggest that..." or "Mr. A. suggests that ..."

One result of the "precision" of the French language is that a treaty expands 10 per cent when translated from English into French. Strange to say, the reverse does not hold true. The language of the treaty does not become less "precise" when translated from French into English, and therefore it is either the same length or only slightly contracted.

Increased length does not always indicate greater precision and logic. Russian, for instance expands 15 per cent when translated from the English. The words are simply longer, partly because the Russian alphabet contains 32 characters, compared to the 24-character Latin alphabet.

Colloquialisms cause even the most experienced of the fraternity to slip up. "Our heads in the clouds", particularly popular at San Francisco and in London, caused many to scurry for comparable colloquialisms in their own tongues. The Chinese found one which, translated back into English, means "staying among the hills" or "surrounded by the peaks of the mountains". "Walking into the fog" is expressed in Chinese as "the fog will cover your eyes".

Translation of World's Classics

A resolution, by which the General Assembly would recognize "that the translation of the world's classics into the languages of the Members of the United Nations will promote understanding and peace among nations by the creation of a community of culture in which the peoples of all nations may participate", was adopted by the Second Committee on 5 December on a proposal by the Lebanese delegation.

The need for such a project is very great, Lebanese Ambassador Charles Malik said. He noted that just as there are economically underdeveloped areas, so there are peoples who have remained at an inferior level of cultural development. The representative warned that differences of cultural level constitute a threat to the peace of the world, since they bring about misunderstandings among peoples, which lead to discord and war. He described the treasures of human thought as remaining the "monopoly of the minority".

Dr. Malik proceeded to define the classics. Despite differences of opinion on the subject, there remain a certain number of objective criteria, he said, and he cited some of these. He defined a classic as a work which has been read throughout the ages, and which is expected, by virtue of its value, to continue to be read. It is also a work which comprises ideas of permanent value, one which has had great importance in history, and which represents a certain stage in the development of human thought.

The Lebanese representative warned against two dangers in selecting the list of masterpieces to be translated; first, false, unintelligent nationalism, and second, false, sentimental internationalism. He suggested that the choice of works should be left to authorities in each field of thought, and that the Members of the United Nations should specify into which languages they wish the different works to be translated.

Measures Proposed to Alleviate World Food Shortage

Continuing its review of action taken and required by the United Nations to alleviate continuing food shortages, the Second Committee (Economic and Financial) received additional data last week on the outlook of the world food situation for the coming year.

Canada put forward the first of several draft resolutions. This resolution asks Governments and international agencies to adopt or retain measures necessary for reducing the deficit in bread grains, rice, fats and other foodstuffs, and for facilitating the equitable distribution of available supplies.

Adlai E. Stevenson, speaking for the United States, supported the Canadian draft resolution. Reviewing the position of the United States in the world food crisis, he said that, during the year ending June 1946, the United States had exported 17,000,000 tons of food supplies of all kinds. For the coming year, the export of 400,000,000 bushels of wheat (10,200,000 tons), as well as 20,000,000 tons of coal, has been fixed as the export goal.

Enrique P. Coraminas of Argentina pointed out that the reduction in the agricultural production in his country has been due to the lack of equipment, and proposed a resolution asking Members of the United Nations to provide equipment which would facilitate export of foodstuffs from agricultural countries.

The United Kingdom submitted an amendment to the Canadian draft resolution which would call on industrial countries to increase the supply of agricultural machinery, etc. to agricultural countries in need of them, and on agricultural countries to increase output, secure a maximum recovery from producers, and improve transportation facilities for cereals and other foodstuffs. Consumer countries would be asked by this resolution to carry out appropriate measures to regulate consumption, including the maintenance of high-extraction rates, and the restriction of the feeding of bread grains to animals.

The USSR was represented on the Committee by Andrei A. Gromyko, who submitted a draft resolution asking the General Assembly to call on Governments and the people of the Member States:

1. To continue their efforts to increase the production of cereals, and to prevent any reduction of the cultivated areas;
2. To take all necessary measures to reduce the consumption of foods in the countries possessing a surplus and to increase exports to those countries suffering from a shortage;
3. To take measures to check the price increase of cereal and other foods in the interests of the consumers in the cities, and of producers as well, who may not benefit from price increases, particularly if the increases accrue to monopolists of middlemen;
4. To draw the attention of highly industrialized States to the necessity of furnishing to the impoverished States fertilizers and industrial implements as well, so that they may improve their transportation system, establish workshops for manufacturing agricultural machinery, tools and, most badly needed, spare parts.

P. C. Chang of China asked that the world deficiency of rice should be especially mentioned in the resolution which the sub-committee is to draft. In his review of the food situation in his country, Dr. Chang pointed out that while China is basically an agricultural nation, some provinces had to rely on imports of foodstuffs even during pre-war years.

He said that China has always favoured the establishment of an international organization to ensure fair and equitable distribution of available foodstuffs among countries in need. It considered, however, that the International Emergency Food Council cannot achieve this purpose unless a definite formula is devised covering all allocations.

Not Quite the Waldorf

Before they've been in the United States very long, they realize that America has its shortages too. The housing shortage strikes them particularly. On arrival, UN personnel are doubled up in hotel rooms as much as possible in order to save space, and the majority find themselves bunked in with strangers.

On the whole, it can scarcely be said that UN officials and delegates live in the lap of luxury in New York. Not knowing how to get around in a strange country, they frequently spend a great deal more on commonplace essentials than an American who knows where he can get a good meal without going to the most expensive restaurant. All the discomforts of American travellers coming to New York are felt by UN personnel—perhaps a bit more sharply since they are frequently unprepared for what they find.

Rockefeller Offer for Permanent Headquarters Accepted



UN Photo 1027
Hunter College, temporary UN headquarters

On 14 December, only three days after the offer of a site in Manhattan had been made for the first time, the General Assembly voted in favour of this location for the permanent headquarters of the United Nations. The decision marked the end of months of exhaustive study and travel by members of the Headquarters Commission. The final "eleventh hour" choice was made by the Permanent Headquarters Committee in two days.

In a letter dated 11 December, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. stated his belief that New York City, "a centre where people from all lands have always been welcomed", affords an environment uniquely fitting to the task of the United Nations. "For these reasons, I have ventured to obtain a firm offer covering property located on the East River in the midtown area, which, should it serve your purpose, I would be glad to give to the United Nations."

The site itself lies in the so-called two-times-height district. Within this height district, buildings may be erected at the street line to a height equal to twice the width of the street. From this point upwards, for each six feet that a building rises vertically, one foot indentation must be afforded. Towers occupying not more than 25 per cent of the area may be built to unlimited heights.

The Mayor's Committee had informed the Sub-Committee that the city would assist the United Nations.

Pros and cons

Appended to the report of the Sub-Committee which visited the area was a minority report by the representative of Iraq describing the objectionable features of the Manhattan site. It is too small, entirely hemmed in within a heavily populated area, and adjoins industrial plants. Smoke, noise and traffic are overpowering and forbidding considerations for work. The headquarters would have no identity of its own. There is no possibility of expansion or protection. The width of a block is entirely insufficient for the space needed for the Assembly and perhaps the Council rooms. Such external features as a tunnel, a bridge, storage houses, etc. make this site "a tormented area unfit for an organization like that of the United Nations Headquarters".

The Sub-Committee reported that it was not able to judge, in the short time given to it, the advantages or disadvantages which the demands of a municipal site would have on construction of United Nations buildings. Since these would have to be of the skyscraper or "vertical" type, none of the previous planning for the rural surroundings of Westchester or other areas apply to the Manhattan site. However, the building requirements have been greatly reduced by the choice of a municipal location. Considering the facilities required for

office buildings for all branches of the United Nations and related agencies at their peak of expansion, it was estimated that approximately 7,000 persons would have to be accommodated. These minimum requirements would have to be met by the Manhattan project. It was estimated, however, that in a rural area, housing and service units, such as stores, garages, electric power plant, theatre, etc., would have to be built, with accommodations for 50,000 persons, if no local facilities were available. In a rural area, a complete community upon which the working personnel of the United Nations would depend, would have to be constructed. Since most, if not all, such services are available in Manhattan, only United Nations personnel and their families have to be accommodated in the city.

The site

The permanent headquarters is to be located in the midtown section of Manhattan, along the East River, on a section of land which was created when Turtle Bay was filled in before 1860. The name, Turtle Bay, still used today for this section, is a corruption of the original Dutch name "Dudeutel", the word describing the act of making a barrel. To the Dutch settlers, the shape of the bay resembled a barrel. In 1677, sixty acres of land stretching between what is now 41st and 50th streets were granted as a farm to David Duffore. During the Revolutionary War, the British fortified the area, and it is believed by some historians that Nathan Hale was executed in Artillery Park at the point now at 45th Street and First Avenue.

Known in recent times as a "depressed area" of tenements, small businesses and factories, much of the site was recently purchased by the firm of Webb and Knapp for development into modern skyscraper apartment buildings, which were to include community facilities. The site comprises this proposed development, donated by Mr. Rockefeller, together with smaller units to be acquired and presented to the United Nations by the City of New York. It is bounded on the north by 48th Street, on the east by the East River, on the south by a portion of 42nd Street and a city-owned property, and on the west by First Avenue. Including interior streets and the East River Drive, over which structures may be built, it contains about 17 acres.

The site is underlain by rock at a depth of 8 to 25 feet along First Avenue, dropping to approximately 50 feet below the surface at points along the East River. According to a statement by the Chief Engineer of the City of New York, this will provide good foundation for the tallest buildings that may be desired, the construction conditions being unsurpassed elsewhere on Manhattan Island. There are no buildings of importance now on the site.

The Grand Central railroad terminal is only three blocks to the west. La Guardia Airport is six miles away. ⌟

UN Photo./Site of permanent headquarters

Stopping Wars Before They Start

Kevin M. Cahill



UN Photo 123944

Like liberty and equality, the idea of prevention is a seminal concept drawn from a reservoir of optimism that centuries of epidemics, famines and wars have failed to deplete, an amalgam of hope and possibility which assumes that misery is not an undefiable mandate of fate, a punishment only redeemable in a later life, but a condition that can be treated like a disease and sometimes cured or even prevented.

During a lifetime in the practice of medicine—in Africa, Latin America and Asia, as well as my own country—I have seen the daily wonders of the healing arts: lives rescued from once-fatal cancers, epidemics miraculously cut short, and countless millions of people saved from communicable diseases like polio and smallpox, its conquest a triumph of prevention attributable not only to Edward Jenner's vaccine, but to skills and efforts of thousands of public health workers over 200 years.

So it is only natural for me to think of clinical and public health models in contemplating the disorders now threatening the health of the world community as it emerges from the rigid alignments of the cold war and gropes for a fresh organizing principle in a new age of high technology, global economic competition and multipolar politics, and seeks for far more subtle, creative and prospective approaches to the problems of peace, problems quite different from the nation-State rivalries and alliances that preoccupied statesmen during most of this century, problems that call for earlier diagnoses and new kinds of therapy, problems whose underlying causes have to be attacked sooner rather than later, before they become fulminating infections that rage beyond rational control or political containment.

This is the defining principle of preventive diplomacy, which argues that social detection and early intervention should be as honoured in international relations as crisis management and political negotiation.

Sweden's Secretary of Foreign Affairs Jan Eliasson, who had served as the United Nations first Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, describes prevention as a "moral imperative in today's world. It is a humanitarian necessity in order to save innocent lives. It is an economic necessity, both for the countries immediately involved and for the international community, because of the exorbitant price of war and post-war reconstruction. It is a political necessity for the credibility of international cooperation, in particular for the United Nations."

The very breadth of this news of preventive diplomacy suggests that the term itself is far more restrictive than its purpose and conception. For diplomacy, as it

has been practised during most of a now-dying industrial age, has been centred on the idea of nation States dealing with each other on a government-to-government basis, with the help of professionals specializing in secret negotiations and political conspiracy. However, international relations have been utterly transformed by the technological revolution, by better informed and more active publics, by the spread of market capitalism, the fragmentation of politics, and a veritable explosion of commercial transactions and non-governmental activism. Even the supposedly bedrock principle of national sovereignty is being eroded.

SOURCES of human stress, community breakdown and group violence are far too diverse and too deeply embedded in social change to be consigned to the windowless compartments of conventional diplomacy. Many problems do not move in a straight line, but in endless gyres of cause and effect, so that a fall in coffee prices, for example, triggers economic collapse in Rwanda, then enormous personal hardships followed by social unrest, genocide and fleeing refugees, starvation, cholera, dysentery and other diseases that overwhelm medical workers and relief organizations. The cycle of disaster involves many different disciplines, including medicine, so that prevention calls for a symphony rather than a solo performance by a single profession like diplomacy. It also calls for a new kind of diplomat. "Preventing conflict", **observes David Owen, a neurologist as well as a statesman,** "requires different skills from resolving conflict even though they cannot always be separated. Yet diplomats, unlike physicians, have not fully developed a preventive ethos and a disciplined method of working." **The President of the International Court of Justice, Mohammed Bedjaoui,** has argued that preventive diplomacy is the mission of a wide variety of protagonists, "from the statesman to the businessman, from the journalist to the international organization, and from the banker to the non-governmental organization".

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali identifies prevention as an absolutely urgent priority at the United Nations. The military costs of peace-keeping operations are overwhelming the resources and distorting the primary mission of the world Organization; he cites the difficulties he faces with his noncompliant patients, recalcitrant nations and contestants who refuse to cooperate in a prescribed regimen for peace; "there are no guaranteed vaccinations to prevent conflicts from starting and no miracle cures to end them once they have started ... The Secretary-General's duty is to use all the means available to him ... to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

In the endless striving towards that ideal, United Nations officials deal daily with emerging as well as existing conflicts all over the world. **Under-Secretaries-General Marrack Goulding and Kofi Annan** have emphasized the need for flexibility and adaptation in preventive diplomacy. Goulding cites the very real problems for the United Nations in developing preventive programmes where the critical political will is absent. Annan notes the importance of the military force dimension in diplomacy, emphasizing that timing and coordination with humanitarian and political initiatives are critical in preventing the escalation of impending or existing conflicts.

I have long suggested that health and humanitarian issues should be the pragmatic as well as the symbolic centrepiece of our foreign policy, and that the methodology of public health and even the universally understood semantics of medicine provide an exceptionally solid basis for a new type of diplomacy. Our leaders simply are not attuned to deal with incipient disorders at a time when prevention is possible. In preventive medicine, one begins by searching for fundamental causes, for the etiology of a disease, and for techniques that can interrupt transmission before serious signs and symptoms become obvious and irreversible damage occurs. One should be able to adapt this approach to the epidemiology of conflict.

If a fatal disease threatens to spread, health experts devise control programmes based on careful research and laboratory experiments, sophisticated statistical studies and models, field trials and double blind surveys that try to minimize biases and biologic variants, which often contaminate the best intentioned projects. When deaths do occur, scrupulous post-mortem analyses are customary so that the errors and failures of the past become the building blocks for a better approach to the future.

Diplomatic exercises should be subjected to similar probes and autopsies. Nations, particularly great Powers and international organizations, must become humble enough to learn from failed efforts, rather than merely defending traditional practices. If there are new actors in world conflicts, and a new global environment created by, among other factors, a communications revolution, then the therapeutics of international mediation must also change.

The international system is in transition so that the contours of the post-cold-war age are still far from clear. But already there are a number of fascinating trends that are central to the development of the preventive diplomacy idea.

ONE is a tentative shift in the direction of individualism that focuses international attention on personal human rights, rather than only on the rights and privileges of national sovereignty. **Francis Deng, Special Representative for Internally Displaced Persons Worldwide,** argues that when sovereign nations fail in their obligations to their citizens, then the international community has the responsibility "to hold the States accountable" and, if necessary,

to intervene to "provide the needed protection" and even to help find remedies for the underlying conditions that led to violence.

During the post-Second World War years, as Deng observes, the cast-iron definition of sovereignty was corroded by a decolonization process that championed self-determination. More recently, the concept has been weakened further "by the internationalization of human rights and the wave of democratization that is sweeping the world". In international law, he says, quoting Michael Reisman, "what counts is the sovereignty of the people and not a metaphysical abstraction called the State". Deng warns, however, that a counter-trend has developed. Governments that feel threatened by these contemporary intrusions on sovereignty, he says, are reasserting their claims by arguing, among other things, that the concept of universal human rights is just "a Western ploy for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries".

WHO/EPI Photo

Professor Robert Skidelsky of Warwick University and Edward Mortimer of the *Financial Times* note that the "fundamental ground" for sanctioning action against domestic State misconduct is that it may disturb international relations. But in a related point that again emphasizes the complexity of the issues involved, they ask whether the mistreatment of minorities is justification per se for intervention. Does a State have the right to wage a civil war, for example, to prevent its own dissolution by a minority group that is waving the banner of self-determination?

Still another perspective on this baseline issue is developed by **Senator Alain Destexhe of Belgium—a former Secretary-General of Médicins Sans Frontiers**. In a series of bristling criticisms, he has argued that the kind of neutrality practised by the Red Cross and some international organizations often helps the villains more than the victims. In a similar vein, **the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, Peter Hansen,** insists that a first step in preventive diplomacy should be to recognize that "humanitarian intervention is not only inherently political, but that it now must become more politically engaged".

When humanitarian aid is almost the only international response to a crisis and when that aid makes no distinction between different categories of victim, Destexhe says, then all catastrophes are "reduced to their lowest common denominator—compassion on the part of the onlooker". Instead of neutrality, he proposes an alternative principle—impartiality. "Whereas neutrality focuses on the warring parties, impartiality focuses on the victims as individuals ... making no distinction between victims in regard to race, ethnic origins, political, philosophical, religious or other beliefs." The rights of the victims and "the moral imperative of justice" would take precedence over the "excuses" of neutrality or sovereignty.

ANOTHER fact that is exerting a powerful influence on the emerging post-cold-war patterns of international relations is the swift and nearly complete dominance of the global economic system by an American-led, knowledge-based free market capitalism. "A virtually unipolar world power is emerging", writes **Judge Bedjaoui,** "with the promotion of a single, generalized type of economic organization, nationally as well as internationally, summed up in the market economy system." He notes that underdevelopment and overpopulation are "triggering a migratory movement toward the Northern Hemisphere, which the North is attempting to curb or at least to control, because it is a major socio-economic danger to itself". However, he adds that "new concepts of development, hinged upon liberalism and competition, inevitably engender economic and social Darwinism, the survival of the fittest, and the exclusion of the rest". As a result, some nations are "perpetually-deprived States, always drifting and always abandoned to their fate".

Salim Salim, who is engaged in hand-to-hand combat with conflict prevention problems as **Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity,** also draws a straight line to root causes as the starting point for prevention. Among other factors, he cites the failure of majorities to share political power, religious and tribal intolerance, and lack of education. He also says that "mass unemployment among the young creates a politically explosive situation that is almost bound to result in violence and anarchy".

Peter Hansen offers a similar analysis. "It is not the end of the cold war that has precipitated the rapid erosion of social structures, ethnic and religious conflict and micro-nationalism", he writes, "but rather the intensifying effects of population growth, environmental degradation and economic disequilibrium, both nationally and internationally. The latitude for a growing number of States to reconcile contending interests from within has been substantially reduced". Quite often, he says, humanitarian action only serves "as a buffer" between political action and human survival, a role "foisted upon the humanitarian network", because the international community lacked the will "to address the root political causes of State crises".

After the Second World War, the United States launched the Marshall Plan that provided massive economic aid to prevent the collapse of a war-shattered Europe. Now the challenges to political and social stability are much larger in both scale and complexity, but the international community seems to be incapable of rising to its responsibilities even though it will eventually pay the price if violence instead of peace opens the new century. The United Nations is hardly able to support itself, much less lead the way to a new world order, and the world's economic leaders are too preoccupied with their own narrow interests to do anything about it.

Much of the burden of preventive action meanwhile falls on a vast array of non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, that provide humanitarian assistance, sponsor public health programmes, promote human rights, monitor abuses, and perform other services all across the international front of social need. And their work involves a great many issues related to the cause of preventive action. One of the more difficult is the extent to which humanitarian assistance may or may not be used to influence political outcomes in a violent dispute.

As a matter of policy or practical necessity, NGOs have often found themselves delivering food through Governments that were violating human rights simply because these Governments controlled the distribution system. As a result, opposition groups fighting for democracy and individual human rights have been effectively cut out of the aid loop. Other NGOs have fought to get aid through to opposition forces even, sometimes, when this has involved clandestine operations with guerrillas. The number of NGOs has expanded dramatically in recent years and they have performed spectacularly in many troubled areas where the major Powers have been absent or ineffective. But they also have their "weaknesses", as **former United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and former United States Ambassador Herbert Okun** point out. "While espousing broad humanitarian principles", they write, "some NGOs have their own partisan religious or political agendas. Rather than promoting peaceful settlements of conflict or working to prevent potential conflicts, such agendas can continue or even stimulate violence."

Another point made by Vance and Okun, as well as other critics, is that NGOs tend to become "increasingly dependent" on government financing as they grow larger. "This results in their not being able to go where the need for prevention is paramount or where a humanitarian need is great, but rather where Governments want them to go."

Kenneth Hackett, speaking from his perspective as **head of an NGO, the Catholic Relief Services,** argues strongly that "conflict prevention depends not only on addressing the causes of the tensions but, more fundamentally, in repairing relationships and changing systemic problems in society". He suggests that private voluntary organizations, or PVOs, believe the best way to promote long-term peace is to work "at the intermediate and grassroots levels to undercut the capacity of those who manipulate and perpetuate conflict". Instead of Governments, the emphasis is on churches, schools and health care institutions where trusting relations with people can be developed.

JUST as a wise clinician understands that the body has an ability to heal itself", **David Owen** observes, "so the wise politician knows that the body politic too has its own correcting mechanism. If one intervenes to correct one factor, an imbalance will often appear somewhere else." He calls for intensive post-mortem investigations of the crises in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda, which he calls "the biggest single humanitarian disaster since World War II". These spectacular demonstrations of institutional failure are literally a school of folly. Paradoxically, however, they can also yield important lessons for preventive diplomacy if the international community is willing to learn.

One of his recommendations is that the world's major economic institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, be drawn into prevention efforts, rather than left on the sidelines. "A predictive capacity on potential conflicts", he says, "is needed which is capable of reaching across from economic to political factors." Economic institutions that monitor these factors, he says, "must be mandated to work with the United Nations Secretary-General". Without the mandate, this kind of involvement will not happen. In an allusion to the present disconnect between economic and political action, he suggests pointedly that the World Bank explore why it and other institutions loaned "so much money to Yugoslavia with so little conditionality during the Tito years".

He believes the whole issue of sanctions should also be studied intensively. He notes that sanctions against Iraq and Serbia took a long time to bite and affect the policies

of their regimes, while they had a "dire" effect on the civilian populations. Evidence that strong financial sanctions can selectively hurt Governments more than civilians, he says, needs to be explored. Action to control drug money, for example, has now made it "very hard for any Government to evade the seizure of their financial assets".

Skidelsky and Mortimer advance a related, very interesting idea: that the enormous premium that the global economic system now places on domestic stability in a country is a powerful instrument for applying political pressures to influence behaviour. "If we think of the post-cold-war era in economic rather than political terms (the global market)", they say, "new forms of sanctions become possible at the sub-political level." Loans made or backed by the World Bank and similar organizations have "strong conditionality clauses attached to them". These are aimed at insuring against commercial risk, "but political risk is part of commercial risk, so that political conditions, like respect for human rights, can be made part of the conditions".

The emergence of private credit-rating institutions which rank the political risk of countries "points in the same direction", they say. World trade rules and new monitoring agencies like the World Trade Organization are also "fertile ground for linking trade issues to legal conditions, including human rights guarantees". Thus, they conclude, "the process of economic integration can be used to promote a common set of standards for doing business which spills over into political standards".

Ideas like these bring great wisdom to the eternal search for a better world. There are no final answers; there cannot be in our finite and imperfect state. But in the presence of disease, there is common pain that makes no distinctions of race or religion or class or wealth. No matter where disaster strikes, all the strands of shared humanity converge in shared suffering. In medical practice, a tumor or a tubercular lesion or an arrhythmia is present in an identical manner, and it makes no difference whether the patient is an ambassador or a street cleaner.

It is also true in medicine and public health that persuasion is more effective that coercion. In the case of AIDS, for example, attempts to curb the disease through legal enforcement have failed. Only persuasion, education and cooperation have had any success in altering lifestyles that contribute to the problem. In the same way, force has proven to be a poor treatment for violence. Indeed, military intervention and sanctions often do more harm than good. And that is the attraction of persuasion, cooperation and prevention in international relations, to stop wars before they start. Even if, as we must fully expect, that noble goal proves elusive, preventive diplomacy offers the best, and maybe the only viable alternative to the failed practices of the past. Even after conflicts have begun, this new diplomacy, based on a philosophy that focuses on root causes and promotes early involvement, can help de-escalate violence and hasten the restoration of peace.

The development of sanitation, vaccines and, more recently, environmental controls has produced phenomenal progress against the enemies of health. In the case of human organization, the invention of liberal democracy and individual rights marked an historic advance beyond such ancient concepts as slavery and the divine right of kings. The United Nations, however imperfect or structurally handicapped, represents a tentative step toward a world society and away from the anarchy of unaccountable sovereign nations. And now there is the chance that the principle of prevention may take its place as a significant improvement over inaction or coercion in dealing with conflict. That is greatly to be hoped. ❑



Dr. Kevin M. Cahill is President and Director of the Centre for International Health and Cooperation, and Professor of Tropical Medicine at New York University Medical School and at the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland. He is the author of numerous books and articles on the relationship of medicine and diplomacy. This essay is adapted from his Introduction to the volume *"Preventive Diplomacy"*, edited by him, and published by Basic Books, a division of Harper Collins Publishers, Inc. and the Centre for International Health and Cooperation (1996), which includes papers by the persons cited by Dr. Cahill in his article, who had been described by the positions they held at that time.

AFGHANISTAN:
Conciliation Called For

The Security Council on 28 September, gravely concerned about the military confrontation in Afghanistan and at the violation of United Nations premises in Kabul, expressed its "dismay at the brutal execution by the Taliban" of former President Najibullah and "others who had taken refuge in these premises".

Through a statement by its **President, Alfredo Lopez Cabral of Guinea-Bissau,** the Council also demanded that all parties fulfil their obligations and commitments regarding the safety of international personnel in Afghanistan. It called upon all Afghans to "co-operate fully with the United Nations and associated bodies, as well as with other humanitarian organizations and agencies in their efforts to respond to the humanitarian needs of the people of Afghanistan".

By reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, the Council also called for the "immediate cessation of all armed hostilities" and urgently called upon the leaders of the Afghan parties to "renounce the use of force, to put aside their differences and to engage in a political dialogue aimed at achieving national reconciliation". In addition, all States were called upon to refrain from interfering in the country's internal affairs.

In reaffirming its full support for United Nations efforts in Afghanistan, in particular the activities of its Special Mission, the Council called upon all parties to cooperate with the Mission, which "will act as a key and impartial facilitator, in order to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict as soon as possible". It also called upon all States to take "all steps necessary to promote peace and work together with the United Nations to this end".

In a report to the Security Council on 16 July, **the Secretary-General** had said there had been "no decline in foreign interference" in the 17-year-long Afghan conflict, and "clearly a need for an impartial third party to help Afghan leaders resolve their differences and to encourage the neighbouring countries and others to work together to support that effort". That was the role of the United Nations and its Special Mission.

Norbert Heinrich Holl of Germany was named on 28 June Head of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan to succeed Mahmoud Mestiri of Tunisia, who had resigned for health reasons. Mr. Holl would be based in Jalalabad pending the move of the Special Mission to Kabul, the Secretary-General stated.

Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in accepting with regret Mr. Mestiri's resignation, paid "tribute to the services he had rendered to the United Nations and to the people of Afghanistan in arduous circumstances".

On 16 July, he also reported that with effect from the end of June, the Secretary-General's Office in Afghanistan had ceased to exist. All United Nations peacemaking activities in the country had been integrated into the Special Mission, which "now consists of its Head, the Deputy Head, five political affairs officers and two military advisers, with the necessary international and local support staff", he said.

Earlier, all major warring factions had agreed to lay down their arms in response to a United Nations Children's Fund-brokered accord to ensure safe passage for health workers to reach 3 million children with life saving immunizations as part of an Olympic Aid-Atlanta mass immunization campaign.

Some $50 million in additional contributions were "urgently required to support the return of Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan, and to meet the most immediate humanitarian needs of vulnerable families", **Martin Barber, United Nations Coordinator for the emergency humanitarian programme in Afghanistan,** stated on 23 May.

According to the mid-term review of the consolidated inter-agency appeal for that country, pledges and contributions in cash and in kind as of 15 April totalled only $3.5 million or 29 per cent of the $124 million requested for the period from October 1995 to September 1996, he said.

At a 3 May press briefing at United Nations Headquarters, Mr. Barber had declared that Afghanistan was the "longest forgotten tragedy", which went on uninterrupted, every day. "Please, bring Afghanistan further up the agenda. Please, put it back on your maps", he pleaded. ❑

That Night in Kabul

SG's Spokesman Briefs the Press

At 4 p.m. on 26 September, government soldiers guarding the compound of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan had fled. President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who had repeatedly promised the Secretary-General that he would make sure former President Najibullah was protected, had placed the government soldiers outside the compound for that purpose. When they left at 4 p.m., there was only an unarmed nightwatchman in the compound besides Mr. Najibullah and three people in his entourage. The compound was comprised of offices, and there was no one there.

At 1:40 a.m. on 27 September, five armed men walked through the gates of the compound, headed straight to Mr. Najibullah's room, talked to him for several moments, and then took him away by force.

Meanwhile, after the government soldiers had fled, a United Nations coordinator in Kabul had tried calling around town to anyone who had a vehicle in the area and which was actually functional, but "there was nothing anybody could do to get there; there was total chaos in the city, it was a very dangerous situation. We just couldn't get there." At approximately 6 a.m., another group of armed men, who were believed to be Taliban, returned to the United Nations compound and took Mr. Najibullah's younger brother. At approximately 8:30 a.m., they returned again—by this time, two United Nations coordinators had been able to get there. Over their protest, the group began searching the compound, but they did not find the other two members of the Najibullah entourage, who evidently had already fled. Shortly thereafter, the bodies of former President Najibullah and his younger brother were found in a park, hanging. United Nations sources said Mr. Najibullah had evidently been shot in the head and his brother hanged.

The Secretary-General "deplores the terrible loss of life in the battle for Kabul", and he found it particularly regretful that a person who had sought sanctuary in United Nations premises was abducted from there, which was a breach of the inviolability of those premises. The Secretary-General had for a long time been personally engaged in efforts with the Government of Burhanuddin Rabbani to try and get them to allow former President Najibullah to leave the country. Unfortunately, those efforts were not successful. The Government had responded that it was a national problem and that the former President's fate was up to the Afghan people. Intensive efforts by the Secretary-General and the rest of the Secretariat in that regard were outlined in the last report on Afghanistan.

Since the fall of Sarobi, United Nations personnel had spoken to former President Najibullah several times about getting the Government's permission to move him outside the compound, the last time being the afternoon of 25 September. He repeatedly rejected suggestions that he be moved, saying that he felt safer in the compound than being driven to another point in the city. He asked United Nations personnel to keep him there.

Other reports from Kabul had indicated that the city was relatively calm. The World Food Programme's (WFP) warehouse that contained approximately 8,400 metric tonnes of food was looted by what were being called "uncontrolled elements". In addition, the office of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (HABITAT) was broken into. Some local security guards there were severely beaten, and a number of items, including radios, were stolen. There were currently three international staff in Kabul from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme and WFP. They were working to facilitate assistance with non-governmental office personnel who had not yet left.

Asked whether the United Nations could have done more to protect former President Najibullah, the Spokesman said the United Nations had had very firm assurances, actually promises, from the Rabbani Government that it would protect Mr. Najibullah. "Obviously, things changed. But there was nothing we could do. We don't have any troops in Kabul", no one with guns. The United Nations was basically there as a humanitarian mission, and "feels very badly that someone who had sought sanctuary on our premises has been hurt", she added.

Asked if the United Nations had any channel of communication with Taliban, and whether the Mission in Afghanistan could be regarded as finished, she said the United Nations had already stated its determination to remain there and work to relieve the suffering of the Afghan people. It had been a very long war and there were lots of people in terrible need. Yes, there had been conversations with Taliban for months now, the Spokesman said.

In a follow-up about the guarantee in 1992 to bring Mr. Najibullah out of Afghanistan, she said that getting him out was not as easy as it sounded, and in 1992 the situation was quite different from what it was at 1:40 a.m. on 26 September. The same authorities were not in power; the people from whom the United Nations could get such assurances were no longer in power, no longer in the city.

Was any action planned by the United Nations? she was asked. The United Nations biggest concern was to carry on with the humanitarian assistance, she said, because people were in very, very bad shape there. ⌟

TAJIKISTAN:

Confict 'cannot be settled by military means'

Expressing its grave concern at the serious deterioration of the situation in Tajikistan, the **Security Council** on 14 June extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) for another six months, until 15 December, subject to the proviso that the 1994 Teheran Agreement remained in force and the parties—the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO)—demonstrated their "commitment to an effective cease-fire, to national reconciliation and to the promotion of democracy".

UNHCR Photo/25030/A. Hollm

It further decided, in resolution 1061 (1996), that the UNMOT's mandate, which commenced in December 1994, "will remain in effect unless the Secretary-General reports to the Council that these conditions have not been met". The Council also expressed its intention to review the future of the United Nations commitment in Tajikistan "should the prospects for the peace process not have improved during the mandate period".

The Tajik parties were called upon to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General's Special Representative, resume talks "without delay in order to achieve a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, with the assistance of the countries and regional organizations acting as observers", lift all restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNMOT personnel, resume without delay the activities of the Joint Commission—the main instrument for maintaining the cease-fire—and cooperate fully with the International Committee of the Red Cross to facilitate the exchange of prisoners and detainees.

In encouraging the opposition to "accept in good faith" the security guarantees offered to them by the Tajik Government, the Council called upon the Afghan authorities and the UTO to finalize arrangements that would permit the establishment of an additional liaison post at Taloqan.

The Council expressed deep concern over the "worsening of the humanitarian situation, aggravated by recent natural calamities", and urged Member States and others concerned to "respond promptly and generously in support of the humanitarian relief efforts" of the United Nations and other international organizations.

On 21 May, the Tajik parties had been called upon to "demonstrate their commitment to peace by strict compliance with the cease-fire and other obligations".

Through a **statement by its President for the month of May, Qin Huasun of China**, the Security Council also condemned violations of the Teheran Agreement, in particular the "planned and organized offensive by the armed Tajik opposition in the Tavildara region", and strongly deplored the loss of life of civilians and of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Peace-keeping Forces as a result of acts of violence, which it described as "totally unacceptable".

The situation in Tajikistan was "at its worst and most volatile since the end of the civil war of 1992", **the Secretary-General** stated on 7 June.

Large-scale fighting in the Tavildara region had resulted in "many human losses, the interruption of communication between the capital and a large part of the country, and a dramatic aggravation of the humanitarian situation of the civilian population", he reported *(S/1996/412)*. UNMOT had indicated that the fighting was continuing. Those developments raised "serious questions regarding the sincerity and intentions of the Tajik parties", the Secretary-General observed.

On the other hand, Gerd Merrem, his new Special Representative and also Head of Mission in Dushanbe, had just begun his activities and should be given time to show results. The support of interested Governments would be essential in that regard, Mr. Boutros-Ghali stated.

The first priority was the "restoration of an effective cease-fire", and both parties had expressed their conviction that the conflict in Tajikistan "cannot be settled by military means", and declared "willingness to resume the inter-Tajik negotiations as soon as possible", he stressed. ❑



Although "standards of free and fair elections, as generally understood in long-standing democratic societies, simply cannot reasonably be applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina at this stage of history", nevertheless, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission had been able to "orchestrate what is generally regarded by the international monitors and the Provisional Election Commission as a reasonably democratic electoral process, one in keeping with internationally accepted practices of eligibility, access, participation and transparency—elections which have reflected the will of the people", **Ambassador Robert H. Frowick, OSCE Mission Head,** declared on 30 September at United Nations Headquarters.

Therefore, the Provisional Election Commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina had agreed to certify the results of the 14 September elections for the Presidency and the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency and the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, and the 10 Cantons of the Bosniac-Croat Federation, Mr. Frowick stated.

The decision to certify elections—based on objective evidence, including actual results, tabulations, reconciliations, allocation of seats and decisions on complaints and appeals, while subjective evidence included consideration of reports from all sources on the results—"directly confers upon each successful candidate the legal right to claim and to hold the public office to which he or she has been elected", he stressed.

The Security Council on 1 October, in noting with satisfaction that the holding of Bosnian elections constituted an "essential step towards achieving the objectives of the Peace Agreement", decided to immediately terminate all sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by a series of its resolutions adopted between 1992 and 1995. Those measures included weapons and trade embargoes, flight ban and a prohibition on sports and cultural events.

By unanimously adoping resolution 1074 (1996), the Council also called upon all parties to "comply strictly with all their commitments" under the Peace Agreement and decided to "consider the imposition of measures if any party fails significantly to meet specific obligations" under that accord.

A Success Story

On 1 October, Jacques Paul Klein of the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in Croatia *told correspondents at Headquarters that the stabilization of the region was a "United Nations success story". On both the military and civilian sides, the mission was "credible and successful", he stated. UNTAES had assembled "troops from as far away as Karachi and Amman", and had been deployed by mid-April, Mr. Klein went on. The demilitarization phase, begun by 21 May, had been completed by 20 June, with some 16,000 Serb regular troops and 120 tanks moved out.*

Following demilitarization, efforts had been directed towards "building linkages" that would reintegrate the region, the Transitional Administrator observed. The railroad link between Croatia and Serbia had been rebuilt, telephone links re-established, and the Belgrade-Zagreb highway reopened, he added. The zone of separation, set up after demilitarization, had "now been turned into an open market-place", and on the weekend of 28 and 29 September, for example, some 11,000 people from both sides had met there and exchanged goods, Mr. Klein said.

In addition, it dissolved the Committee set up by its resolution 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, and expressed its gratitude for the Committee's work.

Carl Bildt, High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 26 September told the press at Headquarters that the "most difficult and most decisive phase of peace implementation" in 1996, following the elections, would be the setting up of the common institutions, the

arrangements for "true and genuine power sharing" that was at the core of the peace process. "I think we can achieve it, and I am convinced we must achieve it", he stressed.

The Secretary-General on 21 June had reported *(S/1996/460)* that the Bosnian Peace Agreement achieved its "immediate aim of stopping the conflict and bloodshed". Among its most difficult tasks, however, was to "assuage the intense and widespread fear and desire for retribution resulting from a vicious conflict in which civilians were the principal targets and victims", he said.

In a 26 June report *(S/1996/472)*, **the Secretary-General** stated that the Organization had been working to "bring divided populations together" in the former Yugoslavia, and "families and individuals who had not seen or heard from each other in many years are finally in touch". After five years of war and tension, there were "signs of a new spirit of cooperation between the parties", he added.

In Florence on 14 June, **the Conference of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)** noted *(S/1996/446)* that while "everyday life was improving all the time at an accelerating rate for the vast majority of people", the parties were "still erecting obstacles in the way of cooperation between themselves, with the international community and in the way of achieving a single, democratic and pluralistic Bosnia and Herzegovina".

In his second report of 4 July *(S/1996/542)*, **High Representative Carl Bildt** stressed that the parties' failure to secure full freedom of movement was a "major impediment to the return of refugees and displaced persons". There was troubling evidence of a "trend not only to accept, but also to institutionalize ethnic separation".

Speaking to the press at United Nations Headquarters on 31 July, Mr. Bildt said, "we have every reason to be concerned about the future". Bosnia was "not a unitary country", but a "highly decentralized country with two entities". The international community's involvement would have to be "wider in terms of geographical emphasis and longer in terms of time", he suggested. It would have to be "involved in different ways with the uncertainties over the stability" of south-eastern Europe for years to come. "There is no exit strategy, primarily for European countries. I mean the West of Europe can't exit from Europe", the High Representative remarked.

On 4 July, Mr. Bildt had reported that while there had been some improvement by the parties to comply with their obligations with respect to war crimes and cooperation with the Tribunal, the "record is incomplete and inadequate". To date, only the authorities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had "partially complied", while on the territory of Republika Srpska there had been "no attempts to live up to the obligations of the Peace Agreement on this point", he declared.

The fact that the Bosnian Serb Commander, General Ratko Mladic, had been present in Belgrade on 21 May attending the funeral of General Djukic and had not been arrested by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)—FRY—was "further evidence of the blatant failure of that State to comply with its clear and overriding legal obligation to execute orders of this Tribunal", **Antonio Cassese, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)** stated on 22 May. A warrant for General Mladic's arrest had been served on the FRY authorities many months ago, he stressed.

In a letter to the Security Council President *(S/1996/364)*, **Judge Cassese** also reported that another indictee, Colonel Veselin Sljivancanin, had also been "seen on 21 May 1996 in Belgrade attending the funeral".

On 8 August, **the Security Council** condemned the failure of the Republika Srpska and the FRY to execute arrest warrants against Radovan Karadzic, former leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and General Mladic, as well as the failure of the Bosnian Croat leadership and the Croatian Government to comply with the Tribunal's orders "regarding several persons indicted for war crimes".

Through a statement by its **President for August, Tono Eitel of Germany, the Security Council** on 8 August stressed the importance of the agreement reached by the Bosniac and Bosnian Croat leaderships in Mostar that "at last secured Bosnian Croat participation in a unified city administration ... on the basis of the election results of 30 June 1996". It called upon the Bosnian Muslims and Croats to "accelerate their efforts for the establishment of a fully functioning Federation, which is an essential prerequisite for peace". The parties were called upon to "stop the trend of ethnic separation" and "preserve their multicultural and multi-ethnic heritage".

On 25 July, **Secretary-General Javier Solana of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** informed

> Respect for human rights and rule of law are prerequisites for a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite commitments to uphold the highest standards of human rights protections, the parties have not fulfilled their obligations in this regard. While it would be unrealistic to expect immediate implementation of all the human rights provisions of the Peace Agreement, the parties have not taken concrete steps to eliminate conditions which threaten the goal of a multi-ethnic society which had been envisioned in the Peace Agreement. The political leaders must commit themselves to ensuring that the full range of civil and political rights are protected for all citizens.
>
> *—Report of High Representative Carl Bildt to the Secretary-General, 4 July 1996 (S/1996/542)*

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali that the multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) remained prepared to "ensure a secure environment and will not tolerate any deliberate attacks on United Nations or other personnel engaged in implementing the Peace Agreement".

In his eighth report *(S/1996/600)* on IFOR operations, **Mr. Solana** stated that the Force, which comprised about 53,000 personnel deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, had placed "increased emphasis" on support to the OSCE, in preparation for the 14 September elections. It was "particularly valuable", he went on, that Richard Holbrooke, the United States Special Envoy to the Balkans, had been able to achieve the "immediate and permanent withdrawal" of Radovan Karadzic from all political activities.

On 21 June, he reported *(S/1996/465)* that IFOR had "passed the mid-point" of its mission and many successes had been achieved over the past six months. However, peace remained fragile, and there were "still many hurdles to overcome".

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali on 21 June noted that the International Police Task Force (IPTF) could make the most effective contribution to the peace process by shaping a "new concept of policing for the common good". But if police forces continued to discriminate against, harass and intimidate citizens who are not of their own ethnicity, the efforts of IPTF would have "little chance of success", he stressed.

It appeared that the Republika Srpska remained "active in its efforts aimed at separation", while within the Federation, the actions of the Bosnian Croat leadership in areas under their control demonstrated their intention to "assert a far-reaching autonomy", Mr. Boutros-Ghali reported, adding that some elements of the Bosniac leadership also seemed "similarly inclined to favour separatist trends".

UNTAES

By unanimously adopting resolution 1069 (1996), the Security Council on 30 July authorized the deployment of 100 military observers as part of the UNTAES in Croatia for a further six months, until 15 January 1997. Its present mandate was also to end on that date. On 15 August, the Council affirmed its readiness to consider extending this mandate still further, noting the importance of the UNTAES' ability to complete its tasks, including the organization of elections "promptly and in full".

On 3 July, **the Council** had noted with appreciation that the demilitarization in the area "proceeded smoothly and was completed on 20 June 1996".

In a period of less than six months, UNTAES had achieved "significant progress in the implementation of its mandate" and contributed to the "gradual normalization of relations" between Croatia and the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro), the **Secretary-General** reported on 26 June *(S/1996/472)*. However, the return of displaced persons "remained a daunting"challenge.

Through a 3 July statement by its **President for July, Alain Dejammet of France, the Security Council** expressed deep concern at the "failure by the Croatian Government to take sufficient measures to safeguard the rights of the local Serb population and to ensure their safety and well-being". **Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali** on 21 June had expressed concern at the "prevailing lawlessness, particularly in the area around Knin", and the lack of progress in the investigation and prosecution of "numerous crimes committed against the local Serb population during last summer's military operations".

In a statement on 22 May by its **President for May, Qin Huasun of China, the Security Council** stressed that both parties must "refrain from any unilateral action which could hinder the implementation of the Basic Agreement including the process of demilitarization".

In noting the law on amnesty adopted in Croatia on 17 May, the Council called upon the Government to make it "comprehensive as soon as possible".

UNMOP

In determining that the situation in Croatia continued to be a "threat to international peace and security", **the Security Council** on 15 July authorized the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) to continue monitoring the demilitarization of that area until 15 January 1997. It acted by unanimously adopting resolution 1066

UNICEF/OSCE Youth Poll

The children of Bosnia and Herzegovina were to take part in a Youth Poll, sponsored jointly by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This, according to UNICEF, will give children an opportunity to communicate their thoughts and wishes to adults and to politicians running in the elections.

The IFOR and UNICEF staff will be handing out ballots to children and, to further emphasize the importance policymakers should give to children and their future, a poster will be distributed, with a Dear Politician letter from a child superimposed on a child's drawing.

"Children are rarely given an opportunity to voice what is on their minds. Articles 12 and 13 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child call for children's participation and freedom of expression. We saw this poll as an opportunity for children to be heard during this critical time for the purpose of Bosnia and Herzegovina", said Tom McDermott, UNICEF Special Representative.

SARAJEVO: Back on Track

After 1,564 days, a train left Sarajevo; President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had commented that that was the "second lifting of the siege of Sarajevo", **High Representative Carl Bildt** observed. The train had gone all the way down to Mostar, with cheering crowds at the stations, and then continued to the Adriatic coast. "The symbolism of that is enormous", since the fact that the train had reached the sea would have been "unthinkable even a month ago".

The joint international effort to keep essential utilities functioning and begin the restoration of Sarajevo's physical infrastructure made a "real difference" by enabling the people to survive, particularly during winter months, and by "giving them hope for the future", **Mr. Boutros-Ghali** said in a 28 May report *(S/1996/381)*.

On 30 April, after two years of operation, "often in the most difficult circumstances", the Office of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo had been closed, the Secretary-General said, paying tribute to the "sterling performance" of Special Coordinator William Eagleton and his staff, and thanking the Governments and organizations that had "so generously contributed to the Plan of Action" for the restoration of essential public services in Sarajevo.

The Dayton Peace Agreement had opened a "new era in which the restoration of the essential public services in Sarajevo has been supplanted by a comprehensive international effort to help reconstruct the whole of the country", the Secretary-General said. As of 15 April, nearly $100 million had been made available for 285 projects. In addition, assistance in kind by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the IFOR military engineering assets, "valued at $30 million at least", had been provided, mainly for emergency repairs.

(1996). Established as an independent mission on 1 February, UNMOP consists of 28 UN military observers and is commanded by Colonel Göran Gunnarsson of Sweden.

The Secretary-General on 27 June, in recommending a three-month extension of UNMOP, until 15 October, reported *(S/1996/502)* that the situation in Prevlaka had improved, and the United Nations military observers had made and continued to make an important contribution to stability in the area, "promoting a better climate for bilateral negotiations" between Croatia and the FRY. Both Governments had requested the continuation of the UNMOP mandate, he added.

"While the UNMOP presence in Prevlaka cannot continue indefinitely, I believe that if it were to be removed at this stage, one or other party could seek to fill the vacuum created by its departure and the ensuing military tensions could prejudice the process of the two sides' political negotiations on their mutual relations", he stated.

UNPREDEP

The **Security Council** on 30 May, in reaffirming its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), extended the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) for another six months, until 30 November.

In adopting resolution 1058 (1996) by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (the Russian Federation), the Council noted that the security situation of the FYROM had improved. Nevertheless, it recognized that it was "too early to be confident" that stability had been established in the region and expressed the hope that future developments would not undermine confidence and stability in the country or threaten its security.

Before the vote, **Sergey Lavrov of the Russian Federation** had said his country felt that a four-month extension would be more appropriate in view of the dramatic improvement in the situation in the region.

UNPREDEP—the first preventive force deployed by the United Nations—had been and continued to be a success for the United Nations, the FYROM and the region as a whole, **the Secretary-General** stated on 23 May *(S/1966/373)*. **Its mere presence had "undoubtedly had a reassuring, stabilizing and confidence-building effect", its military operations had "helped to reduce tensions on the country's borders and to ensure that stability there is impaired neither by unintended military confrontations nor by the activities of armed smugglers", he reported. Moreover, the Force had played an important role in helping the FYROM to "establish its statehood and to consolidate its security", the Secretary-General stressed.** ❑

GEORGIA:

'Continued Deadlock' Reported; UNOMIG Extended

Deep concern at the "continued deadlock in the efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia", was expressed by **the Security Council** on 12 July as it extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), until 31 January 1997.

By **unanimously adopting resolution 1065 (1996)**, the Council also reaffirmed its commitment to the necessity of defining Abkhazia's status in strict accordance with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, within its internationally recognized borders, and underlined the "unacceptability of any action by the Abkhaz leadership in contravention of these principles".

The parties to the conflict, in particular the Abkhaz side, were called upon to achieve "substantive progress without further delay towards a comprehensive political settlement", and to cooperate fully with the efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Russian Federation as facilitator.

The Council condemned the continued obstruction by the Abkhaz side of the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in secure conditions, and stressed the "unacceptability of any linkage" of their return with the question of Abkhazia's political status.

In condemning "ethnically motivated killings and other ethnically related acts of violence", the Council affirmed the "unacceptability of the demographic changes resulting from the conflict".

Standstill

Since the core issue in the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict—the definition of a political status for Abkhazia acceptable to both sides—was still unresolved, the political process remained "at a standstill", **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** reported on 1 July *(S/1996/507)*. Nevertheless, he was still convinced that negotiations between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities continued to be the "only means of eventually settling the issue and thus solving the humanitarian problems of the refugees and displaced persons".

The Secretary-General's Special Envoy, Edouard Brunner, and his resident Deputy, Liviu Bota, remained ready to carry forward their efforts towards finding a solution, Mr. Boutros-Ghali stated. Moreover, he himself was offering to meet "either separately or jointly with the leaders of the two sides if this will advance the peace process".

The current lack of progress, however, called into question how serious the parties were in their search for peace, the Secretary-General said. Nor were additional measures by the United Nations to improve conditions in the security and restricted weapons zones likely to prove effective "unless the parties demonstrate the necessary will to cooperate", he observed.

Also, the Organization's financial situation was such that "I cannot continue to request resources for peacemaking and peace-keeping in situations where there is little prospect of making progress", the Secretary-General warned. It was "in the hope that the parties can still be persuaded to help reactivate the peace process" that he recommended a further mandate extension of UNOMIG.

President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia on 6 July warned *(S/1996/527)* the Security Council that the current situation in Abkhazia seemed "likely to remain frozen for years". In drawing the Council's attention to, among other things, the "rampant ethnic cleansing conducted by the Abkhaz separatists" and the expulsion of the Georgian population from Abkhazia, he declared that the protracted conflict also remained a "heavy burden on the shoulders of Georgia, seriously hampering its economic recovery and market reforms and exacerbating social tensions". ⌟

The Drugs Danger: Transcaucasus Transit for Trafficking

The Transcaucasus—a subregion consisting of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia—has emerged as a new corridor for transit trafficking in illicit drugs from south-west and central Asia to Turkey, western Europe and the Russian Federation. Yet, the three countries are not in a position to cope with the growing drug problem due to a lack of training, experience and equipment.

In response to this alarming situation, the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) has begun to provide drug control assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, particularly in the training of drug law enforcement personnel.

According to the UNDCP, illicit cultivation of opium poppy and cannabis is increasing in the three former Soviet republics, which form a compact subregion in the Caucasus. Drug abuse is also rapidly spreading, particularly among youth. *(See also pages 26-27.)*

RWANDA:
Living with the Legacy

UNICEF Photo 00195/0119

It has been more than two years since Rwanda was devastated by genocide, when 500,000 or more of its citizens—mainly Tutsis but also moderates among Hutus—were killed. An estimated 1.6 million refugees still live outside the country. About 78,000 prisoners and detainees are awaiting trial for their participation in the genocide and other gross violations of international humanitarian law. **Meanwhile, sporadic killings continue to be reported by international human rights observers stationed throughout the country resulting from an ongoing insurgency and respective countermeasures. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, set up to try suspects in the 1994 genocide, has already issued over 20 indictments and arrest warrants on charges that include genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the Geneva Conventions.**

Among those indicted is Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, former Director of the Cabinet of the Minister of Defence in Rwanda, who is alleged to have masterminded the massacres of Rwandan civilians, as well as the murders of 10 Belgian soldiers assigned to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

Colonel Bagosora is presently being detained in Cameroon, along with several other genocide suspects. A court order was issued on 17 May for their transfer to the Tribunal's Detention Unit in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, where a small number of indicted individuals are currently held, among them Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Jean Paul Akayesu and Clement Kayishema, who were transferred to the Detention Facility from Zambia. The accused are being assisted by counsels assigned by the Tribunal.

New UN office

On 31 May, **the Security Council** supported the recommendation of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali *(S/1996/286/Add.1)* that a new United Nations Office in Rwanda (UNOR) be established for an initial six-month period. In a report to the Council, he said UNOR would be set up as a political office to be headed by a Special Representative.

Expressing satisfaction that agreement had been reached with the Government of Rwanda on UNOR's establishment, **Mr. Boutros-Ghali** said, **"I am convinced that an office of this kind will enhance the ability of the United Nations system as a whole to provide the support Rwanda needs for its efforts to solve the grievous problems that still confront it."**

UNOR's functions would, to a large extent, be determined by the wishes of the Government, according to the Secretary-General. However, based on previous experience, he said, they could involve providing advice on political aspects of Rwanda's current problems, especially in the fields of national reconciliation, the return of refugees, and relations with neighbouring States. The presence of the Office could also facilitate high-level coordination of all United Nations system activities inside the country.

The Secretary-General went on to say that Rwanda had not approved the establishment of a planned United Nations radio station, but had instead offered the United Nations three hours of air time each evening on the Government's own station. ⌟

International Community Pledges $617 Million

More than 30 donors pledged $617 million towards the 1996-1998 medium-term development plan of Rwanda, at a 20 June meeting in Geneva co-organized by the United Nations Development Programme and the Rwandan Government. It was described by its Prime Minister, Pierre-Celestin Rwigema, as an opportunity for Rwanda to "show to the international community our will to resolve some of the challenges which face us today".

Arms Restriction Imposed on Rwandan Government Ended

In accordance with paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1011 (1995) of 16 August 1995, the restrictions imposed by paragraph 13 of resolution 918 (1994) on the sale or supply of arms and related *matériel* to the Government of Rwanda were terminated effective 1 September. In this regard, no notifications are required to be submitted by States of exports from their territories to the Government of Rwanda or by the Government of imports of arms and related *matériel*.

However, restrictions remain in effect against the sale and supply of arms and related *matériel* to non-governmental forces for use in Rwanda, and all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related *matériel* of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts, to such non-governmental forces in Rwanda or to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if such sale or supply is for the purpose of using such arms or *matériel* within Rwanda.

Seminar on Lessons Learned

A comprehensive seminar on lessons learned from UNAMIR was held in Plainsboro, New Jersey, United States, from 12 to 14 June, bringing together troop contributing countries, external experts and United Nations officials involved in the operation, as part of an ongoing exercise to draw lessons from the experiences of the United Nations in peace-keeping, in order to improve the functioning of current operations and better prepare for future ones.

BURUNDI
Warning of the Worst

I continue to believe that the international community must allow for the possibility that the worst may happen and that genocide could occur in Burundi. In that case, whatever Governments may think now, military intervention to save lives might become an inescapable imperative. It would be quicker and more effective if it had been planned in advance by countries with the necessary military and logistic capacity. I appeal again to those countries to undertake the necessary contingency planning. The United Nations is ready to help, within its limited capacity, but I am convinced that it is a delusion to think that such an operation could be planned, deployed and commanded by the United Nations as if it were a peace-keeping operation.

—Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi, 15 August 1996

The Security Council on 29 July, in condemning the actions that had led to the "overthrow of constitutional order in Burundi" on 25 July, urged the country's military leaders to "restore constitutional government and processes, including the continuation of the elected National Assembly and civil institutions and respect for human rights".

Through a statement by its President for July, Alain Dejammet of France, the Council also called upon all Burundian parties and leaders to "halt all violence and engage immediately in concerted efforts to achieve a lasting national settlement and reconciliation". It stressed their "responsibility to protect the lives of all persons", including Burundian President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, Prime Minister Antione Nduwayo and members of their Government, and expected them to "maintain democratic institutions and to enter into negotiations for a peaceful resolution of the crisis". All leaders were called upon to respect the Constitution and the will of the people of Burundi.

The Council reiterated its "full support for regional mediation efforts", including those of former President Julius Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania and of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 25 July urged all concerned to uphold the Constitution and bear in mind that the international community would "on no account accept a change of government by force or other illegitimate means in Burundi" and called upon the armed forces, all political parties and the people of Burundi to "show restraint and prevent a new outbreak of violence". He supported calls for a regional summit to discuss ways of calming the situation.

Arusha Summit

The Second Arusha Regional Summit on Burundi—attended by Presidents Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Pasteur Bizimingu of Rwanda, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo of Zaire, and hosted by President Benjamin William Mkapa of the United Republic of Tanzania—took place on 31 July in Arusha.

In a Joint Communiqué, the Summit called upon *(A/51/264-*

Humanitarian Corridors Urged

On 22 August, the United Nations Children's Fund confirmed it had no plans to suspend its operations in Burundi despite violence there. UNICEF has eight international and 74 national staff members in the country and its programmes are continuing in health, water and sanitation, education, nutrition, psycho-social recovery and family tracing.

UNICEF is concerned that children are already being affected by the sanctions recently imposed on Burundi, and that the situation will deteriorate unless steps are taken to ensure their special protection. Fuel shortages are hampering cross-border reunification programmes for 20,000 unaccompanied children and may paralyze immunization activities since there are no supplies of polio or BCG vaccines in the country. Fuel shortages will also jeopardize the supplementary feeding programme which is currently reaching 30,000 malnourished children who have been uprooted from their homes. UNICEF currently has only three to five days' supply of fuel.

UNICEF, together with other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, has been advocating protected supply routes, or so-called 'humanitarian corridors', to allow the continued flow of food, fuel, vaccines, medical supplies and other items essential for the well-being of children.

S/1996/620) the Bujumbura regime to: immediately restore the National Assembly, which was a "democratic institution of legality" that had derived its mandate from the people of Burundi; unban political parties and; undertake "immediate and unconditional negotiations with all the parties to the conflict", including "parties and armed factions inside and outside the country".

The Summit also decided to "exert maximum pressure on the regime in Bujumbura, including the imposition of economic sanctions in order to bring about conditions which are conducive to a return to normalcy in Burundi". **It declared its preparedness to contribute towards the adoption of "measures aimed at avoiding a catastrophe in the country in the event of the further deterioration of the situation". In that regard, the Summit strongly stressed the "importance of closer cooperation and better coordination" between the United Nations and the OAU, as well as with other countries of the region.**

The 19 July "massacres of civilians, including that of more than 300 women, children and elderly men in Bugendana commune in Gitega province", were condemned by **the Security Council** on 24 July.

In deploring the "recent forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees" from camps in Kibezi and Ruvumu, the Council called upon the Government to honour its obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and "desist from further refoulement of refugees". It was also "concerned at reports of Rwandan cooperation in the forced repatriation process".

The Government of Burundi has asked the United Nations to defuse the crisis created by the sanctions imposed on that country by the States of the Great Lakes region. The Permanent Representative of Burundi, who met the Secretary-General on 11 September, was assured by him that the United Nations was doing its best to increase humanitarian assistance and support efforts towards national reconciliation in Burundi.

Reporting to the Security Council on the Bugendana massacre of civilians, **Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali** on 22 July said *(S/1996/591)*: With respect to the "ongoing security operations to close down the Kibezi and Ruvumu camps for Rwandan refugees", more than 3,000 refugees had been expelled to Rwanda, 4,000 were said to have fled into the hills, and more than 12,000 were "under guard at a local football stadium awaiting expulsion". In addition, many other refugees had been reported missing after attacks on the camps. "Kibezi camp is said to have been ransacked and its huts destroyed."

Those reports only underlined the "pressing need for the international community to take concrete and immediate action to halt the cycle of violence and to prevent another catastrophe in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa", the Secretary-General said. "It is for this reason that we need to press forward with the ongoing contingency planning for a multinational force", he stated.

Also on 22 July, in condemning in the "strongest possible terms" the wanton killings of civilians in Bugendana and those who had carried them out, Mr. Boutros-Ghali said the massacre was "all too reminiscent of the genocide experienced in Rwanda two years ago". It was "just the most recent of a long line of incidents that underline the urgent need for regional and international efforts to restore peace and stability in Burundi", he stressed.

Paolo Sergio Pinheiro of Brazil, Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Burundi, on 18 July declared that the international community could "no longer tolerate the catastrophic evolution" of the situation in that country. Returning from his third mission to Burundi (1-17 July), the Special Rapporteur concluded that the "waywardness of the country is becoming more pronounced, bringing with it the risk that the situation could degenerate at any moment". That, in turn, could provoke an "unprecedented humanitarian disaster in the Great Lakes region", he warned.

"The victims in Burundi are counted today in the hundreds and in the thousands. The army is losing control of the activities of its soldiers on the ground and is fighting rebels or armed groups, whose repeated attacks in most of the country are causing heavy casualties. Civilians—particularly women, children and the elderly—are the victims of an endless cycle of attacks and reprisals from armed groups and members of the armed forces."

—Paulo Sergio Pinheiro

Massacres and killings "most often occurred in the absence of witnesses", the Special Rapporteur pointed out. As a result, a number of non-governmental organizations had left the country or reduced their staff, and the United Nations agencies, too, had been forced to cut down on their programmes. In fact, Mr. Pinheiro went on, "information on the humanitarian consequences of the conflict in Burundi do not cover more than 20 per cent of the national territory, vast expanses of which are now out of the reach of any system of international monitoring". ⌟



The Secretary-General was following closely developments in Somalia and had been in touch with the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), as well as with Somali leaders, Sylvana Foa, **Spokesman for the Secretary-General,** said on 2 August, the day after clan leader General Mohammed Farah Aidid died from wounds in factional fighting in south Mogadishu.

"The United Nations remains ready to assist the Somali people in all efforts to further national reconciliation.We hope the Somali people, who have suffered so much over the past five years, will give peace a real chance and work together to end the conflict", the Spokesman said. She recalled that 136 United Nations peace-keepers had died while serving in the country, 99 of them in hostile action. Another 423 had been wounded.

At the request of the Secretary-General, UNPOS convened a meeting on 9 August in Nairobi of interested regional organizations to undertake a coordinated assessment of the situation.

United Nations personnel in Somalia include several hundred national staff in Mogadishu, as well as 32 international staff stationed throughout the rest of the country, mostly from humanitarian agencies, such as the World Food Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

On 30 April, the Secretary-General had met in Nairobi with representatives of Somali factions and assured them that the United Nations would not "abandon" the strife-torn country and would continue its assistance efforts there. He also discussed ways in which the United Nations could better assist in the reconciliation process, and stressed that it was committed to finding a solution to their problems.

On 14 August, the High Commissioner for Refugees announced that a group of 10 Somali refugee representatives was visiting northwest Somalia at the start of a UNHCR programme to promote the voluntary repatriation of some 275,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia.

The group was looking at 10 potential returnee areas which have enjoyed relative peace and stability over the past 19 months. "The visit is going very well and we are hopeful that the repatriation movement will go on as planned", said **Kyaw Zin Hla, head of the UNHCR office in northwest Somalia.**

Similar refugee visits to Somalia are to be scheduled shortly. Before the end of 1996, UNHCR is organizing a pilot repatriation project involving 10,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia. Also, a full programme to bring home 10,000 Somali refugees is being planned for 1997. Since January 1995, peace and order had been restored in large parts of Somalia's northwest region, allowing UNHCR to continue modest rehabilitation projects with support from the international community.

ANGOLA:
Progressing Peace Process Hindered by Hurdles

"We are now reaching the decisive juncture in the peace process of a country that has not known peace for over 30 years", **Angolan Vice-Minister without Portfolio General Higino Carneiro** told the Security Council on 11 July, as that body voted to extend the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) for another three months, until 11 October, acknowledging recent progress in the peace process, but also expressing regret that implementation remained behind schedule. Declaring it would place "special emphasis" in the future on the progress demonstrated by the parties, the Council, in adopting unanimously resolution 1064 (1996), underscored its readiness to consider still "further measures".

Progress was noted in a number of important areas, including the adoption of a framework agreement on military matters and the efforts of both parties in lifting checkpoints and opening major routes and the registration so far of over 52,000 troops of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in quartering areas. The quartering and disarming of UNITA troops "are crucial components of the peace process which are fundamental to its success", the Council said, as it called on UNITA to complete the process and hand over all arms. It also commended the Angolan Government for its new Amnesty Law, the quartering of the rapid reaction police and the ongoing withdrawal to barracks of its armed forces.

The Council also asked both parties to move ahead with the formation of a Government of national unity and national reconciliation, and the seating of all elected members in the National Assembly. They should also move forward the constitutional issues and incorporate UNITA personnel into the State administration, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the national police.

Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi were encouraged to meet as soon as possible in Angola, in order to resolve remaining differences. The Government was also asked to provide facilities for the establishment of an independent United Nations radio, and for UNITA to complete the transformation of its own station, Vorgan, into a non-partisan station.

On 22 May, the Council had approved simultaneous letters urging President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi to speed up the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

UNICEF/1161/Murray Lee

UNAVEM is giving WHO and UNICEF helicopters, fuel, land transportation and communications support in a campaign against polio. United Nations soldiers are themselves vaccinating children throughout the country.

With a strength of over 7,000 military, police and civilian personnel, UNAVEM III has become the United Nations' largest peace-keeping operation. It is targeted to complete its two-year mission in February 1997, and contingency planning has already begun for the phased downsizing of its military component as soon as the quartering process has been successfully concluded, and the incorporation of UNITA troops into the FAA and the formation of the unified armed forces have reached an advanced stage.

"If the peace process is to succeed, the parties, especially UNITA, must show greater readiness to implement, in good time, the commitments they have entered into. Unless they do so, the international community is unlikely to make the similar efforts that are required of it also", Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said in a report on 27 June *(S/1996/503)*. "The military environment in the country remained calm and only minor troop movement and skirmishes were reported" since 30 April, the time of his previous report on UNAVEM, the Secretary-General said. However, a marked increase in violent crime was causing serious concern. The law and order situation had become particularly precarious in the areas from which UNITA troops had been withdrawn.

The general humanitarian situation was gradually improving, the report stated. However, restrictions on the free circulation of people and goods in some areas were ongoing matters of concern. With respect to human rights, both the Government and UNITA promised to cooperate fully with UNAVEM in its investigations, it said. ⌟

LIBERIA:
Reservoir of Resolve Replenished

The civil war in Liberia broke out nearly seven years ago—in December 1989—putting an end to more than a century of relative peace and stability in the long-independent West African State. International and regional efforts since then have led to at least 10 peace agreements, the latest of which, signed in Abuja in 1995, provided for a cease-fire, disarmament and demobilization, and a six-member Council of State composed of faction leaders, who were to hold power until elections could be held in late August of this year. That deadline has passed and a new one set for 30 May 1997. To guarantee that elections are free and fair, basic conditions of peace and security would first have to be satisfied, and the implementation of the Abuja Agreement would need to resume.

UNHCR Photo 23113/L. Taylor

The faction leaders have clearly demonstrated their disregard for the aspirations of the Liberian people for peace. They have shown wanton disrespect for the United Nations, ECOWAS and the international community, and have forced most international personnel to relocate to other countries.

—The Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, 21 May 1996

The United Nations has been involved in the peace process since the commencement of the civil crisis in Liberia. In spite of the setbacks, we must not allow ourselves to be discouraged. Liberians have the faith and the determination, as recent developments confirm, that the path ahead will ultimately lead to the restoration of peace and democracy in Liberia.

—William Bull, Liberia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 30 August 1996

The Liberian factions should implement "fully and expeditiously" all their agreements and commitments, the Security Council stressed on 30 August, as it voted to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for another three months, until 30 November.

In unanimously adopting resolution 1071 (1996), the Council said the continued support of the international community for the peace process, including UNOMIL's participation, was "contingent on the Liberian factions demonstrating their commitment to resolve their differences peacefully and to achieve national reconciliation" in accordance with a plan reached on 17 August in Abuja.

That plan, adopted as a Final Communiqué *(S/1996/679)* at the summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), extended the 1995 Abuja Agreement until June 1997 and established a revised timetable for its implementation: the restoration of the cease-fire by 31 August 1996; the holding of free and fair elections on 30 May 1997; and the installation of a new government by 15 June 1997. The summit also decided on possible measures to be applied against persons obstructing the implementation of the Abuja Agreement. It agreed as well to the appointment of Ruth Perry as the Chairman of the Council of State. The results of the ECOWAS meeting had been "arrived at in part thanks to the cooperation of the United Nations and the countries of the region", a Spokesman of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, adding that "this is a perfect example of the United Nations cooperating with a regional organization".

Proposals for enhanced UN role

Under the latest resolution, the Secretary-General is to report back by 15 October with proposals for assistance which UNOMIL or other United Nations agencies could provide in support of the renewed peace process, including in the election process, disarmament, demobilization and verification of compliance by the factions.

UNOMIL's deployments are to be maintained at an appropriate level as recommended by the Secretary-General, who had suggested the deployment of an additional 24 military observers, as well as additional civilian personnel, and said he would advise on any planned further deployments.

By other terms of the text, the Council stressed the importance of close contacts and enhanced coordination between UNOMIL and the ECOWAS' Monitoring Observer Group (ECOMOG), and demanded freedom of movement for UNOMIL and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

In a 22 August report *(S/1996/684)*, **Mr. Boutros-Ghali** recommended the extension of UNOMIL and stressed that, despite substantial improvement since restoration on 26 May of the cease-fire in Monrovia, the security situation in the city remained a cause for concern. Recent weeks had witnessed a new wave of violence in the capital, some of which may have been politically motivated. However, in view of recent progress, he intended to deploy the additional essential military and civilian personnel to assist UNOMIL to respond to developments on the ground.

He urged faction leaders to remember Somalia and take this opportunity to restore peace. "For if they do not, the international community may have no choice but to disengage from Liberia", he said.

On 31 May, the Security Council extended UNOMIL's mandate until 31 August, noting that its continued presence would depend on the much larger peace-keeping force stationed there—the over 8,000-strong ECOMOG. It also demanded the restoration of the cease-fire.

In the first week following the outbreak of intense fighting on 6 April, there was a complete breakdown of law and order in Monrovia, and the bulk of UNOMIL's 93 unarmed military observers was relocated.

In unanimously adopting resolution 1059 (1996), the Security Council required that the Liberian factions allow ECOMOG to deploy, and called on them to implement fully all of their commitments, particularly the Abuja Agreement, stressing it would be ready, if the situation deteriorated further, to consider possible measures against those who did not cooperate with the resumption of the peace process.

Strict compliance by States with the arms embargo was also called for, as was the provision of security by ECOMOG for UNOMIL observers and civilian staff, as provided for in the 1993 Cotonou Agreement.

Possible catastrophic consequences

In a 21 May report *(S/1996/362)*, **the Secretary-General** had emphasized that UNOMIL's continuance depended on that of the ECOWAS Monitoring Observer Group, which had informed faction leaders that it would have to reconsider its involvement in the country unless the cease-fire and safe haven status of Monrovia were restored, and the deployment of ECOMOG, disarmament in the city, and the inclusiveness of the Liberian National Transitional Government were facilitated.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali stressed that if ECOMOG did decide to withdraw, the results "could be catastrophic not only for the country but also for the subregion as a whole" and UNOMIL would have no choice but to withdraw.

Ambassador James Jonah of Sierra Leone, who visited Liberia as the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, told correspondents on 9 August that the determination of the Organization of African Unity and ECOWAS to impose effective sanctions had had an effect.

"The warlords now know that they do not enjoy much sympathy", Mr. Jonah said. While there was broad consensus on the need to hold elections, he hoped all the parties could agree on the proper criteria, "because merely holding elections is not enough—they must be free and fair. Under the present circumstances, that is not possible." ⌟

Devastating scenes met relief workers as they entered the strife-torn city of Tubmanburg in Liberia, where factional fighting had been preventing people from leaving the city to farm or buy food, according to the World Food Programme (WFP), which began trucking in emergency food on 10 September to revive nearly 5,000 severely malnourished children and feed another 10,000 older children and adults for two weeks. Continuing operations are expected to cover the estimated 35,000 people suffering from extreme hunger in the city.

"The children are all malnourished, many have swollen hands, swollen feet and swollen bellies, and you can count their ribs", a WFP official said.

WESTERN SAHARA:
Willingness Wanting

It is unlikely that the identification process in Western Sahara will be resumed soon, **the Secretary-General** said on 20 August, adding that the deadlock could be broken and progress achieved only when both parties—the Government of Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario)—recognized that identification was "a scrupulous process based on clear principles, and in the context of a broader agreement".

Appealing to the two parties to demonstrate flexibility and cooperate with efforts to find a solution to their differences, the Secretary-General called on both sides to uphold the cease-fire as efforts continued to seek a solution to the current impasse, and to cooperate with his Acting Special Representative, Erik Jensen.

On 29 May, the Security Council declared its support for the Secretary-General's proposal to reduce by 20 per cent the military component of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), while extending the Mission's mandate until 30 November.

Acting on the basis of an 8 May report by **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** *(S/1996/343)* in which he made that recommendation, the Council, under resolution 1056 (1996) adopted unanimously, also temporarily suspended the voter identification process, which aims at identifying those eligible to participate in the referendum. The suspension is to remain in effect until both parties demonstrated their commitment to resuming and completing the process without further obstacles, it said.

The Council reiterated its commitment to the holding as soon as possible of a "free, fair and impartial referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara". It deeply regretted the fact that "the required willingness does not exist to give MINURSO the cooperation needed for it to resume and complete the identification process, and that there has therefore been no significant progress towards implementation of the Settlement Plan".

UN Photo 131153

The Council also supported the proposal of the Secretary-General to "maintain a political office to continue the dialogue with the parties and the two neighbouring countries, and to facilitate any other effort that could help set the parties on a course towards an agreed formula".

The Council encouraged the parties to consider additional ways to "create confidence between themselves in order to remove obstacles to implementation of the Settlement Plan". It reminded the parties that if significant progress was not achieved, it would have to consider other measures, including possible further reductions in the strength of MINURSO. It would support resumption of the identification process once the parties had demonstrated the necessary political will, cooperation and flexibility.

On 11 September, the Secretary-General received the President of the Security Council, Alfredo Lopez Cabral of Guinea-Bissau, who had been mandated by Council members to express their appreciation for Mr. Boutros-Ghali's report on Western Sahara. While saluting the fact that the cease-fire still held, Council members wanted to express concern over the lack of progress. They asked the Secretary-General to convey once more to the parties the necessity to find a solution which would allow the identification process to resume. The Secretary-General told the Council President that he was following the situation and was doing his utmost to bring the parties to an agreement. ⌟

EAST TIMOR:
SG Confident of Workable Long-term Solution

The ninth round of talks between the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal on the question of East Timor will take place in New York on 21 December. In the meantime, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, Ismat Kittani, would lead discussions between the two Governments' Permanent Representatives. The Secretary-General, for his part, would continue to consult with East Timorese personalities of various political persuasions. In a report, the Secretary-General writes: "Given the continued desire of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal to find a negotiated settlement of the problem, I am confident that the talks being held under my auspices will lead to the achievement of a workable long-term solution."

MIDDLE EAST:
UNDOF, UNIFIL Extended

The Security Council on 30 May unanimously renewed the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for a further six months, until 30 November. The Force was established in 1974 to supervise the cease-fire called for by the Council between Israeli and Syrian forces, and the agreement on disengagement between them.

Resolution 1057 (1996) also called on the parties to implement immediately Council resolution 338 (1973) and asked the Secretary-General to report on measures taken in this regard.

Also, through a **statement by its President for the month of May, Qin Huasun of China, the Council** said it agreed with the Secretary-General's view that, "despite the present quiet in the Israeli-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East continues to be potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached".

In his report of 23 May *(S/1996/368)*, **the Secretary-General** had also drawn attention to the "serious shortfall in the funding of the Force", with unpaid assessments amounting to some $60.7 million. That sum, approximating twice the UNDOF annual budget, represented money owed to Member States that contributed troops for the Force. The Secretary-General appealed to all Member States to "pay their assessments promptly and in full and to clear all remaining arrears".

Resolution 1068: UNIFIL extended

The Security Council on 30 July unanimously reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries.

While extending the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for another six months, until 31 January 1997, resolution 1068 (1996) also condemned "all acts of violence committed in particular against the Force", and urged all parties to put an end to them. It called upon all parties concerned to "cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate".

"... the Council asserts that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

—Alain Dejammet of France, President of the Security Council, on behalf of the Council, 30 July

The Council welcomed the completion of the streamlining of UNIFIL and encouraged "further efficiency and savings", provided they did not affect the Force's operational capacity.

Through a statement by its President for the month of July, Alain Dejammet of France, the Council commended the Lebanese Government for its successful effort to extend its authority in the south of the country, in full coordination with UNIFIL, but expressed concern over the continuing violence in southern Lebanon and the loss of civilian life, and urged all parties to exercise restraint.

Urging the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) in all its aspects, the Council also reiterated its "full support for the Taif Agreement and for the continued efforts of the Lebanese Government to consolidate peace, national unity and security in the country, while successfully carrying out the reconstruction process".

'Shielding civilians'

In his report of 20 July *(S/1996/575)*, **the Secretary-General** said that, in recommending the six-month extension for UNIFIL, he had especially in mind the Force's role in "shielding the civilian population from the worst effects of violence".

The last six months had been marked by the "serious escalation of hostilities in April, of which the population of southern Lebanon was the primary victim", and "UNIFIL, too, came under fire", Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported.

In the circumstances, however, the Force had "done its best to limit violence and to protect the civilian population", which had become its "de facto mandate", he stated. In pursuing it, UNIFIL had "in fact impeded both sides from pursuing their military aims in the conflict, but only to the extent that the parties have permitted it to do so, out of a presumed desire to avoid escalation", the Secretary-General added.

"As a peace-keeping force, it is powerless when either party is bent on confrontation", he stated, and recalled his predecessor's observation in 1985 that "UNIFIL, for obvious reasons, has no right to impede Lebanese acts of resistance against the occupying force, nor does it have the mandate or the means to prevent countermeasures". UNIFIL today is in the "same difficult and dangerous situation in which it has been since the Israeli forces withdrew to their present lines" at that time, Mr. Boutros-Ghali noted.

UNRWA Photo

In 46th Year, UNRWA Moves to Gaza

On 15 July, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) moved to its new offices in Gaza City. Its departments for education, health, and relief and social services programmes, which had relocated to Amman earlier, continue to be based there. This is the second major move in the Agency's 46-year history. In 1978, because of the difficult security situation, UNRWA had moved its headquarters from Beirut to Vienna.

The move was being financed through special donations from Governments, including Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States as major contributors.

Established by General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) on 8 December 1949, UNRWA began operations on 1 May 1950. The Agency provides education, health, relief and social services to more than 3.2 million registered Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

$10-million Saudi donation

Saudi Arabia made a donation of $10 million on 21 June to support UNRWA projects in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This will fund a number of projects under the second phase of UNRWA's Peace Implementation Programme, launched in October 1994, to which Saudi Arabia is the third largest donor. Four schools will be set up—one in Gaza and three in the West Bank—as well as a mother-and-child health centre at the Askar camp in the West Bank. Shelter rehabilitation in the Gaza Strip will also be assisted.

Two symposia address Palestinian economy

A wide range of issues focusing on building the Palestinian economy was considered at a seminar (21-23 May, Cairo) convened by the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, which was attended by representatives of 62 donor and other Governments, the United Nations system, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Experts discussed international assistance to the Palestinian people, including trade, the role of financial institutions and the housing sector, as well as Palestinian efforts at rehabilitating their economy, and nation-building. Participants also made mention of the need for the Palestinian economy to reduce its dependence on the Israeli economy.

The annual North American NGO Symposium on the Question of Palestine was held in New York from 24 to 26 June, to consider the theme: "Towards a just and comprehensive settlement of the question of Palestine". Convened by the Palestinian Rights Committee, the meeting heard presentations by experts from the United States, Canada, Palestine and Israel on self-determination and state-building, Palestine refugees and displaced persons, as well as the question of Jerusalem. An anthropologist and independent researcher, Rosemary Sayigh, estimated that more than two thirds of the Palestinian people were refugees. ⌟

The Secretary-General on 26 September expressed grave concern over the clashes which erupted in the West Bank and Gaza, and called on both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships to bring an immediate end to the violence and prevent further casualties.

He also callled on the parties to resume in earnest negotiations that will lead to full implementation of the agreements already reached.

On 28 September, the Security Council called for the immediate cessation and reversal of all acts which have resulted in the aggravation of the situation and which have negative implications for the Middle East peace process.

CYPRUS

'One of the Most Densely Militarized Areas in the World'

The Security Council on 28 June extended the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months, until 31 December. The Council was acting on the recommendation of **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,** who in a 7 June report *(S/1996/411)* had stated his belief that the presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus remained "indispensable to achieving the objectives set out by the Security Council" in previous resolutions.

Through its unanimous adoption of resolution 1062 (1996), the Council also deplored the "tragic incident" on 3 June, which involved the fatal shooting of a Greek Cypriot National Guardsman inside the United Nations buffer zone, as well as the hindering by Turkish Cypriot soldiers of UNFICYP personnel attempting to assist the National Guardsman and investigate the incident.

The cease-fire lines of the Turkish forces and the Greek Cypriot National Guard extend approximately 180 kilometres, roughly from east to west across the island. The area between the lines—known as the United Nations buffer zone—covers about 3 per cent of the island and contains some of the most fertile land in Cyprus.

The Secretary-General stated that both sides had continued to improve their military capabilities. The arrival of more Turkish tanks in January 1996 had enhanced the capability of the Turkish forces. The National Guard, which remained much weaker than the Turkish forces in Cyprus, had also continued its comprehensive military upgrading programme. Cyprus has therefore become one of the most densely militarized areas in the world.

The Secretary-General, in a report of 25 June *(S/1996/467)*, emphasized the importance of creating as soon as possible a basis for the resumption of direct talks between the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, and the Greek Cypriot leader, Glafcos Clerides, after he had met with them on 6 and 11 June, respectively.

He said that "interest in the Cyprus question has grown, in particular among the permanent members of the Security Council and members of the European Union and its Commission. ... In addition, the decision of the European Union to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus in 1997 or 1998 is an important new development that should facilitate an overall settlement."

New Special Representative

The Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cyprus, Han Sung-Joo, after a trip to Cyprus and other European capitals, said on 17 July that there was still "a great distance between the positions of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities on how to resolve the Cyprus problem". While he had not returned from his trip with much greater optimism, neither had he returned with much greater pessimism. His next trip to the area would probably take place later in 1996.

Mr. Han, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, was appointed on 1 May as the new Special Representative, succeeding Joe Clark of Canada, who had served in that position since 1993. ❑

The Secretary-General on 14 August deplored the violent clashes that took place in the United Nations buffer zone in Cyprus that day and on 11 August. He expressed great concern at the excessive and indiscriminate use of force, which has killed two men and injured many more, including United Nations peace-keepers.

UNFICYP has completed its review of the events surrounding the demonstration of 14 August. The Force notes that, as a result of the indiscriminate shooting by Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot soldiers, two British UNFICYP soldiers were shot from behind and two Greek Cypriot civilians were also hit by gunfire. "Three were inside the buffer zone and one of the civilians, who sustained a serious gunshot wound to the abdomen, was standing outside the United Nations buffer zone close to the National Guard checkpoint", the statement said.

The UNFICYP Force Commander, accompanied by the Chief of Staff, met with the Commander of the Turkish Forces in Cyprus to strongly protest the totally unwarranted use of force by Turkish or Turkish Cypriot military personnel, which resulted in the killing of a Greek Cypriot male and in injuries to two peace-keepers and two civilians.

UN Photo/E. Schneider

HAITI

Police Professionalization

A new operation—the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), with a mandate until 30 November 1996—was set up by **the Security Council** on 28 June, in order to assist the Government of Haiti in the "professionalization of the police and in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the current efforts to establish and train an effective national police force".

In unanimously adopting resolution 1063 (1996), the Council also noted that the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) would end on 30 June, and that Haitian President René Préval had asked for a six-month extension of a multinational presence in his country.

"Our newly established National Police is unfortunately not fully in a position to assume ... responsibility" for the "maintenance of order and security", **President Préval** wrote on 31 May *(S/1996/431)*. "This extension would have the doubly beneficial effect of supporting the maintenance of public order and strengthening the National Police."

The Security Council also decided that UNSMIH would be composed initially of 300 civilian police personnel and 600 troops. On 5 July, Brigadier J. R. P. Daigle of Canada was named Commander of the UNSMIH military component.

On 2 August, **the Security Council** agreed *(S/1996/619)* with the Secretary-General's proposals that the military component of UNSMIH should be made up of contingents from Bangladesh, Canada, Pakistan and Trinidad and Tobago, and that Algeria, Canada, Djibouti, France, India, Mali, the Russian Federation and Togo should contribute to the Mission's police component.

It also supported the role of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Enrique ter Horst, in the coordination of activities by the United Nations system to "promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation" in Haiti.

By recognizing that the major tasks facing Haiti included economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, the Council stressed the importance that the Government and the international financial institutions "agree as soon as possible on the steps necessary to enable the provision of additional financial support". It also asked all States to make voluntary contributions to the trust fund established in resolution 975 (1995) for the support of the Haitian National Police (HNP), to "ensure that the police are adequately trained and fully operational".

Limited presence

In recommending *(S/1996/416)* the establishment of a new United Nations mission in Haiti, **the Secretary-General** was mindful that, according to Council resolution 1048 (1996) of 29 February, the UNMIH extension until 30 June "was intended to be final". However, he went on, "although President Préval and his Government had demonstrated "great determination to build an effective and professional force", committed to the rule of law and respect for the human rights and dignity of all citizens, the "memory of the distressing circumstances imposed upon the majority of Haiti's population by the former military rulers, the militia and their sympathizers lingers in the minds of most Haitians".

"Many remain fearful that at this stage the ill-equipped and inexperienced HNP may not alone be able to protect them from those groups, whom they suspect of retaining a capacity to destabilize the country's emerging institutions", he observed.

It was therefore clear that complete withdrawal of the United Nations military and police presence could "jeopardize the success achieved so far by the Haitian people with the help and support of the international community", Mr. Boutros-Ghali said. ❑

Haiti Human Rights: Improving, but Slowly

The Secretary-General has recommended that the General Assembly authorize the extension of the mandate of the United Nations component of the International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) until 31 December 1996.

In a report to the Assembly on the situation of democracy and human rights in Haiti, Mr. Boutros-Ghali said the overall human rights situation continued to improve. He, nevertheless, said the rate of improvement was slow, and serious human rights violations were reported, including summary execution, deliberate shooting and ill-treatment or torture of suspects by the police.

"The new police force's record in this respect is mixed and it urgently needs to strengthen disciplinary mechanisms and to initiate criminal proceedings against any of its agents suspected of involvement in grave human rights violations", the Secretary-General stated.

EL SALVADOR:
ONUV Established

A small United Nations Office of Verification in El Salvador (ONUV)—to follow up, through 31 December 1996, the implementation of pending aspects of the 1992 peace accords between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)—has been established by the General Assembly.

By **adopting without a vote resolution 50/226** on 10 May, the Assembly welcomed the continuing commitment of the Government and people of El Salvador to the consolidation of the peace process and urged other parties to the peace-accords to "work together to complete their implementation without delay".

Speaking in the General Assembly, Guillermo A. Melendez-Barahona of El Salvador said that possible instances of non-compliance with the commitments in the peace process called for a continued United Nations presence in his country.

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had reported *(A/50/935)* on 23 April that the public security situation in El Salvador and the Government's efforts to address it continued to raise concern.

"The recent adoption of emergency legislation designed to fight crime, which represents a substantial departure from the process embodied in the peace accords, contradicts, in some instances, basic human rights and due process standards and may exacerbate the already explosive situation of overcrowding in Salvadoran prisons", he said.

Recent developments also suggested a "reversion in the trend towards fulfilment of the recommendations relating to judicial reform and other measures arising from the peace accord aimed at strengthening the rule of law", the Secretary-General went on.

It was to be hoped that pending constitutional reforms, as well as the proposed Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and Penitentiary Law would be adopted without delay, Mr. Boutros-Ghali stated.

The Government was encouraged to "bring its full attention" to the implementation of "programmes designed to ensure the productive reintegration of combatants and others most affected by the war", such as those related to land transfers, human settlements and the elaboration of an agrarian code. ⌟

GUATEMALA:
Tangible, Although Insufficient, Progress

In the first half of this year, there had been "tangible progress" in Guatemala in fulfilling the commitments under the 29 March 1994 Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, David Stephen, Director of the United Nations Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), stated on 19 July. However, those steps were "not sufficient to bring about substantial change in a situation characterized by grave human rights violations and persistent impunity".

But the overall context in Guatemala was increasingly positive, marked by important strides forward in the peace process and a growing commitment by the Government and civil society to move forward in the fight against impunity and the consolidation of a state of law in which human rights were respected.

Nevertheless, the human rights situation in Guatemala continued to be of serious concern. This could be attributed to a number of reasons, including "defective functioning" of the judicial branch, the Public Prosecutor's Office and the security forces; insufficient cooperation from the Army with those bodies when its members appeared to have been involved in illegal acts, and the protection it afforded to such persons and the "alarming proliferation of and failure to control firearms".

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 10 May praised Mr. Stephen's predecessor, Leonardo Franco of Argentina, for the "effective and instrumental manner" in which he had conducted MINUGUA, which he had headed since its establishment. Mr. Franco has rejoined the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva.

The Secretary-General has expressed his great concern on the kidnapping that occurred in Guatemala City on 19 October, in which a senior member of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) was involved, noting its damaging consequences for the peace negotiations, under the auspices of the United Nations, which are very close to a successful conclusion. He called upon the URNG to take the action necessary to restore conditions in which a final peace agreement can promptly be reached in Guatemala.

From the Security Council Debate ...

El Fatih Mohamed Ahmed Erwa (Sudan): **How can you give what you do not have? To request Sudan to extradite suspects it does not have is like asking it to try to square the circle, and is unjustified—unless the objective is to find an excuse to impose unjust sanctions.**

John Weston (United Kingdom): **We remain convinced that the Government of Sudan knows where they are. If they are still in Sudan, the answer is straightforward: the Government must extradite them to Ethiopia under the terms of the bilateral extradition treaty.**

Sergey Lavrov (Russian Federation): **We cannot fail to be concerned by the fact that when resolutions 1044 (1996) and 1054 (1996) were adopted, the prevailing approach in the Security Council was aimed not so much at investigating those suspected of perpetrating a terrorist act as at isolating Sudan.**

Alfredo Lopes Cabral (Guinea-Bissau): **Today's draft resolution is not aimed at the people of Sudan. As its provisions indicate, it is intended to inform the Government of Sudan that it must take the decision to bring to justice the individuals implicated in this act of terrorism.**

Nabil Elaraby (Egypt): **Our brothers in Sudan should understand that the resolutions of the Security Council should be respected and implemented. That is why we call on the Sudanese Government to take advantage of the grace period given it by the Council, until the middle of November 1996, to translate sweet talk into proper action.**

Edward Gnehm (United States): **The Council will act today in a manner which carefully avoids aggravating the humanitarian crisis in the Sudan. We will ensure that if Sudan forces us to implement sanctions on its airline, humanitarian relief will continue.**

(16 August 1996)

SUDAN:
Strengthened or Suspended Sanctions?

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council on 16 August gave Sudan 90 days to extradite to Ethiopia three Egyptian suspects wanted in connection with the attempt on the life of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, in Addis Ababa on 26 June 1995, or face new sanctions that would ban its aircraft from the territory of United Nations Member States.

Under resolution 1070 (1996), if Sudan should fail to do so within that period, the Council would determine when and how these sanctions are to be applied. It could decide so even earlier, based on a report to be submitted to it by 15 November by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Two permanent members of the Council—China and Russia—abstained in the vote, voicing concern over the impact expanded sanctions would have on Sudan which has denied it is sheltering the suspects and already faces diplomatic and travel sanctions under resolution 1054 (1996) of 26 April. That resolution demanded that Sudan take action to ensure extradition to Ethiopia of the suspects, and desist from assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities, and from giving sanctuary to terrorist elements.

The Council had had before it a report *(S/1996/541 and Adds.1-3)* of the Secretary-General, which noted that Sudan, in letters to the Council, had stated its condemnation of terrorism and that it would take steps to ensure that "no such activities were tolerated in Sudanese territory". According to the Government, its investigations of two of the suspects had produced "no trace of their presence" in Sudan, and that the identity of the third one was unknown to it.

On 19 July, **Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali** described as "wanton acts of murder and destruction" the death of 107 Sudanese refugees in separate attacks from 12 to 14 July on the Acholi-pii refugee camp near the town of Kitgum in northern Uganda, in which the attackers looted and burned the refugees' huts, as well as trucks belonging to the World Food Programme (WFP) and to an Italian non-governmental organization, ASVI, and a WFP driver was reported missing. The Secretary-General urged Uganda to reinforce measures to ensure the safety and protection of Sudanese refugees in the area.

Earlier, on 15 July, **Mr. Boutros-Ghali** had expressed deep concern about the serious deterioration in the humanitarian situation "as a result of the unilateral and unjustified obstruction by the Government of urgently required humanitarian assistance to the affected population in southern Sudan", including Pochalla and cholera-affected areas, as well as areas of the Nuba Mountains.

However, he said he was pleased that Sudan had allowed the United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) C-130 Hercules relief flights to resume delivery of humanitarian assistance to southern Sudan during July.

WFP Executive Director Catherine Bertini had warned that "hundreds of thousands of human lives are at stake" as a result of Sudan's violation of the 1989 accord and its refusal to allow WFP to make urgently-needed airdrops of food in the south of the country, affecting the needs of more than 700,000 people and resulting in growing malnutrition and disease even as WFP warehouses in neighbouring Kenya were well stocked with food. ⊔

Food-grains supplied during emergency relief at the time of "Operation Lifeline Sudan" in 1989. Photo by Jeff Share

IRAQ:
Oil-for-Food Agreement

Plans are moving ahead to implement the oil-for-food agreement on Iraq, United Nations Under-Secretary-General Chinmaya Gharekhan told United Nations correspondents on 13 September. He said Security Council members have expressed the wish that the agreement be implemented as soon as possible.

At its 142nd meeting on 8 August, the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait adopted the expedited procedures to be employed by the Committee in the discharge of its responsibilities under Council resolution 986 (1995). The procedures consist of 46 paragraphs and 2 annexes.

Section I (paragraphs 1 to 24), entitled "*Sale of petroleum and petroleum products originated in Iraq*", deals with the procedure to be followed for the approval of oil sales, the question of the overseers, the pricing mechanism, and the opening of a letter of credit. Four independent oil experts or "overseers", to be selected by the Committee upon the recommendation of its secretariat, will consider oil contracts endorsed by the Government of Iraq or the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization.

If a contract employs a pricing mechanism submitted by Iraq and approved by the Committee, it will be reviewed by two overseers to determine whether it meets the set criteria, including details of a confirmed irrevocable letter of credit to be opened, with the irrevocable undertaking that the proceeds of the letter of credit will be paid directly to the escrow or Iraq account established by the Secretary-General under paragraph 7 of resolution 986 (1995).

The export of petroleum and petroleum products will be monitored by United Nations independent inspection agents, appointed by the Secretary-General, who will be stationed at the loading facilities at Ceyhan and Mina-al-Bakr and at the metering station at the Iraq-Turkey border, and who shall report regularly to the Committee.

Section II (paragraph 25), entitled "*Import by Turkey of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 985 (1995)*", stipulates that such import will be undertaken in accordance with the relevant provisions of Section I of the present procedures and the requirements of paragraphs 2 and 6 of resolution 986 (1995).

Section III (paragraphs 26 to 38), "*Export to Iraq of humanitarian supplies*", outlines the procedures which have to be followed in cases of payment for humanitarian supplies requested from the Iraq account; the current practice of the Committee will continue to be observed for applications submitted by the United Nations Inter-Agency Programme. This section also contains provisions covering the opening of letters of credit.

Payment from the Iraq account can, in principle, take place only for items included in the categorized list of goods and after confirmation of their arrival in Iraq by independent inspection agents appointed by the Secretary-General.

Section IV (paragraphs 39 and 40), entitled "*Export to Iraq of parts and equipment, and financial transactions related thereto, pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 986 (1995)*", stipulates that the export of the parts and equipment will be undertaken in accordance with the procedures set out in Section III of the present procedures.

Section V (paragraphs 41 and 42), entitled "*Approval of reasonable expenses other than expenses payable in Iraq*", provides that the Committee can approve the financing from the Iraq account of reasonable expenses, other than expenses payable in Iraq, which are determined by it to be directly related to the export by Iraq of petroleum and petroleum products permitted under resolution 986 (1995).

Section VI (paragraphs 43 to 46), entitled "*General provisions*", addresses general questions such as the establishment of communication links, reports of the Secretary-General on the details of disbursements made out of the Iraq account, the form of the letters of credit and the possibility of a revision of the procedures.

The last part of the procedures are the two annexes. Annex I contains the "*Standard application form to request approval of contracts for the sale of Iraqi petroleum and/or petroleum products*". Annex II lists up the "*Information to be included in the letter of credit*".

Following the adoption of the procedures, the Committee agreed to introduce a new application form for sending humanitarian supplies to Iraq and requested the Chairman to make it available to all States and relevant international organizations.

Pursuant to paragraph 1 of the procedures, the Secretariat made a recommendation to the Committee on the selection of the overseers. Pending approval of the recommendation by the Committee under its no-obligation procedure by noon, 9 August 1996, the names of the selected candidates will be forwarded to the Secretary-General for appointment.

The Committee also considered a request from Turkey to resume the import of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq for domestic purposes given the serious economic difficulties it has suffered as a result of the sanctions against Iraq. In view of the complexity of the matter and its implications for the sanctions regime, several members requested that the matter be deferred to allow them additional time to study the request. It was so decided. ❑

2,600,000 Compensation Claims

The Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission is to receive $100 million a month under the terms of Security Council resolution 986 (1995). The sum should equip the Commission's Fund for the implementation of the "oil-for-food" resolution, specifically, paying out approved claims.

To date, 2.6 million claims have been submitted to the Commission, at an asserted value of over $200 billion. The great bulk of that sum comes from claims by corporations and Governments. Of the claims received, 2.2 million from individuals have so far been processed by the Secretariat and reviewed by the appropriate panel. In 1994, the Commission used its limited resources to begin paying instalments on the most urgent humanitarian claims involving death or serious personal injury. It expects to accelerate those payments and begin paying claimants in other categories once funding is received under resolution 986 (1995).

Reviewing the work of the past five years, the Commission's Executive Secretary, Carlos Alzamora, has paid tribute to the work of its Member States and the Geneva Secretariat. He has noted that, although the Commission is a subsidiary body of the Security Council, with the same membership, all its decisions have been taken by consensus and there was agreement from the beginning that the veto would not apply to the Governing Council's decisions. Non-members of the Council were allowed to participate in Commission meetings, and Iraq and Kuwait contributed to each meeting of the Governing Council.

The Commission had also taken the unprecedented step of putting the claims of individuals ahead of those of Governments and corporations. The Commission has received 28 million pages of claim forms and documents. Coping with that torrent of paper has required the innovative application of new technologies and statistical methods. The Commission was setting records in terms of the speed of its operations and the minimal cost of its administration relative to the sums of money it would pay to claimants.

The Commission has completed the processing of all claims for people who were forced to leave Kuwait and Iraq, as well as those involving death and personal injury. It has also completed processing many of the individual claims for losses of up to $100,000. Substantial work remains, however, including the review of the remaining individual claims, especially those for more than $100,000, and the review of corporate and Government claims for larger amounts and involving more complex legal issues.

Emergency Relief for Iraq

On 27 September, the United Nations appealed for $39.9 million to meet the most essential needs of the vulnerable population of Iraq for the next three months. The United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Assistance Programme to Iraq was prepared by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, in cooperation with United Nations humanitarian agencies.

The Programme sets out the emergency requirements for assistance until such time as Security Council resolution 986 (1995), which allows for the sale of limited quantities of Iraqi petroleum for humanitarian purposes, may be implemented. This programme was developed in response to a marked deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout Iraq, aggravated by the recent conflict in the north.

Throughout Iraq, the majority of the civilian population is believed to be living below the poverty line. Family incomes are currently only a fraction of pre-1991 levels. Non-replenishment of basic food and health items in the marketplace has resulted in price increases of 50 to 100 per cent between late August and early September 1996. The cumulative effects of economic sanctions, hyper-inflation, unemployment and a 30 per cent drop in crop production this year have led to a disquieting level of hardship now suffered by vulnerable groups in Iraq.

FIRST PERSON

The Lessons from Somalia

By Ismat Kittani with Ian Johnstone

More than one year after the withdrawal of United Nations peace-keepers from Somalia, the international community is still reeling from what the Secretary-General called "one of the most challenging, arduous undertakings in the Organization's 50-year history". The United Nations' experience there marked a turning point for its peace operations in the post-cold-war era, a brief but extraordinarily eventful period for the Organization. Some of the lessons of that short history have been catalogued in the Secretary-General's *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, which sought to highlight the unforeseen or only partly foreseen difficulties that had arisen since his path-breaking *Agenda for Peace* of mid-1992. Yet the full story of Somalia remains to be told and its full implications remain to be digested. The tragedy that has befallen that sad land is not over and, having intervened, the international community owes it to the Somali people not to forget their plight. Nor are the Somali people the only ones suffering from the "failed state" syndrome, with its disastrous consequences. The Somalia type of conflict is likely to plague the international community for some time to come. To a great extent, therefore, the future of the UN's role in the maintenance of international peace and security depends on how well the lessons of Somalia are learned.

Before turning to those lessons, I would like to make two preliminary points, both of which have been made before, but bear repeating. **First, one of the principal functions of UNOSOM II—to disarm the warring factions—was a task the United Nations never wanted and was never properly equipped to perform.** Recall that the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), with 37,000 troops deployed in 40 per cent of the country, had the means and mandate to perform this critical task, and yet chose not to do so. The Secretary-General stressed the need for disarmament in the letter he sent to the Security Council that formed the basis for resolution 794, which authorized UNITAF to use "all necessary means" to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. The Secretary-General expanded on his position in a letter to United States President George Bush shortly thereafter, insisting that "any forceful action by the international community in Somalia must have the objective of ensuring that at least the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed". And when the 14 factions agreed to disarm in January 1993 (at least on paper), the political environment became more conducive to bold action on this front. Nevertheless, by the time of UNITAF's departure, with the back of the famine having been broken, the warring factions and their followers were still armed to the teeth. Because of this continuing source of insecurity, the Security Council authorized UNOSOM II to take up the challenge—with fewer troops more widely spread throughout the country and, as it turned out, with the main faction leaders determined to resist.

Under-Secretary-General Ismat Kittani, who served as Special Adviser to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has had a long and extensive career at the United Nations. A former Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, he was elected President of the General Assembly in 1981, becoming the first person to hold that post who had been both a United Nations delegate and a member of the Secretariat. After serving as Iraq's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York and Geneva, Mr. Kittani was Secretary of the Economic and Social Council, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General with the rank of Assistant Secretary-General, Chief of Specialized Agencies of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations. He served as the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Somalia from 1992 to 1993.

My second preliminary observation concerns the misconception that the United Nations saw UNOSOM II as having a mandate to rebuild Somalia *by force*. **When UNITAF was leaving and the mission of UNOSOM II was being designed, it was understood that its enforcement powers would extend to the delivery of humanitarian relief and disarmament. They would not, however, extend to nation-building.** Promoting reconciliation and helping the Somali people to revive their economy and political institutions were part of UNOSOM's mandate, but we did not have the illusion that this could be done coercively. As I wrote to the Secretary-General in a weekly report during my tenure as his Special Representative, delivering humanitarian assistance in a hostile environment is

difficult enough, "but to move from that to the idea of using UN armed forces in order to achieve political reconciliation and economic viability in a completely shattered country is mind-boggling". The United Nations knew the magnitude of the challenge in Somalia and it knew that most of what had to be done required the cooperation and commitment of the Somalis themselves.

THE FIRST principal lesson from the Somalia experience stems from the fact that the United Nations was not and still is not equipped for large-scale enforcement operations, nor was it given the resources to carry out the broad mandate UNOSOM II was assigned. Since then, the Security Council has typically authorized single States or multinational coalitions to conduct such operations—Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, the United States-led intervention in Haiti before the establishment of UNMIH, and the NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia are the most obvious examples. This is not to say that delegated enforcement action is inherently better than UN operations (distinguished as they are by their universal character), but the United Nations simply does not have the capacity to manage major military operations, nor do Member States seem inclined to give it that capacity. There is, however, a category of conflict where something less than full-scale enforcement is called for, but which nevertheless requires something more than traditional peace-keeping treatment. This category of cases requires a capacity to engage in limited military action—to protect humanitarian relief, for example—and the international community must decide whether the United Nations should be endowed with that capability, or whether non-UN coalitions—often able but not always willing—should be left with the task.

SECOND, enforcement action should not take place concurrently with peace-keeping operations. As the Secretary-General noted in the *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, peace-keeping and peace enforcement flow from entirely different premises and it is dangerous to mix the two. The situation becomes even more complicated when the two operations are conducted by two different organizations, with different priorities, reporting lines and political masters. Peace enforcement, however, may be followed by peace-keeping operations under the command and control of the United Nations. In these cases, the handover from the non-UN force to UN peace-keepers should be subject to careful coordination and consultation. And the transition should not take place until the mandate established by the Security Council has been met and the parties to the conflict consent to the UN presence: UN peace-keepers cannot be expected to take over an incomplete enforcement action. In Haiti, perhaps having learned the lesson of Somalia, UNMIH did not deploy until all concerned were confident that the United States-led intervention had achieved its goals and the environment was secure enough for a Chapter VI operation to pursue its mandate.

THIRD, the coordination of political, humanitarian, developmental and military activities is critical. Somalia cried out for an integrated approach, which at times was sorely lacking. As Special Representative, I instituted regular meetings with the heads of all UN agencies in the field and with humanitarian non-governmental organizations. Although coordination remained far from ideal, it was important to establish that we were all reading from the same page and working towards the same goal. The Secretary-General has since instituted a policy that his Special Representatives are responsible for overall coordination of all members of the UN family in a mission area—a policy that has proven its worth in Rwanda, Haiti and elsewhere. Taking the logic a step further, it is now sometimes suggested that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General should be provided with a discretionary fund, to be used as an inducement for the parties to cooperate and as a mechanism for connecting peacemaking and peace-keeping goals with the more long-term challenges of peace-building.

FOURTH, the United Nations cannot substitute for the political will of the protagonists—not by the use of force, not by the provision of humanitarian assistance and not by the deployment of peace-keepers. It can and must, however, develop political strategies commensurate with the task at hand. In the case of "failed States", persuading faction leaders to end the fighting and lay down their arms is just the beginning. Peacemaking may require the building of institutions, and the rehabilitation of political and economic infrastructure. In Somalia, UNOSOM II helped with the revival of local, district and regional governmental councils, and strived to re-establish politically neutral police, judicial and penal institutions. Though these measures cannot create political will, which they clearly did not do in Somalia, they can help establish conditions within which moderate elements can maneuver and seek ways of settling disputes peacefully, which in turn can provide the foundation for a lasting peace. Sitting around a table to negotiate is only one part of the process of national reconciliation.

The setbacks suffered in Somalia should not cloud our view of the successes achieved there. The famine was broken and untold human suffering was alleviated. But because the factions themselves were unwilling to commit to peace, there was little more the international community could do. The United Nations, however, has not given up on Somalia. A political office continues to function out of Nairobi, and it will return to Mogadishu as conditions permit. UN agencies also continue to operate, providing relief and development assistance when and where they can. As the Secretary-General has suggested, the fact that there is no government in Somalia does not mean the United Nations cannot provide assistance to the people of that country—perhaps the most important lesson of all.

COSTWATCH

Reduced United Nations Budget Foreseen

7% fall in budget; 15% in posts

Preliminary estimates—before allowing for inflation and foreign currency exchange fluctuations—indicate that the United Nations would need $178.9 million or 6.9 per cent less for its programme budget for 1998-1999 than in the previous biennium, **Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management Joseph Connor** told the press at Headquarters on 19 August.

Explaining the decrease in overall resources "in terms of our prime resource"—the number of staff working in the Secretariat—Mr. Connor said that for 1998-1999 it was estimated that on average 8,500 posts would be occupied—a 15-per cent reduction since 1 January 1996 and a 30-per cent reduction since 1985.

"Productivity improvements mean producing the same output with fewer staff members", Mr. Connor remarked.

At Headquarters, the notional cost of one meeting is $4,553, of which $4,194 stems from interpretation. In 1995, overall utilization at Headquarters, Geneva and Vienna was down to 76 per cent, owing to late starting and early ending of meetings and sessions and repeated cancellation of meetings.

Although the reform process was "just beginning", concrete results were "already visible", and the leaders of the "Group of Seven" most industrialized nations had acknowledged "positive reform efforts in progress" at the United Nations, Mr. Connor said upon returning from the G-7 Summit in Lyon, France, on 1 July.

In the last few years, 20 departments had been reduced to 12. The Secretary-General's intention is to have five or six departments, Mr. Connor said.

Money shortages are nothing new at the United Nations, which relies exclusively on its Member States for funding. Many Member States fail to pay their dues on time and in full for a variety of reasons, ranging from budgetary technicalities to poverty. Others have withheld payments to make a political point.

The current financial crisis includes all of these elements. But it is unlike any other in United Nations history. Its magnitude is unprecedented. The United Nations is prohibited by law from borrowing from commercial institutions. It relies on countries to pay their membership dues in full and on time. Each country's contribution is calculated on the basis of its share of the world economy and ability to pay.

If every meeting of the United Nations in New York began 10 minutes late, it would cost the Organization some $875,000 per annum.

As of 1 August, more than 160 of the 185 United Nations Member States owed the Organization a total of over $3 billion—$2.2 billion for peace-keeping and $830 million for the regular budget. Of the total, the United States owes more than half: over $1.6 billion for past and current payments and accounts for 74 per cent of the $830 million owed by Member States for the regular budget.

The United Nations is so strapped for cash that for the third time this year, on 31 July, it ran out of regular budget money to pay its bills. To cover its regular budget expenses, the Organization has been forced, once again, to borrow from peace-keeping funds. As a result, it is unable to reimburse promptly those countries that provide peace-keeping troops and equipment. By the end of 1996, these countries will be owed an estimated $675 million.

The Organization lacks the money to pay for all of the programmes called for in the current two-year budget—a tough, zero-growth plan that required the Secretary-General to carry on the work of the United Nations with $252 million less than he had for the previous two-year period.

The United Nations staff has been slashed by 11 per cent since 1994, and an additional $14 million in savings is in the works for September. But another $35 million to cover new unfunded mandates, primarily democracy-building missions in Haiti and Guatemala, have to be found within the existing budget.

In welcoming the proposed 1998-1999 budget outline, the **United States Representative to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright,** noted that it was an important and responsive step towards the fiscal reform mandated by the General Assembly in December 1995. "As I have often said, one of the hallmarks of a more efficient United Nations is the streamlining and consolidation of United Nations staff. The impact of the proposals, together with those already under way, will amount to a 15 per cent contraction in United Nations staffing", she said.

The United Nations Office at Geneva is shedding 200 posts as its contribution to the major streamlining and cost-cutting measures under way throughout the United Nations Secretariat, Director-General Vladimir Petrovsky announced on 16 September.

Efficiency Board Brings About a Major Shift

In November 1995, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali launched an efficiency effort to accelerate change in the management of the Secretariat of the United Nations. Guided by the Efficiency Board, the effort has achieved early results, mobilized Secretariat and Member State participation, and identified a number of outstanding challenges. The Efficiency Board's objective was to act as a catalyst to achieve early results, not draft a body of recommendations; to help solve problems, not just describe them. There have been substantial results in less than one year. For example:

- Starting in February 1996, every department and office in the UN Secretariat worldwide has carried out efficiency reviews and identified 400 projects to deliver both better service and better value to Member States. Focusing on solutions within its authority, the Secretariat has already completed over 20 per cent of projects, and the rest are under way.
- The United Nations has tackled the problem of "too much paper", as the volume of documentation and publications printed in the Secretariat has been cut 13 per cent since January 1996 through tighter print runs and distribution patterns and the use of more advanced technology alternatives.
- A new, easier-to-use UN Home Page is now on the Internet that will make more than 270,000 UN documents in all official languages available electronically in 157 countries and the majority of New York missions.
- Through a combination of efficiency measures and budget cuts, the travel bill has been reduced more than 25 per cent in the first six months of 1996 and the cost of administering travel is being reduced.
- Multiple projects in offices from Bangkok to Santiago are streamlining administrative processes, out-sourcing routine services, expanding the use of information technology, improving cash management, and taking other steps to reduce the cost of administration and enhance management.
- Many individual initiatives are modest. They focus on how the Organization does its business, rather than what the Organization does, which is decided by Member States. Not one, by itself, will transform the Secretariat or a managerial culture that took decades to create, but incrementally they are contributing to a major shift in how the United Nations conducts its operations, raising awareness of the need for continued commitment to efficiency, and identifying additional opportunities for efficiency improvements and for major systemic changes that are needed.
- Efficiency measures are contributing in two ways to the United Nations' current budget situation, by identifying specific savings and by mitigating the impact of budget cuts on the delivery of programmes. Altogether, the Secretariat has identified—through enhanced efficiency, reduced staff levels and increased staff productivity—the savings needed to live within the 1996–1997 biennium budget of $2.608 billion set by the General Assembly. In the same period, the Secretariat has achieved zero budget growth and reduced staff numbers by nearly 10 per cent, to the lowest level since the 1980s.

A fresh approach: Although there have been many calls for UN reform, the efficiency effort has a number of features quite unlike earlier efforts. It is focusing on achieving early results, rather than on making recommendations. Its success hinges on the active participation and innovation of Secretariat managers and staff. Hundreds of efficiency projects were proposed by staff members; each project has a Secretariat Action Manager responsible for implementation. UN Member States from every region are contributing to the effort with their resources and expertise, based on their experience with the reform of public-sector institutions and working with the Secretariat to analyze current problems and identify solutions.

Building on and complementing other efforts: The report describes current internal efforts to enhance the managerial efficiency and effectiveness of the Secretariat of the United Nations. It builds on efforts already under way to revitalize the Secretariat and recommendations made by a number of advisory and oversight bodies, and complements reviews concerning the future of the United Nations that are being addressed in other forums.

For example, urgently needed reform of the financing and intergovernmental structure of the United Nations is being considered by a number of high-level groups established by Member States. The Secretary-General has put forward to the High-Level Group on the Strengthening of the United Nations the concept of a strategic realignment of activities in the United Nations and a parallel realignment of its intergovernmental machinery.

Still more to do: The efficiency reviews have accelerated change within the Secretariat. They have also identified a number of areas where further systemic changes are needed to prepare the management of the Secretariat for the future and to institutionalize efficiency in the Organization, and to make the major shift from administering the United Nations to managing its programmes, people, money and information.

Continued financial constraints and the desire for enhanced performance mean that the search for efficiency will continue into the next biennium. If the Organization is to shift to be more results-oriented, more effective and efficient, with managers being given greater responsibility and authority to fulfil the mandates that they are given, significant changes will be required in the management systems and management culture of the Organization.

As its next step, the partnership of Member States and Secretariat staff forged by this process will work to complete the 400 current efficiency projects and to conduct a series of cross-cutting efficiency reviews of the Organization's management systems and administrative processes, such as human resources, publication and procurement.

Conclusion: The report shows that, even under the current constraints, it is possible for effective managers to do a great deal. However, even more can be accomplished. **The successful first phase of the efficiency exercise leaves the Board confident that, together, the Organization and its members can meet the commitment made by the Heads of State and Government at the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations to "give to the twenty-first century a United Nations equipped, financed and structured to serve effectively the peoples in whose name it was established".**

Committee Urges Enhancement of UN Image

The eighteenth session of **the United Nations Committee on Information**, which met in New York from 6 to 17 May, has asked all countries and the United Nations system to reaffirm commitment to the principles of freedom of the press and of information, as well as of the independence, pluralism and diversity of the media. Draft resolutions approved by the Committee, to be forwarded to the General Assembly for adoption, would also urge increased assistance for the development of the communication infrastructures and capabilities in developing countries to enable them and the media to develop freely and independently information and communication policies, while ensuring journalistic freedom, promoting training and enhancing regional cooperation.

The Committee has recommended that the General Assembly encourage the Secretary-General "to develop a concrete plan to continue to enhance the public image" of the United Nations. It would ask him to explore ways to improve United Nations Radio access to airwaves worldwide, and to see how the Dag Hammarskjöld Library could take advantage of new, automated and electronic library information and communication technologies and services.

While the continued importance of traditional and mass media was stressed, the Committee urged the Department of Public Information (DPI) "to take full advantage" of recent developments in information technology, such as the Internet and CD-Roms, to improve dissemination of information on the United Nations. Concern has been expressed about proposals to further reduce the Department's budget, as this might negatively affect mandated activities.

Assistant Secretary-General for Public Information Samir Sanbar told the Committee's opening session that 1.3 million copies of UN publications and other documents had been disseminated to the public in 1994. In 1995, the figure had risen to 4.4 million. However, "the continuous erosion of resources", including severe budgetary restrictions and a negative growth budget, was beginning to cut into DPI's core programme, affecting its delivery, timeliness and quality.

Under other provisions of the wide-ranging draft, the Assembly would also ask that DPI's involvement at the planning stage of peace-keeping and other field operations continue. Stress has been placed on the importance of United Nations information centres, particularly in developing countries, countries in transition, and in countries "where there is a need for greater understanding about United Nations activities".

In the discussion on the subject, **Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan** suggested the centres should be made into models of high-tech information to resource-starved people and could become the focus for transfer of technology to developing countries. **Suzanne Maikarfi of Nigeria** spoke of "new concepts" in environmental protection, human rights, peace, disarmament and international security that these centres delivered.

Mr. Sanbar told the Committee that DPI was responding to the challenges the United Nations faced—the reinforcement of its role in the fields of development, peace-keeping, and the promotion of democratic values—allied with formidable progress in information technology. It had set up a Home Page on the Internet's World Wide Web, offering comprehensive information about the work of the United Nations. Electronic dissemination of information, at a rate of 16,000 retrievals per day, was helping to reduce print runs, and work was under way to offer selected publications for sale through the Internet.

"In an age when new information technologies offered exciting new opportunities", **Walter Douglas of the United States** told the Committee, the Department "should have the resources it needs to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century." But while delegates praised DPI's innovative efforts to reach new audiences, some cautioned that this should not be at the cost of continued support for more traditional media, particularly in developing countries, which continued to rely heavily on print, radio and television.

"The traditional means of information dissemination should by no means be minimized until we are all able to cruise along the information highway", remarked **Jack B. Wilmot of Ghana**.

Speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community, **Cherryl Gordon of Jamaica** said ways must be found to disseminate material which was easily and instantly absorbed by the public and which had commercial and aesthetic appeal. She wondered whether DPI could enter into more arrangements with media companies to produce documentary dramas to be aired on national and international cable television.

A number of the 45 delegations and observers taking part in the general debate also praised DPI's efforts to streamline staff, diversify its media outreach, consolidate its broadcasting and publishing activities, and leap into the World Wide Web. They stressed that the Department should be strengthened so that the United Nations purposes could be fully understood, and support for its work garnered.

In a closing statement, **Committee Chairman Ivan Maximov** called the recommendations action-oriented and well-targeted, and said they would give DPI the direction necessary to respond vigorously to new realities. The session had confirmed the importance the countries attached to the role of information and communications in a new technological age. ❑

UN Photo 156543/J. Bottaro

OPINION:
Does Development Lead to Greater Equality of the Sexes?

This paper by Helen Ware, Deputy Director-General of the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau in Canberra, Australia, argues that development does not necessarily result in greater equality between men and women. There are areas, such as health and education, where sooner or later the economic gains do flow on to women. But equally, there are other areas, such as legal rights, equal pay and treatment in the labour force, and women's political decision-making power, where there is no necessary or clear relation between the status of women and the level of development.

Although international conferences of representatives of male-dominated Governments (there are no female-dominated Governments) have been extremely reluctant to address the issue, quality for women depends not upon the level of development or the economic resources available, but upon the political will of Governments and the cultural setting in which women have to live. **Even where it is clear that development does not necessarily benefit women, it might well be expected that development assistance, which comprises planned input from the developed countries to the less fortunate and less technologically advanced societies, should inevitably benefit women. Unfortunately, the evidence is in and it is quite clear: development assistance does not normally improve the lot of women.** This finding is true even where donors have an explicit policy of directing their assistance towards women.

Perilous premises

First, there has been a tendency to consider only one aspect of women's life. This approach is seriously flawed, given the numerous tasks and responsibilities of women—nurturing and/or productive work in the home, and paid and unpaid work in and around the home, outside the home and in the community.

Secondly, many approaches are geared to a greater or lesser extent to integrating women into the overall development effort. In fact, however, women are fully integrated into the development of their country, thanks to the productive and reproductive work they perform; but because of their subordinate position, they have no control over the products of their labour, their own body and their living conditions.

There are other issues. In too many cases, women's needs are simply ignored (many infrastructure projects take little note of the requirements of people of either sex, instead focusing on abstract objectives, such as improving traffic flows or crop yields). **Also, it is still true that the great majority of decision makers in the donor agencies are men; and often men who, because of the nature of their international careers and their technical backgrounds, have been little exposed to women's movements in their own countries.** Lastly, for women, as for minority groups, the "trickle-across" effect does not work. Benefits to men or to ethnic or other majorities are seldom passed on or shared. Persons in the developed world tend to assume that household members inevitably share a common level of living: they fail to understand that women and men may operate in separate economies or that daughters' nutrition, health and education may be deliberately sacrificed in favour of sons' welfare (even though the latter pattern was commonplace in Europe only a century ago).

Acceptance does not assure association

As early as 1980, the United Nations Development Programme, in its review of rural women's participation in development, recognized that "while there has evolved a greater acceptance and fuller understanding of the role of women in development, difficulties are encountered in actually programming for women's participation in development". Very little has changed: women are still marginalized; and because their existing contributions to the informal economy are ignored, planning for their future

participation, training and access to technology is inappropriate or non-existent.

Some factors that facilitate women attaining equality with men are much easier to provide at high levels of development when economic resources are plentiful. Women's legal rights are dependent upon political and national culture. Thus, most African countries gave women the right to vote at independence, but Switzerland did so only in 1971 and Iraq in 1980. Laws relating to access to contraception and abortion equally depend upon will, not resources, although access to services does reflect resource availability and allocation.

The household: help or hassle?

The interaction between class inequalities in the distribution of resources and sexual discrimination is especially significant in the case of women's additional burdens, such as child care which presents problems when neither relatives nor servants are available to release the mother for work outside the home. Many former centrally planned economies provided highly subsidized commercial child care to free women for the labour force. Advanced market economies have yet to find a solution for child care, which, being highly labour-intensive if of high quality, tends to cost more than most women with middle or lower pay rates can afford, especially if they have more than one child. Equally, it may be easier for women to make it to the top in highly stratified and/or sexually segregated societies than in more egalitarian ones. If cultural norms decree that male physicians cannot examine female patients and men cannot teach girls, then there have to be some female physicians and teachers, and possibly even professors. If political power is restricted to a highly limited group of "top families", then, in the absence of a suitable male, females may achieve power; hence the phenomenon of queens even in medieval Europe and of female prime ministers in a number of countries where the rights of ordinary women are extremely restricted.

Beyond a certain level, high levels of national income tend to bring women educational equality with men because, first, illiteracy disappears with succeeding generations and eventually nearly all adults achieve more than a primary education. Educated men may marry illiterate women, but they normally choose to educate their daughters to some extent even if not as far as their sons. It is at lower levels of development that there is the greatest scope for educational discrimination against girls.

UN Photo 155727/ John Isaac

The economic and social benefits of educating girls are not only substantial, they are also greater than the benefits of educating boys. Women's education results in smaller and healthier families and the participation of educated women in the labour force serves to reduce poverty. A recent World Bank study looks at ways of encouraging parents to educate their daughters. Whatever reduces the cost of education disproportionally raises the proportion of girls in school. Thus, for example, providing free primary-school textbooks in Peru resulted—controlling for all other factors—in girls being three times more likely to enrol, whereas there was no effect on boys' enrolment.

Scholarships for girls may be necessary in cultures where girls are very much undervalued. Less costly alternatives are flexible hours and calendars that allow girls to participate in household tasks. Other innovative approaches have included school child care for younger siblings, public transport, accessible water and fuel supplies, public meetings to encourage female participation, siting of girls' schools nearer to villages, improved school sanitation and hedges for girls' areas of schools, special science clubs for girls, and bonuses for women teachers in remote areas.

One area where statistics are understandably limited relates to the sharing of power and decision-making within households. Yet, all the available evidence suggests that even in these intimate settings women in the developed countries do not succeed in negotiating to achieve equality. Housework and child care are still considered the woman's responsibility even in urban areas of the most industrialized countries. It would appear that no study anywhere in the more developed regions has found that pattern of equal sharing between husbands and wives without which there can be no true equality.

Many nineteenth century European and American feminists believed that technology as applied to domestic tasks would liberate women, both by the industrialization of such activities as food preparation and laundry, and by the reduction of the time required to perform tasks still confined to the home. Instead, what has happened is that standards have risen, as with the ever-increasing frequency of the washing of clothes. The limited studies available suggest that as the wife's power (within the household) in relation to that of the husband rises with increased education and income, the household buys more outside services, such as restaurant meals, but the

husband does not increase input into the running of the household. "New" men continue to feel that a token contribution of domestic labour is sufficient. Women themselves could do much to change the situation through the way in which they raise their sons, for it is only if sons are required to make the same household labour input as daughters that equality will be achieved.

A biological advantage?

Development sectors, such as mining, that provide employment for men but not for women and provoke mass migration by men, who leave their families at home, play a major role in the creation of female-headed households. Thus, 47 per cent of households in Zambia are headed by women. The issue of female-headed households and the feminization of poverty had a brief period of high-profile attention, but would appear to have been set aside as "too hard" in face of the society-wide problems associated with structural adjustment.

Female humans have an innate biological advantage over male humans. As noted above, unless they are radically discriminated against, girl babies out-survive boy babies and women live longer than men. This is a female advantage which increases linearly with development in the absence of very marked preference shown to males. The greatest gap between the sexes and the greatest longevity for women is found in Japan. This disparity exists despite the persistence of very considerable discrimination against women in Japan. Some of this discrimination, such as that legally obliging women to retire up to a decade earlier than men, may actually give an advantage to women by contributing to their good health and greater longevity.

It should always be kept in mind that any index of the status of women, such as the Human Development Index, which incorporates a measure of women's longevity, will tend to show an advantage to women. Conversely, indices incorporating income data (which are much harder to find) will show women at a disadvantage. Even where women live longer than men, they are often less healthy; anaemia is the lot of two thirds of pregnant women and one half of non-pregnant women in Africa and in Southern and Western Asia. It is clear that a major factor in women's health is their reprodutive histories. The sad irony is that it is the women of the developed countries that have the good health to flourish through numerous pregnancies, while the malnourished women of the developing countries experience repeated pregnancies and the associated high rates of maternal mortality.

Shouldered Responsibilities

Often, it appears that women are only remembered when there is a need for cheap or volunteer labour. Currently, women and the environment is the theme of the year, and there is once again a pattern where women are to be loaded with new responsibilities and given inadequate resources to produce results which should be for the benefit of all. For a number of reasons, including a very justifiable awareness that one inhabitant of an industrialized country consumes more resources than 210 inhabitants of the developing countries, population issues have been relegated to a footnote to the environmental debate. Women's interests lie in ensuring that they shall be integrated as active participants at all levels in the planning and implementation of development and environmental programmes; and that their rights and access to education, health services (including a choice of family planning services) and employment and income-earning opportunities shall be recognized and realized in practical form. As has already been stressed, for women to gain such equality will require a level of political will that has yet to be demonstrated anywhere in the world.

—Population and Women (Sales No. E.96.XIII.10) United Nations Publications, Population Division

What political will means

It is difficult to overstress the importance of political will in ensuring that women shall access to the benefits of development. This does not simply mean that women need to have the vote and the right to stand for election; more importantly, it means that women need to play a vital role in decision-making at all levels. **This aspect is not simply a question of equity; it is because men and women have different priorities and the less developed the country, the wider the divergence is likely to be. Often the local village level is just as or even more important than the central level. Indeed, both the developed and the developing countries have now had the experience of women prime ministers, who would appear to have done very little to improve the status of women.** It would appear that for women in politics to have a feminist impact, it is necessary that their numbers should reach a certain critical mass. The Nordic experience would suggest that this critical mass is close to 30 per cent.

Conversely, however, military Governments often offer very little to women, both because of their ideology which tends to stress that women should be in the kitchen and breeding

the next generation, and because of their priorities, which focus on military expenditure to the neglect of virtually all forms of social expenditure. Women have much to gain from the peace dividends, which should follow the end of the cold war, but only if governmental priorities are reordered to place greater emphasis on basic social expenditures on education and health.

Backing up the politicians and implementing their policies are the bureaucrats. Here again, merely having a scattering of women in the bureaucracy is not enough to secure an impact; it is necessary to have sufficient numbers of women in the senior decision-making ranks (say, at least 20 per cent). It is possible to debate whether it is more effective to have a ministry of women officers to make an impact on overall policy or individual women's bureau within each ministry to ensure that women's perspectives shall not be forgotten, whatever the topic under discussion (industry, transport or decentralized policy). What is certain is that women's ministries or bureaus will get nowhere without strong political support to allow them to overcome mass culture inertia or active opposition.

The reasons for a lack of political will became self-evident from the statistics on women in positions of political power. Less than 1 in 25 of the cabinet ministers in the world is a woman, and 93 countries have no women ministers. It is true that there have been 18 women heads of Government this century, 11 of whom have headed developing countries. However, such women at the helm have done remarkably little, except as the ultimate role models, to improve the position of women in relation to men in their own country.

UN Photo 192067/C. Lavoipe Debebe

A gift from Arab women to the United Nations and the world's women, this sculpture, symbolizing "sisterhood solidarity", is the first from women of any country or region to the UN since the Organization was established. The sculpture is of brushed stainless steel, approximately 12 feet high and weighing around 3,000 pounds. It was designed by artist and sculptor Silvio Russo, and shows 12 women holding hands in a synergetic representation of a rising sun.

In most of the national parliaments, women represent fewer than 10 per cent of the total members. There is no simple relation between the level of development and the proportion of women among parliamentarians: women are better represented in India (8 per cent) than in the United States (5 per cent), and in Angola and Cameroon (14 per cent each) than in the United Kingdom and France (6 per cent each). Formerly, the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe used to stand out as having close to one third of parliamentarians as women, but the proportion of women elected has now fallen.

It has been known since at least 1975 that there are many problems in ensuring that women shall have equal access to the benefits of development and that unthinking assumptions that what is good for the economy must be good for women are simply wrong. **There is now a very wide range of studies of the many and varied cultural barriers to women's full participation in society and its rewards. What is lacking are solutions—successful strategies for ensuring that women shall have equal access to the benefits of development and shall avoid being unequally penalized with the unwanted negative side-effects.** ⌟

'Offer them not just a pair of sneakers'

At a press conference at United Nations Headquarters on 9 October, a correspondent asked if having a woman as head of the Government had affected the agenda. Ruth Perry, Chairman of the Council of State for the Liberia National Transitional Government, replied that it had not affected the agenda, because it was the men who said they wanted a woman to lead them. Women have the integrity and the confidence to make a difference.

What relations did the Chairman have with the "male warlords" in Liberia, and how did she think she could bring them together for peace, a correspondent asked. Mrs. Perry replied that, as a mother, she would be a stabilizer for her male counterparts. She had been working with the faction leaders and they generally agreed on issues, especially on children, the elderly and women. On political issues, the men knew that if they did not agree, the women would take the lead.

Were there any plans to disarm child soldiers and reintegrate them into society, a correspondent asked. Mrs. Perry responded that there was a programme to bring those children back and offer them "not just a pair of sneakers, but also put them into institutions where they will have benefits for the future".

The Chronicle Library Shelf

A World of Art: The United Nations Collection

by Edward B. Marks
Published for and on behalf
of the United Nations
by Il Cigno Galileo Galilei, Roma

UN Photo 39501/ptp

Outstanding works by Picasso, Miro, Matisse, Giacometti, Moore, Chagall, Hepworth, Dali, Calder and other famous artists are to be found not just in museums and art galleries, but in the offices of the United Nations all over the world, presented by the Governments of Member States.

A World of Art: The United Nations Collection portrays together, for the first time, the many works of art that decorate the United Nations building in New York, UNESCO's headquarters in Paris, the Palais des Nations in Geneva, the Peace Palace in the Hague and other United Nations offices in five continents.

Besides important works by modern artists, the United Nations art treasures also consist of priceless antiquities, such as a perfectly-preserved 2,500-year-old burial mantle from Peru, two second century Roman mosaics from Tunisia and a 700 B.C. statue of Osiris from Egypt.

The author, Edward B. Marks, is a former United Nations official. Over the years, he enjoyed giving friends and visitors to New York a tour of the Headquarters, from which pastime came the inspiration for this book.

Much of the art is purely decorative, but some works also speak to such basic United Nations themes as peace, justice and human rights. In 1984, the King of Spain presented a set of 30 prints by Spanish and American artists illustrating the Declaration of Human Rights. In the spirit of disarmament, the former Soviet Union gave a statue depicting St. George slaying a dragon, constructed of metal from two nuclear missiles—one American and the other Soviet.

The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996

"The responsibility for the genocide lies directly with certain elements of the Rwandan people", says Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his introduction to the newly released *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, the tenth volume in the "Blue Books" series.

However, Mr. Boutros-Ghali says, "the international community must also bear some of the burden for allowing the disaster to reach such horrendous proportions". The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was one of the greatest catastrophes to befall a nation since the Second World War. It was also an international tragedy that resulted in "a distinct setback" to the expectation that the international community, "in a new global era, could and would act swiftly and resolutely in the name of peace, justice and global solidarity".

The volume points out that after the initial international hesitation, the entire United Nations system was mobilized to help stabilize the situation, alleviate the suffering of the survivors and assist the country on the path to reconstruction.

The Blue Books series, published by the United Nations Department of Public Information, was recently cited by the American Libraries Association for a Notable Government Documents award.

48th volume of UN Yearbook published

The forty-eighth volume of the *Yearbook of the United Nations*, covering the activities of the UN system in 1994, has been published by the Department of Public Information. The 1,564-page book consists of 54 chapters covering six major areas: political and security concerns; regional questions; economic and social issues; legal questions; administrative and budgetary matters; and an overview of the work of intergovernmental organizations related to the United Nations.

The *Yearbook* is the most current comprehensive and authoritative publication covering the annual work of the Organization, designed not just for use by diplomats, governmentl officials and scholars, but also by writers, journalists, teachers and students. It is fully indexed and contains detailed information on all important reports, meetings and activities of UN bodies, as well as the texts of all major resolutions in their entirety.

The United Nations Handbook, 1996

The 1996 *United Nations Handbook* has been published by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. It is a ready reference guide for delegates, diplomats and foreign ministry officials concerned with UN matters. It is also widely used by the media and non-governmental organizations with an interest in the UN. It is hoped the explanatory information contained about the UN system in general makes it a useful work of reference for other officials, business organizations, academics and students, and interested members of the public. ⌟



Photo by Nick Fogden

During the 1990s, more land will be lost to degradation than in the 20 years between 1960 and 1980.

SILENT EMERGENCY

That's what it's been called.

Dryland degradation and devastating droughts may have caused more visible suffering than all the myriad environmental problems plaguing our planet, but desertification—the process of land degradation in the world's arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid regions—has often been dismissed as an ordinary technical problem capable of technical solutions.

And so, few bothered.

The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the Elaboration of an International Convention to Combat Desertification decided at its ninth session (3-13 September, New York) to hold the first Convention of the Parties in Rome.

Regarding the location of its permanent secretariat, the Committee decided to request the interim secretariat to present a document comparing the offers of Canada, Germany and Spain to host its offices.

But now, says **Samuel Atud Nyambi, Director of UNSO**, the Office to Combat Desertification and Drought of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "there is scientific and political agreement that desertification and drought are problems with global dimensions".

Forced migration is just one of the serious side effects of the spreading deserts, he told the *UN Chronicle*. And statistics back him up.

At least 150 million people around the world will be forced to migrate in the next half century, as drought, over-exploitation and deforestation turn farmland and forests into deserts.

The possibly irreversible decline in the planet's biodiversity may be irreversible.

Despite the name, drylands are anything but barren. They teem with a wide variety of animal and plant life which the world can ill afford to lose.

"Again, this is something that people are just beginning to wake up to", he adds, stressing the irretrievable loss of possible sources of new medicines, genetic material and other products as yet undiscovered.

Because the forces of degeneration are much stronger than those of regeneration, desertification cannot be halted simply by planting a few trees, preventing sand dunes from forming, or providing more efficient wood stoves.

In so many words, prevention is cheaper than regeneration.

The 50 required countries have already ratified the 1994 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa, and the Convention is set to enter into force by the end of the year. Under the Convention, affected developing countries, in particular those in Africa, are called upon to prepare and implement action plans at the national, subregional and regional levels, where desertification needs to be fought first, including National Action Programmes (NAPs) through a participatory process involving affected communities, community-based organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

In developing these programmes, Governments have agreed to engage stakeholders and communities in defining problems and solutions. The NAP process thus provides a prime opportunity for broad-based national participation in identifying root causes of degeneration of drylands, and in the design and implementation of ways to address them.

A Global Mechanism (GM) is foreseen to assist the efforts of the Parties to the Convention to mobilize and improve availability of financial resources to support implementation of actions.

The ninth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Desertification (INC-D) in September brings together some 150 countries, over 100 NGOs and about 20 United Nations and other multilateral agencies to draft recommendations regarding the exact functions and operations of the GM, the criteria for selecting an existing United Nations body to host it, and the issue of where the permanent secretariat will be situated.

Those recommendations will be passed on to the first session of the Conference of Parties, scheduled during the second half of 1996. Regional meetings have already taken place in Africa, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

"I think we have taken a significant step further in agreeing to a Global Mechanism that will promote implementation of the Convention", Mr. Nyambi says. Funding was one of the "missing elements" of earlier efforts, and therefore the creation of the GM is seen as critical to future success.

Perhaps even more important, financing will not just come from traditional sources such as the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions. National desertification funds are being established, for which resources will be mobilized locally, as well as internationally. Other innovative ways of funding are also being looked at, with an emphasis on optimizing the use of existing sources.

Mr. Nyambi says: "We will also look at how we can best use what funding is already there. We will be able to release funds that are badly programmed and give them to those areas that are more productive."

He nevertheless hopes that the donor community, mainly developed countries, can be persuaded that the effects of drought and desertification are indeed as linked to their own future and concerns as the effects of greenhouse gases and climate change. "If left unchecked, the negative effects will be felt worldwide", he concludes. ⌟

WFP Photo

TIME TO TAKE THE BULL BY THE HORNS: Desertification costs the world more than $42 billion each year in lost income.

Healthwatch

TB Fears Revive; New Thrust to Salt Iodization

More people died from tuberculosis in 1995 than in any other year in history, according to a report released by the World Health Organization. Nearly 3 million people died from TB in 1995, surpassing the worst years of the epidemic around 1900, when an estimated 2.1 million people died annually.

WHO warned the world that at current rates, up to a half billion people could become sick with TB in the next 50 years. Increasingly, these people may become sick with often-incurable multidrug-resistant TB.

According to the WHO report, TB has increasingly assailed all segments of society and is now the leading infectious killer of youths and adults. It has become the principal killer of HIV-positive people and kills more women than all causes of maternal mortality combined. Nearly half of the world's refugees may be infected.

TB has returned with a vengeance to affluent countries, as increased air travel and migration have helped transport the disease throughout the world. Multidrug-resistant TB, which has cost New York City hundreds of millions of dollars to fight, has now been reported in London, Milan, Paris, Atlanta, Chicago and cities throughout the developing world. In particular, the number of multidrug-resistant cases in Asia are expected to increase rapidly, unless TB control efforts are strengthened.

WHO endorses a strategy known as directly observed treatment, short-course, or "DOTS", which has proven successful in fighting TB. Countries that follow the Organization's recommended DOTS strategy, such as the United Republic of Tanzania, China and Peru, have discovered that they can double the number of TB patients cured. The strategy can cure nearly 95 per cent of TB patients, using medicines that cost less than $11 in some parts of the world.



The secret to the success of the DOTS strategy is that it places the responsibility for curing TB patients on the health workers—not the patients. The TB epidemic has spread rapidly over the past decades because patients often forget to take their medicines, remain contagious, and continue to infect others in their communities. With the DOTS strategy, health workers watch as patients swallow their medicines and track each one's progress, ensuring that contagious people are cured.

According to WHO, only 10 per cent of the world's TB patients are being treated with the DOTS strategy. If the strategy were used throughout a dozen large countries—such as Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, South Africa and Zaire—nearly three fourths of the world's TB cases could be cured. As of 1995, only a few of these countries had aggressively committed to establishing and expanding TB control based on DOTS. ⌟

Iodine Deficiency Disorders: 1.5 Billion More Use Iodized Salt

Problem: In 1990, about 30 per cent of the world's population, or 1.6 billion people, risked mental and physical disorders because they did not have enough iodine in their diet. Some 750 million people suffered from goitre, an enlargement of the thyroid gland, because they lacked iodine, and about 43 million suffered brain damage due to such a deficiency before birth or during infancy or childhood. Few developing countries had large-scale salt iodization programmes in 1990 and fewer than 20 per cent of people at risk consumed iodized salt, a low-cost way of preventing iodine deficiency disorders (IDD).

Promise: Iodize at least 90 per cent of edible salt by mid-decade and virtually eliminate IDD by the year 2000.

Progress: Of the 87 countries for which information is available, 21 are now iodizing 90 per cent or more of their food-grade salt. Another 14 countries iodize between 75 and 90 per cent. Since 1990, some 1.5 billion people have begun to consume iodized salt for the first time, protecting some 12 million infants yearly from mental retardation. All but eight countries with an IDD problem have or will soon have laws requiring salt iodization.

Prognosis: Many of the remaining 52 countries for which information exists could achieve at least 90 per cent salt iodization by the year 2000. Other countries will need additional support. In all cases, monitoring to ensure adequate iodization continues to be necessary (*see story on opposite page*).

Iodization:

Case Report: Indonesia

By Rap Yip and Pandaya

Nine-year-old Marlita Kusuma of Pembina school in West Java cannot wait to tell her mother that the salt the family now uses is "good". The week before, she had found, to her dismay, that the sample she had brought from home was "not good". It had not turned purple on contact with the solution from a classroom test kit.

Turning purple when a drop of the solution is added means the salt is adequately iodized—at more than 30 parts per million of iodine. If it does not change colour, there's not enough iodine or none at all.

These lessons—that iodized salt is "smart" salt and that a lack of iodine makes you "not smart"—are precisely the messages Marlita's teacher aims to impart, and not only to her third-year class. The class project uses the school system to teach all Indonesians about iodine deficiency disorders (IDD) and the use of iodized salt to avoid them.

When Marlita and her classmates find out that the salt they have brought from home is not "smart", they tell their parents immediately. Marlita's mother had never even heard of iodine. "When she came home from school, I thought something terrible had happened", she recalls of the day her daughter presented her with the unfortunate news about their salt.

The programme in the schools is the most recent effort in Indonesia to eliminate centuries-old IDD—a goal that the country, like others attending the 1990 World Summit for Children, pledged to reach by the year 2000. The programme began in West Java and six other provinces in 1995, and expanded with the training of an additional 100,000 teachers nationwide this year.

Historically, most of the country's interior has been severely iodine-deficient, resulting in high levels of endemic goitre, a visible swelling of the neck from enlargement of the thyroid gland, and cretinism, manifesting in physical deformity and mental retardation. In fact, cretinism prevalence was found to be 15 per cent in some interior hamlets in the 1980s, among the world's highest.

The first national IDD programme, begun in 1974, provided iodized oil injections to people in endemic areas and began to iodize salt. By the early 1990s, when universal salt iodization was adopted as a mid-decade goal, a little more than half of Indonesia's salt was iodized.

Before the schools joined the effort, "the iodization programme focused on the supply side, supporting and monitoring the progress of the salt industry", says Virginia Kadarsan, UNICEF Nutrition Project Officer in Jakarta.

But there were problems with this approach. Indonesia has about 300 iodized salt producers, but the iodine content of much of their output is inadequate. And controlling distribution is no easy task in a broad archipelago where "folk salt", made by 30,000 salt farmers in coastal areas, shows up in the market.

Early in 1995, a national survey of iodized salt consumption in 220,000 households showed that half of them were using adequately iodized salt, 28 per cent inadequately iodized salt, and the rest non-iodized salt. Clearly, if the level of consumption were to be raised, a strategy had to be devised to create awareness of IDD and encourage people to insist on using the right salt.

"The teaching and testing of iodized salt in school in order to reach into the homes added a new dimension—the creation of demand", says Ms. Kadarsan. The new approach began when UNICEF brought the country's iodine deficiency problem to the attention of the Indonesian Teachers' Association.

According to studies in Indonesia and elsewhere, the intelligence quotient of children in iodine-deficient areas is an average 10 points below that of children in other areas. This means a five- to sixfold increase in the number of children with severe mental retardation, and a five- to sixfold decrease in the number of very clever or gifted children.

Significant iodine deficiency in Indonesian children is obvious from the swollen neck of goitre, which occurs in as many as 28 per cent of schoolchildren. Last year, nearly 8 in 10 students in a West Sumatra elementary school were found to have goitre.

Galvanized into action, the 1.4 million-member Teachers' Association added iodine deficiency training to its annual teacher upgrade course in 1995. The programme was thus launched, its costs initially underwritten by UNICEF and assumed by the Government of Indonesia in 1996.

Students and their parents are expected to tell their neighbours about "smart" salt and lend them the school test kit. "A test kit is enough for 100 teaspoons of kitchen salt. Imagine how many people will benefit if each kit is used by just 50 households", says Martha Mijardi of the Teachers' Association task force in charge of the programme.

Indeed, the potential for outreach is great in a country where more than 95 per cent of children attend primary school. Through them, the message of iodized salt can reach almost every household in almost every community, including those hard to reach by traditional media.

Students like Marlita know the stakes are high, and each time they do the iodine test, they, too, eagerly anticipate the results. When the salt changes colour, everyone cheers. ⌟

Quote — UNquote: Thoughts, Expressions, Ideas

In spite of it all, I enjoy being here. The Afghans are remarkable people. Whatever strength and initiative we may have is drawn from the fact that every day we witness their extraordinary capacity to survive, to do business, to provide for their families, to continue life among the ruins. You give them a little and they make the absolute most of it.

—Terry Pitzner, UNHCR Officer-in-Charge, Kabul, Afghanistan

Women constitute over 70 per cent of the one third of the world's population living in absolute poverty. Their impoverishment has been exacerbated in large part by the transformations taking place in the world through trade liberalization, rapid technological changes, industrialization, structural adjustment programmes and environmental degradation. In recognition of the importance of correcting this trend, it is critical that the United Nations place emphasis on the role of women's economic empowerment in strategies for poverty eradication. UNIFEM defines economic empowerment as having access to and control over the means to make a living on a sustainable and long-term basis, and receiving the material benefits of this access and control.

—Report of the UNDP Administrator, 17 July 1996 *(DP/1996/33)*

What I am saying is not a matter of instructions or lectures (God forbid): the world has changed, the laws of the coexistence of States and peoples have changed. Instability in one region is an alarm signal for the whole world. The example of the former Yugoslavia is instructive in this respect. Peoples are beginning to live in the conditions of a different, new world order. The ending of the cold war without bloodshed and loss of life changed the conception of wars, and of who wins them. At the present juncture military "successes" won at the cost of blood and the expulsion of people from their native land are to be equated with the defeat, the violation of universal human moral principles. No one can draw any other portrait of a "victor", no one can impose any other image.

—Statement by President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia, 11 August 1996 *(S/1996/645)*

Any viable and sustainable institution dealing with such a complex issue as development must promote a corporate culture of critical thinking, of having an intellectually open climate, of being able to critically look at its own programmes, dogmas and corporate gospels. It is as important in the international development arena as it is for UNICEF internally to constantly question theories and practices, and here ICDC has a key role striking the right balance between intellectual freedom and organizational relevance.

—Representative of Sweden at the 1995 Advisory Committee meeting of UNICEF's International Child Development Centre (ICDC) *(E/ICEF/1996/20)*

We do not belittle the problems that face the United Nations in managing effective operations, recovering from the disappointments of Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda and inducing its members to decide on clear policy. But the bottom line is equally plain. Continuing the organization we founded in 1945 is an important part of the architecture for an effective American foreign policy. The United Nations has served America's security interests, when the United States had a clear and firm position on what was a desirable course of action, and has served common interests of the world community. The United States often will act alone or through other alliances. Our status as a super-Power gives us options that other nations lack. But international institutions have a purpose. Framing common norms, providing a ready place for consultations, enhancing the legitimacy of super-Power action, and gaining the compliance of other nations through Security Council decisions are among the United Nations' invaluable functions—and are crucial to United States interests. Not every decision taken in the United Nations framework will be to our liking. But overall, we gain far more than we lose. Our friends and allies would take our rejection of the United Nations—the institutional structure we chose to create after World War II—as a radical retreat by the United States from international engagement and responsibility.

—Statement of the independent Task Force on the United Nations; News Release by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 19 August 1996

The Security Council must recognize the limits of what can realistically be achieved by the peace-keeping forces available in a given situation. It should not pass resolutions that are declaratory and cannot be implemented on the ground. The criteria established by the Security Council on 4 May 1994 provide a useful framework for

decisions on new peace-keeping missions. To ensure that the Security Council is fully aware of military practicalities, we would welcome more regular briefings of the Council in informal consultations by the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General and by force commanders where appropriate. The Military Adviser should be able to draw on military expertise from leading troop-contributing nations where necessary. In parallel, United Nations military and civilian officials should continue to brief the Council and potential troop-contributing nations on the military aspects and implications of Council decisions before the adoption of new mandates and when major change is in prospect. Effective arrangements for consulting troop-contributing nations on the mandates of peace-keeping operations is vital, and we welcome recent improvements. Council members, troop-contributing nations and the Secretariat must work together to make these a success. Changes in mandate during the mission need thorough reassessment, taking account of military advice as to the implications on the ground for both military and civil components and need full discussion with troop-contributing nations, as well as the Council.

—Statement by the United Kingdom on the *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (A/51/273)*

Suppose, for example, that the world's leaders, appreciating both the seriousness and the interconnectedness of our global condition, agreed to equip the world Organization with the capacities to respond to the pressures that are threatening the viability of Member States. Suppose that they had the foresight to make the Security Council more representative. Suppose they were also willing to enhance both the measures for preventing conflict and for resolving conflict, and to have better peace-keeping and peace-enforcement mechanisms, and ready-to-go United Nations forces. Suppose the ECOSOC was replaced by a really authoritative permanent body (on the lines of the Security Council) that encouraged global economic cooperation on the most pressing issues of trade, technology, aid and sustainable development; and suppose that there was another body, or bodies, to oversee international efforts to promote improvements in the social institutions of States, in human rights, and on gender issues. Suppose, finally, that these newer structures were run efficiently and adequately funded—perhaps by innovative forms of financing. Is it not possible, and in many respects likely, that these reforms would make a difference? Can't we try?

—Paul Kennedy, writing in *The New York Review of Books*, 19 September 1996

In the General Assembly, there is a desperate need for another chamber, the Chamber of the United Peoples, to complement the Chamber of the United Nations; this is a democratic measure that will make the United Nations everybody's concern, and also to some extent counter the absurdity of every Member State having one representative, whether the population be about 5 million or a thousand million as in China. As for the question of funding, there is everything to say for some effective method whereby the United Nations is funded indirectly, so that among other things no particular State is identified as chief provider. That should discourage those who want to hear their own particular tunes because they have paid the piper most. Perhaps these changes will come one day. Or is this a pipe-dream?

—*Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 4 September 1996

The United Nations is leading efforts to reverse "Africa fatigue". But we cannot do everything. President Mandela's immense moral stature has done much for Africa's image. Africa now needs an international environment favourable to its development. First, the world can, and must, lift the millstone of debt from around the neck of Africa. Second, there must be much greater private sector interaction with Africa. Third, Africa must be given the means, the technology and the finance to pursue its own development priorities.

—Secretary-General's statement at a dinner hosted by the Business Council for the United Nations, 10 September 1996

The first requirement is for the five Nuclear-Weapon States to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement. This commitment should be made at the highest political level. Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should support the commitment by the Nuclear-Weapon States and join in cooperative international action to implement it. This commitment would change instantly the tenor of debate, the thrust of war planning, and the timing or indeed the necessity for modernisation programmes. It would transform the nuclear-weapons paradigm from the indefinite management of a world fraught with the twin risks of the use of nuclear weapons and further proliferation, to one of nuclear-weapons elimination. Negotiation of the commitment should begin immediately, with the aim of first steps in its implementation being taken in 1997.

—Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August 1996

Membership of Principal United Nations Organs in 1997

General Assembly

The General Assembly is composed of all 185 United Nations Member States.

Security Council

The Security Council has 15 members. The United Nations Charter designates five States as permanent members, and the General Assembly elects 10 other members for two-year terms. The term of office for each non-permanent member of the Council ends on 31 December of the year indicated in parentheses next to its name.

The five permanent members of the Security Council are China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The 10 non-permanent members of the Council in 1997 are: Chile (1997), Costa Rica (1998), Egypt (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1997), Japan (1998), Kenya (1998), Poland (1997), Portugal (1998), Republic of Korea (1997), and Sweden (1998).

Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council has 54 members, elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly. The term of office for each member expires on 31 December of the year indicated in parentheses next to its name. In 1997, the Council is composed of the following 54 States:

Argentina (1998); Australia (1997); Bangladesh (1998); Belarus (1997); Brazil (1997); Canada (1998); Cape Verde (1999); Central African Republic (1998); Chile (1999); China (1998); Colombia (1997); Congo (1997); Côte d'Ivoire (1997); Cuba (1999); Czech Republic (1998); Djibouti (1999); El Salvador (1999); Finland (1998); France (1999); Gabon (1998); Gambia (1999); Germany (1999); Guyana (1998); Iceland (1999); India (1997); Jamaica (1997); Japan (1999); Jordan (1998); Latvia (1999); Lebanon (1998); Luxembourg (1997); Malaysia (1997); Mexico (1999); Mozambique (1999); Netherlands (1997); Nicaragua (1998); Philippines (1997); Poland (1997); Republic of Korea (1999); Romania (1998); Russian Federation (1998); South Africa (1997); Spain (1999); Sri Lanka (1999); Sudan (1997); Sweden (1998); Thailand (1997); Togo (1998); Tunisia (1998); Turkey (1999); Uganda (1997); United Kingdom (1998); United States (1997); Zambia (1999).

Trusteeship Council

The Trusteeship Council has five members: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. With the independence of Palau, the last remaining United Nations trust territory, the Council formerly suspended operation on 1 November 1994. By a resolution adopted on that day, the Council amended its rules of procedure to drop the obligation to meet annually and agreed to meet as occasion required—by its decision or the decision of its President, or at the request of a majority of its members, or the General Assembly, or the Security Council.

International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice has 15 members, elected by both the General Assembly and the Security Council. Judges hold nine-year terms, which end on 5 February of the year indicated in parentheses next to their names.

As of 6 February 1997, the composition of the Court will be: Mohammed Bedjaoui (Algeria) (2006), Carl-August Fleischhauer (Germany) (2003), Gilbert Guillaume (France) (2000), Géza Herczegh (Hungary) (2003), Rosalyn Higgins (United Kingdom) (2000), Shi Jiuyong (China) (2003), Pieter H. Kooijmans (Netherlands) (2006), Abdul G. Koroma (Sierra Leone) (2003), Shigeru Oda (Japan) (2003), Gonzálo Parra-Aranguren (Venezuela) (2000), Raymond Ranjeva (Madagascar) (2000), Jose Francisco Rezek (Brazil) (2006), Stephen M. Schwebel (the United States) (2006), Christopher G. Weeramantry (Sri Lanka) (2000) and Vladlen S. Vereshchetin (the Russian Federation) (2006).

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Evanescent Images

United Nations photographer Evan Schneider captures images of children around the globe, many of whom come from societies that have been scarred by strife.
In our next issue, the *Chronicle* will look at the story of children caught in conflict and war.

Evan P. Schneider has been a staff photographer with the United Nations since 1994, carrying out various assignments at Headquarters and in the field. He has also worked extensively as a freelance photographer for many well-known magazines. His photographs have been a part of many exhibits, including the permanent collection of the Fogg Art Museum at Harvard University. He has received several awards.

The Seven Secretaries-General